Sovereignty, self-determination, and the catalyst for change in the political status of East Timor by Webb, Virginia
SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND THE 
CATALYST FOR CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL STATUS 
OF EAST TIMOR 
A thesis submitted to Victoria University of Wellington 
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of Master of Arts in Politics 
by Virginia Webb 
Victoria University of Wellington 
1995 
Abstract 
Starting with the premise that a change in the political status of East Timor is inevitable, and 
imminent, this dissertation evaluates the potential catalysts for this change. Indonesia invaded East 
Timor following the initiation of a decolonisation process by the administering power, Portugal. In the 
twenty - odd years since the invasion, the decolonisation era has come to a close, which has led to 
reformulation of the principle of self-determination. This principle is crucial to an understanding of the 
Timor conflict and this dissertation establishes that there is still a firm basis in international law for 
application of the principle of self- determination to East Timor. Indonesia' s role in the conflict is 
examined, as are internal political changes in Indonesia. It is the political dynamics of the Indonesian 
state which will, it is argued, open a window of opportunity for the establishment of an independent 
East Timor. The responses of members of the international community, especially Australia and New 
Zealand, to the conflict are examined and this dissertation concludes that their realist approach to 
regional relations precludes them from agitating for change in the political status of East Timor. 
Sources include government documents, non-governmental organisation publications, Church 
publications, personal interviews, public lectures, audio and video recordings and secondary sources. 
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Glossary 
ABRI 
APODETI 
A SEAN 
EC 
FALINTIL 
FRELIMO 
FRETILIN 
ICJ 
IGGI 
KOSTRAD 
MP 
NAM 
NZ 
PGET 
PKI 
UDT 
UK 
UN 
UNCLOS 
UNGA 
us 
Note 
Indonesian Armed Forces 
Associacao Popular Democratica, Timorese Popular Democratic 
Association 
Association of South East Asian Nations 
European Community 
Forcas Armadas de Libertacao Nacional de Timor-Leste, Armed Forces for 
East Timor's National Liberation 
Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Mozambique 
Frente Revolucionara do Timor Leste lndependente, Revolutionary 
Front for an Independent East Timor 
International Court of Justice 
Inter - Governmental Group on Indonesia 
Strategic Reserve Command of the Indonesian Military 
Member of Parliament 
Non-Aligned Movement 
New Zealand 
Provisional Government of East Timor 
Indonesian Communist Party 
Uniao Democratica Timorense, Timorese Democratic Union 
United Kingdom 
United Nations 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
United Nations General Assembly 
United States of America 
The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs became the Ministry of External Relations and Trade 
in December, 1988, then changed its name to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in June, 
1993. Throughout this dissertation, it will be referred to as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
8 
Introduction 
East Timor occupies half of the island of Timor, one of some 13,500 islands in the Indonesian 
archipelago, which is the world's largest. Portugal established a colonial administration there in 
1702, and fought with the Dutch for control of the island for the next 300 years. East Timor was 
formally divided from West Timor, and the rest of the Dutch East Indies, as recently as 19131. 
Decolonisation was implemented by the Portuguese in 1974 and in the political turmoil which 
followed, an East Timorese political party, FRETILIN, declared an independent East Timor. The 
new state was short lived, however. Indonesian troops invaded in December, 1975, and the 
following July, East Timor was formally incorporated into the Indonesian Republic. The 
Portuguese administration had evacuated during Indonesia's armed intervention and East Timor 
entered a period of political limbo - the Indonesian annexation remained unrecognised either by the 
United Nations or most of its member states; Portugal's responsibility to implement an act of 
self-determination in East Timor remains undischarged. 
East Timor is a small territory, about 19 000 square kilometres2, with a population of 800 000. 
This is only a fraction of the 175 million people who make Indonesia the most densely populated 
country in the world. Currently, nineteen percent of East Timor's population are Indonesians who 
have migrated there from other parts of the archipelago3. Indigenous East Timorese resistance to 
the Indonesianisation4 of their land has been persistent. Armed resistance has been waged by 
FRETILIN guerillas since the Indonesian invasion and shows no sign of declining. Despite these 
indications of dissatisfaction with Indonesian rule, and rejection of it by the United Nations, the 
international community has taken no concerted action to bring about self-determination for the 
East Timorese. 
Although small in size, East Timor was the third largest non-self-governing territory listed by the 
United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisations. East Timor is larger than, or comparable 
I John Taylor, 1994 "A Brief History of East Timor" New Internationalist, March, p. 10 
2 Keith Suter, 1979 West Irian, East Timor and Indonesia , Minority Rights Group Report No. 42, 
London, p. l9. 
3 Carmel Budiardjo, 1994b "A Colonised Nation" New Internationalist, March, p.18. 
4 'lndonesianisation' is defined by Gietzelt as an acculturation process aimed at incorporating ethnic 
minorities into the Indonesian nation-state through the education system, the media, economic 
development and transmigration. The process is predicated on the assumption that inculcation of the 
Indonesian world view will strengthen national unity - Dale Gietzelt, 1989 "The Indonesianisation of 
West Papua", Oceania, Vol. 59, No.3, p.201. 
5 Only Namibia and Zimbabwe were larger - Suter 1979, p.l9. 
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in size and population to several United Nations Member States6. This negates the argument put 
forward by former Australian Prime Minister Gough Whittam, among others, that it is too small 
to be politically viable as an independent state?. Indonesia has effectively ruled East Timor for 
almost 20 years but the principle of self-determination is still applicable in its anti-colonial form; 
the right of the East Timorese to choose the political form of their state has not been 
extinguished. Self-determination was accepted by all parties (Portugal, Indonesia, the United 
Nations and the East Timorese political parties) as being the principle at stake in East Timor at 
the time of Indonesian military intervention, and by other state governments. All have sought to 
justify their positions using this principle, although disagreeing about the extent to which it has 
been implemented, and how it has, or should have been expressed. 
During the period of Indonesian rule of East Timor, the era of decolonisation has given way to a 
post-colonial era. The principle of self-determination which informed decolonisation is being 
reformulated to mean something quite different from the right of a people to choose the sovereign 
status of the state in which they live. Self-determination has become divorced from the idea of 
sovereignty, an explosive combination which potentially threatens the territorial integrity of many 
members of the international community. Application of the principle has been sharply curtailed8. 
Another important change which has occurred during the period of Indonesian rule was he decline 
of the Cold War. The organising framework of the international community, an East- West 
dichotomy, has been removed. As a result, nationalist conflicts and internal legitimation crises, 
such as the East Timor conflict, have become more visible. 
Although governments have been willing to voice support for the principle of self-determination 
in East Timor, in practice they have done little to ensure its implementation. Cold War anxieties, 
such as the fear of a communist state within the Indonesian archipelago, made the political price to 
be paid for supporting the principle, and opposing Indonesia, seem too high. As regional security 
concerns make room for economic interests, a challenge to the status quo (which support for East 
Timor's self-determination would be) seems a dangerous gamble. This is particularly true for 
Australia which has reached an accommodation with its large northern neighbour. Nevertheless, 
self-determination for East Timor is still a political issue, however much this is denied. This 
dissertation examines how support for the principle of self-determination has been reconciled with 
6 For example, Kuwait and members of the Association of Small Island States. 
7 Sue Nichterlein, 1982 "Australia: Courtier or Courtesan? The Timor Issue Revisited", Australian 
Outlook, Vol. 36, No. 1, p.46. 
8 New Zealand's Minister for Treaty Negotiations, Doug Graham, considers self-determination to refer to 
the preservation of customs, traditions and language; the right of minorities to be consulted on matters 
of concern to them; and to manage their own affairs. He rejects the idea that self-determination involves 
a division of the state or of state sovereignty - Interview with Mike Hosking, Morning Report, Radio 
New Zealand, May 5, 1995. 
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the response of the international community to conflict in East Timor, and asks how it might 
influence that response in the future . 
Important to this dissertation is the premiss that change in the political status of East Timor is 
inevitable, and imminent. The dynamics of the guerilla conflict being waged by the East Timorese 
resistance make Indonesia's position untenable. Taber identifies the prerequisites of a successful 
armed resistance as follows: 
1. An unstable political situation, marked by sharp social divisions; 
2. A political objective, based on firm moral and ideological grounds, that can be 
understood and accepted by the majority as the overriding 'cause' of the insurgency, 
desirable in itself and worthy of any sacrifice; 
3. An oppressive government with which no political compromise is possible; 
4. Some form of revolutionary political organisation, capable of providing dedicated 
and consistent leadership towards the accepted goal; 
5. The clear possibility, or even probability, of success.9 
As this dissertation will show, these are all clearly identifiable characteristics of the conflict in 
East Timor, which suggests that Indonesia does not have the capacity to successfully integrate 
East Timor into the Republic of Indonesia. 
Chapter One reviews the development of the principle of self-determination in international Jaw 
and practice. The problems which the principle poses for governments in the post-colonial era are 
discussed and the case for self-determination in East Timor is established. This dissertation argues 
that there is a firm legal basis for the rejection of Indonesian rule in East Timor. Because Portugal 
has never satisfactorily discharged its responsibility for East Timor, it is still considered a non-
self-governing territory. As such, the Timorese must be allowed to freely determine the sovereign 
status of their state in accordance with the practice of decolonisation. Neither the unilateral 
declaration of independence by FRETILIN nor the 'referendum' held by the Indonesian-backed 
Provisional Government of East Timor can be considered legitimate acts of self-determination. 
Chapter Two examines why, given its outspoken support for self-determination and its own 
revolutionary anti-colonial origins, Indonesia annexed East Timor, having gained control of the 
territory by way of an act of aggression. Indonesia's perspective on the conflict differs somewhat 
from that of the United Nations. It is, however, still a member of the UN and has dealt with the 
9 Taber, Robert, 1969, The War of the Flea: Guerilla Warfare in Theory and Practice, Paladin, St. Albans, 
p. 31. 
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Timor issue in that forum. Indonesia justifies its rule in East Timor using the framework for self-
determination advocated by the UN. When considering Indonesian involvement in the Timor 
conflict, it is clear the sovereignty and self-determination play a crucial role in the discourse and 
actions of the Indonesian state. This chapter also looks at the incapacity of the Indonesia state to 
deal with political dissent and armed resistance, such as that waged by the East Timorese, and the 
internal political dynamics of the Indonesian state. 
Chapter Three considers a case before the International Court of Justice in which Portugal alleged 
that Australia ignored its rights as administering power of East Timor when it concluded the 
Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty with Indonesia. Indonesia was not a defendant in this case, 
and refused to recognise the jurisdiction of the Court. Because of this, the Court declined to give a 
ruling but the case raised important legal questions. Particularly, whether Australia was in breach 
of an obligation not to recognise Indonesian rule in East Timor, pending an international 
determination of East Timor's disputed sovereignty. Australia' s response to the Timor conflict 
generally is also discussed. Relations between Australia and Indonesia are complex and interaction 
over East Timor reveals these complexities, and the realist approach taken by Australia to regional 
affairs. The Australian response has been the most extreme of the states considered in this 
dissertation. 
Chapter Four examines New Zealand's response to the Timor conflict. New Zealand does not have 
the geographical proximity to Indonesia that Australia has and consequently has a less complex 
bilateral relationship. New Zealand's response has been shaped by factors such as economic and 
security interests, regional perspectives and involvement in the Western Alliance. New Zealand's 
response is, in many ways, typical in that it is informed by power politics. Documents made c 
available by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate that New Zealand' s primary concern has not 
been with the legal and moral aspects of the Timor conflict, but with the implications it has for .., 
regional stability and bilateral relations. When commenting about the impact of Indonesian rule in 
East Timor, third parties such as New Zealand and Australia do not discuss these aspects and 
instead express concern about human rights violations by Indonesia' s armed forces. 
The common pattern in the response of Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand is support for the 
principle of self-determination in the abstract, but tacit acceptance of Indonesian rule in practice. 
The final chapter traces this same pattern in the response of the United States and other 
governments. This chapter also looks at changes in Indonesia' s political landscape, and at changes 
which are imminent, such as the end of Suharto's presidency. The chapter concludes by suggesting 
that internal political crises in Indonesia will provide a catalyst for a change in the political status ., 
of East Timor, arguing that Indonesia will find it increasingly difficult to sustain its position there 
in the face of widespread resistance and persistent armed conflict. 
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Chapter 1 
Self-determination for East Timor 
Crucial to an understanding of the conflict in East Timor is the principle of self-determination. A 
comparatively recent development in international politics, self-determination has become a major 
force in modem political history. The principle is problematic however, particularly in its 
application to East Timor. East Timor is considered a non-self governing territory by the United 
Nations and is therefore entitled to independence in accordance with international law and the 
practice of decolonisation, but the reality of Indonesian rule in East Timor cannot be ignored. 
Because Indonesia views East Timor as an integral part of the state, it does not accept the need for 
a formal act of decolonisation to take place. Thus any debate on the future of East Timor in which 
Indonesia takes part is outside of the discourse on decolonisation. Removed from the context of 
decolonisation, the principle of self-determination becomes ill-defined and of uncertain application. 
To a large extent, the confusion surrounding the definition and application of self-determination is 
a result of confusion surrounding the definition and extent of its correlative, sovereignty; 
particularly as to whether sovereignty is of enduring application, so far as determination of 
international states by self-defining groups is concerned. The word 'sovereignty' has different 
meanings in different contexts and its use, therefore, is often confusing 1. In the case of East Timor 
and the call for self-determination, sovereignty can be understood as meaning independence from all 
other states and recognition as a sovereign state in international law. Hinsley notes that the 
existence of sovereign authority in the separate community is the essential qualification for 
membership of the international community and that the principle that there is no authority over 
and above the state is widely accepted2. In East Timor, self-determination has come to mean the 
establishment of a sovereign state3. Taylor argues reluctance to accept self-determination in 
another form, such as autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia, has become a psychological 
barrier to reaching a settlement4. 
I Falk and Camilleri note that current definitions of sovereignty are rigid and defirung compared to past 
political arrangements which were characterised by subtle and fluid relations between rulers and ruled. 
The hegemony of Rome of Egypt bears little resemblance to the 'separate but equal' implication of 
modern sovereignty- Jim Falk & Joseph A. Camilleri, 1992 The End of Sovereignty?: The Politics of a 
Shrinking and Fragmenting World, Edward Elgar, ALdershot, England, p. 12. 
2 F.H. Hinsley, 1986 Sovereignty (2nd ed), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.215. 
3 Peter J. Taylor, 1989 Political Geography: World Economy, Nation State and Locality, Longman, New 
York, p. 190. 
4 ibid. 
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The concept of self-determination originates with two strands of philosophical thought: that all 
people have equal political rights , and that state power is legitimised by popular sovereignty5 . 
Early expressions of the principle can be found in the Declaration on the Rights of Man and the 
American Declaration of Independence which affirm that governments derive their authority from 
the people they govern. This link between self-determination and popular sovereignty was 
preserved in the decolonisation era, and formalised in United Nations resolutions. However in the 
post decolonisation era the meaning of self-determination has been reformulated and links between 
the principle of self-determination and state sovereignty tested. 
Defining the "self' 
Under international law, territories whose inhabitants have not yet attained self-government are 
most often identified as the units able to claim the right to self-determination6. Accordingly, self-
determination can be defined as the right of people living in a territory to determine the political 
and legal status of that territory - for example by establishing a state of their own or by choosing 
to become a part of another state?. This approach to defining who is entitled to claim the right of 
self-determination is supported by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV)8 
which presumes that a non-self-governing territory subject to the provisions of Article 73 of the 
United Nations Charter is any territory "which is geographically separate and is distinct ethnically 
and/or culturally from the country administering it"9. Resolution 1541 (XV) is applicable in the 
5 C.E. Merriam Jr. , 1968 History of the Theory of Sovereignty Since Rousseau, AMS Press, New York, 
p. l22. 
6 Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 1977 The Principle of Self-determination in International Law, Nellen Publishing 
Co. Inc, New York, p.44 
7 Michael Akehurst, 1987 A Modern Introduction to International Law, Allen and Unwin, London, 
p.290. 
8 The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 
9 Objective characteristics such as language, religion, history, location and ethnicity provide some 
evidence of distinctiveness but a subjective perception of this is also important. In East Timor the 
perception of distinctiveness has become increasingly acute in the years since the annexation of East 
Timor by Indonesia. Expression of this can be found in the spread of the Tetun language, its use in daily 
life as well as in songs, drama, and literature; and in increasing membership of the Catholic Church. Hull 
estimates 13% of a population of 450 000 were Catholic in 1952. This had increased substantially to 
30% of a population of 659 000 in 1974, and by 1994 to 80% of the current population. The Church 
identifies itself as the only institution within East Timor able to voice the aspirations of the Timorese 
people to obtain a peaceful resolution to the conflict. It offers a cultural and physical space beyond the 
normal reach of the Indonesian authorities. The Catholic Church has strongly identifi ed with the East 
Timorese and has frequently spoken out on their behalf. Increased membership of the Church therefore 
has a political aspect and many public protests against Indonesian rule have been associated with 
religious events - Ramos-Horta, 1987, p.205; Dr Geoffrey Hull, 1992 East Timor: Just a Political 
Question ?, Occasional Paper #11, Australian Catholic Social Justice Council, Sydney; New 
Internationalist, March 1994, p. l8; Jack de Groot, 1993, introduction to The Church and East Timor, 
The Catholic Commission for Justice, Development and Peace, Melbourne. 
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case of East Timor which is a clearly defined territory and is both geographically separate and 
ethnically and culturally distinct from its administering power, Portugal. It is also geographically 
separate from Indonesia, in spite of a shared border, and is certainly ethnically and culturally 
different. 
Explicit in Article 73 of the UN Charter is the important consideration of accountability of 
colonising powers to the international community, as represented in the United Nations, for the 
discharge of their responsibilities to implement acts of decolonisation . Once an act of 
decolonisation has occurred to the satisfaction of the UN, the issue is effectively resolved and 
cannot be revisited. 
Resolution 1514 (XV), and the Declaration on Principles of International LawlO (Resolution 
2625(XXV)) were adopted At the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations in December, 
1960, the latter by a unanimous vote. These were landmark resolutions in that they supported self-
determination for all peoples but being firmly linked to decolonisation, they also stress 
preservation of territorial integrity (all UN member states being vulnerable to claims from ethnic 
or indigenous minorities). 
The provisions of these two Resolutions which establish both the illegality of Indonesian 
occupation and the continuing responsibility of Portugal, are: 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right 
freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every state has 
the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the 
Charter. UNGA Res 2625 (XXV); unanimous. II 
The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation 
constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter 
of the United nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace 
and cooperation. UNGA Res 1514 (XV); 89:0:9. 
All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development. UNGA Res 1514 (XV); 89:0:9 
Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should 
never serve as a pretext for delaying independence. UNGA Res 1514 (XV); 
89:0:9. 
10 The full title of this Resolution is 'The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations' . 
11 This resolution was first adopted in 1960 as UNGA Res. 1541 (XV) and was later inserted into the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law, UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV). 
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All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against 
dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully 
and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their 
national territory shall be respected. UNGA Res 1514 (XV); 89:0:9. 
The final paragraph of Resolution 1514 (XV) relates the right of self-determination to human 
rights and to the question of sovereignty. It states: 
All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter 
of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal 
affairs of all States and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and 
their territorial integrity. 
These paragraphs identify self-determination with independence, but in fact the United Nations 
accepts other forms of self-determination as legitimate provided they are legitimate and not 
enforced outcomes of spurious acts of self-determination. Resolution 1541 (XV) provides for a 
choice between independence, integration with another independent state, and free association with 
an independent state. 
Changing application of the principle 
The development of the principle of self-determination in international law has been a gradual 
process and is marked by changes in its interpretation and application which correspond to changes 
in the international community12. Although the idea of self-determination can be traced to the 
American Revolution, it emerged as a political principle at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference 
following World War I where it was promoted by American President Woodrow Wilson. Wilson 
identified national identities based on territory, language, culture and shared history as the criteria 
for claims to self-determination 13 but was imprecise and inconsistent in his use of the term 'self-
determination•14. The 'self to which the principle applied was unclear and delegations to the 
conference critical of the concept interpreted it in its most extreme form to mean self-determination 
for all ethnic groups however small. Another US delegate to the Paris conference, Secretary of 
State Robert Lansing, considered the phrase 'self-determination' to be "loaded with dynamite. It 
will raise hopes which can never be realised"15. 
12 Discussion on the principle of self-determination in the United Nations General Assembly was 
provoked by the Lichtenstein Proposal on Self-Determination. A summary of the discussion, prepared 
by the Chair, is contained in the Appendix. 
13 Dov Ronen, 1979 The Quest for Self-determination, Yale University Press, New Haven, p.1 0. 
14 Halperin et al, 1992, p.16. 
15 cited in Halperin et al , 1992, p.17. 
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The principle of self-determination was indeed explosive, having the potential to legitimise any 
struggle against oppression and therefore posed a challenge to existing states. Following the 
Second World War, application of the principle was sharply curtailed and carne to refer to the right 
of colonies to independence or voluntary integration with another state. Heraclides points out that 
in practice this means independence from Western colonial rule and was not applied to non-
Western empires16. The principle was also not applicable in cases such as Indonesia which, prior 
to Dutch colonial rule had itself been an empire encompassing vast territory and several peoples. 
The Dutch East Indies was entitled to self-determination but not the composite parts of the 
archipelagic colony 17. On the whole, the colonial state was determined to be the entity entitled to 
self-determination, not pre-colonial nations, regardless of how coherent they may have been before 
coming under Western dominance. Such parameters are not necessarily accepted by groups 
claiming the right to self-determination, however. In addition to a horizontal sense of unity among 
the group, Falk and Camilleri point out that groups also have a vertical sense of community 
through time - a shared history 18. Thus, Indonesia' s first president, Sukarno, could speak of 
hundreds of years of oppression endured under Dutch colonial rule although Indonesia itself had 
been created only recently. 
The League of Nations had effectively restricted the application of the principle of self-
determination to European states. A system of Mandates and Trust Territories was endorsed to deal 
with the colonial possessions of the defeated European powers; the time frame for their self-
determination was unspecified. As the European powers began to decolonise, the United Nations 
transformed the principle of self-determination into an anti-colonial weapon. 
Decolonisation and the aftermath of World War Two 
Under the auspices of the United Nations, which obliges its members to respect the "sovereign 
equality" of all states 19, the principle of self determination legitimised anti-colonial struggle and 
saw many former colonies become full-fledged members of the international organisation. In the 
decolonisation process the concept of popular sovereignty remained intact, although self-
16 Alexis Heraclides, 1991 The Self-determination of Minorities in International Politics, Frank Cass, 
London, p.22. 
17 Post-colonial Indonesia initially comprised sixteen component states which were guaranteed 
internal and, should they seek it, external self-determination. Regional unrest led to the consolidation 
of the state into a unitary republic - Gavan Breen, 1993 Let Them Be: West Papua Revisited, Australia 
West Papua Association, Melbourne, p.3. 
18 Falk & Camilleri, 1992, p.55. 
19 Werner Levi, 1976 Law and Politics in the International Society, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 
p.42 . 
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deterntination was applied to territories (following colonially established borders) rather than 
nationalities (ethnic or linguistic groupings). 
Application of the self-deterntination principle in the era of decolonisation was relatively simple. 
The colonial powers themselves had, in defining their colonial empires, deterntined the basis on 
which self-determination would be applied. Independence was granted or ceded on the basis of the 
geographical boundaries of former colonies, disregarding any divisions these drew across ethnic, 
linguistic or religious lines - the 'natural' political entities existing within or across colonies. 
Chapters XI and XII of the United Nations Charter refer to decolonisation and both emphasise 
territory rather than ethnicity as the basis for decolonisation - a deliberate effort to curtail the 
applicability of the principle. Neither refers explicitly to self-determination but establish the 
principle indirectly by requiring administering powers to bring their territories to the point of 
independence. The 'self was limited by treating each colony as a whole political entity not to be 
divided any further, so far as that was possible. 
Self-determination at the United Nations 
Self-determination is specifically mentioned in only two articles of the United Nations Charter: 
Article 1 where it invokes "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples", and in 
Article 55 which calls for respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination for all 
peoples. 
Although the United Nations Charter does not mention the 'right' of self-determination, subsequent ~ 
resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as Covenants 
awaiting ratification by member states, have effectively revised the provisions of the Charter by 
authoritatively interpreting it to allow for the recognition of the right of self-determination20. 
Whether the right of self-determination has the force of law can be challenged. The United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) has no law making capacity so Declarations and Resolutions of the 
UNGA are not legal instruments per se, but they do establish international principles and norms 
which are considered binding21. 
Advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice have further contributed legal weight to 
the principle of self -determination. In 1971 the Court delivered an advisory opinion concerning 
Namibia in which it recognised the principle of self-deterntination as international law and 
enshrined in the UN Charter. The Court also recognised its subsequent development in the 
20 Wilson, 1988 International Law and the Use of Force by International Liberation Movements, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.68; Akehurst 1987, p.294. 
21 W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 1977, p.39. 
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Declaration on the Granting oflndependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Resolution 1514 
(XV)22. In a 1975 advisory opinion on Western Sahara, a Judge Petren of the Court wrote that: 
[A] veritable law of decolonisation is in the course of taking shape. It derives 
essentially from the principle of self-determination of peoples proclaimed in 
the Charter of the United Nations and confirmed by a large number of 
resolutions in the General Assembly.23 
Although advisory opinions are not binding interpretations, they are authoritative explications of 
the content of international law. Further evidence of the development of the right of self-
determination can be found in the International Covenants on Human Rights. Common Article 1 
of these Covenants states that: 
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development.24 
Although the Covenants have not been widely ratified by member states, they nevertheless indicate 
the evolution of the principle of self-determination into a right under international law. The 
Covenants, once ratified, carry the legal weight of multilateral treaties. 
It is evident that under international law, the East Timorese are entitled to exercise their right of 
self-determination, and this is widely recognised, even by Indonesia. The East Timorese are not 
fighting to establish their right to self-determination, but to have this right respected. 
Self-determination in the post-colonial era 
In the post-colonial era, application of the principle is less widely agreed upon. Calls for self-
determination today potentially challenge the territorial integrity of established sovereign states. 
Because modern states are essentially artificial constructions, dependent for their legitimacy on 
recognition by other states and by the citizens who live within them, any challenge to that 
legitimacy, particularly from indigenous groups, provokes a hostile or defensive reaction. Calls for 
self-determination are a rejection of the authority of the state and/or its geographical extent. 
22 Wilson, 1988, p.76. 
23 ibid., p.77. 
24 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights were adopted by UNGA Resolution 2200A (XXI), 16 December, 1976. To 
date they have not been widely ratified. 
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The implications of this are far-reaching. Whilst Hinsley argues that sovereignty is not a act but 
an idea, a claim about the way power should be exercised25, Falk and Camilleri disagree. They 
point out that sovereignty is more than just an idea; it is part of the general discourse of power. 
Sovereignty justifies international political arrangements by explaining them as if they were a part 
of the natural order of things26. The sovereignty debate is anchored fmnly in the realist school of 
international relations. From a realist perspective, the international community operates as a 
collection of individual sovereign states, organised into regional groupings such as the 
Organisation of African Unity or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and into the United 
Nations where almost all states are represented. States are fictionalised as persons and become 
individuals for the purpose of analysis . Sovert<ignty is crucial to the functioning of international 
organisations and all inter-state relations because it bestows individual characteristics upon 
territorial entities. 
Sovereignty informs international legal principles such as the principle of non-intervention and 
legitimises legal instruments such as treaties and international covenants. Yet some aspects of 
international law also challenge the idea of sovereignty by qualifying it; the International 
Covenants on Human Rights for example, proscribe states from infringing on the individual rights 
of its citizens. The concept of sovereignty is not only qualified by law however. Janis27 
challenges the utility of the concept of rigidly defined national sovereignty in light of structural 
changes in inter-state relations which mean transactions - economic, environmental , cultural, 
political, social or military - increasingly transcend national boundaries. 
Application of the principle of self-determination in the post-colonial era need not necessarily 
mean a challenge to the existence of sovereign states. Some suggest that exercise of self-
determination can lead to a number of outcomes ranging from protection of the rights of 
minorities to cultural or political autonomy to independent statehood28. Because not all objectives 
of self-determination require independence and the fragmentation of an existing state, outright 
rejection of self-determination claims by governments is inappropriate. Sovereignty is either being 
divorced from the principle of self-determination or being defined more narrowly. 
Whilst much of the justification for self-determination which was relevant during the anti-colonial 
struggle is still applicable to East Timor, it still being technically a non-self-governing territory, 
25 Hinsley, 1986, p.l. 
26 Jim Falk & Joseph Camilleri , 1992 The End of Sovereignty?: The Politics of a Shrinking and 
Fragmenting World, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, England. p.ll . 
27 Mark W. Janis, 1991 "International Law?" Harvard International Law Journal, 32:2, p.368. 
28 Halperin et al , 1992 Self-determination in the New World Order, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Washington D.C.,p.47. 
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continuing debate on the issue represents a transformation of the principle into a post-colonial 
issue; settlement or resolution of the East Timor conflict will occur in a modern political context. 
Problems with the principle for governments: self-determination and 
secession 
Crawford writes that since 1945 there has been "perhaps no more divisive issue among writers (at 
least in the Western tradition of international law) than the question of whether there exists a legal 
right or principle of self-determination of peoples."29 There is an inherent tension between the 
principle of self-determination and the strong support for territorial integrity within the UN, 
expressed in Resolutions condemning aggression and in the territorial basis of UN references to 
self-determination. The international community has often refused to support attempts to create 
independent states which would have fragmented existing states30, for example Biafra, Kurdistan 
and Katanga. There have been some exceptions to this however, notably Bangladesh and Eritrea. 
Even these apparent exceptions must be qualified however. Both states emerged after a period of 
war, and only when the dominant actor effectively ceded the territory, avoiding an inevitable 
protraction of the conflict. UN Secretary General, U Thant, said in 1970: 
The United Nations' attitude is unequivocal. As an international organisation, 
the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do not 
believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member 
State31 . 
Classification of a claim as a legitimate (in UN practice this means anti-colonial) expression of 
self-determination however imposes an obligation on the international community to bring 
independence to the claimants. This perhaps accounts for the reluctance of governments and 
lawyers to accept the principle of self-determination as existing in international law and their 
preference for classifications such as 'insurgency' or 'insurrection' to label armed uprisings against 
the state. Certainly the Indonesian government favours the term 'bandit' over 'guerilla', which has 
political implications, when referring to FRETILIN fighters. 
Heraclides argues that in fact the principle of self-determination offers legal protection to states 
against secession32. He argues that the principle of self-determination as articulated in United 
Nations instruments is an exclusively anti-colonial tool and that once a colony has become 
29 James Crawford, 1979 The Creation of States in International Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.85. 
30 Halperin et al, 1992, p.14. 
31 Press Conference at Dakar, Senegal, January 4, 1970, cited in Halperin et al, p.l5. 
32 Heraclides, 1991 , p.21. 
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independent, claims for self-determination from groups within the state are invalid. In an 
independent state, self-determination refers narrowly to the right of a people to freely select their 
form of governments and constitutional status government. Essentially, once a state qualifies for 
membership of the United Nations, the principle of self-determination no longer applies and the 
state is protected from any challenge to its territorial integrity, either from within or from an 
external source, by international law. 
International law applies to states, not to groups within them. Thus international law mitigates 
any challenge to the state to which it applies. Having emerged from the states which make up the 
international community and dependent upon them for its weight (cannot be applied without 
consent of the state in question), international law must proscribe any activity which threatens the 
state and thus its own legitimacy. 
Application of self-determination in East Timor 
Under the influence of United States President, Woodrow Wilson, the League of Nations had 
favoured a plebiscite method of determining statehood. Plebiscites enshrine the notion of popular 
sovereignty and enable the expression of the right of people to choose the form of government 
under which they live. In the United Nations' Charter and Resolutions pertaining to self-
determination, sovereignty is interpreted as being democratic in nature; power resides with the 
people. In a decolonisation situation the people of the territory in question, by virtue of the right 
of all peoples to self-determination, must freely determine the future political status of the 
territory. Any alteration to the political form of a colony or state without some degree of popular 
consent is viewed with suspicion. East Timor, annexed in the wake of an invasion by a powerful 
neighbour is just such a case. The East Timorese have been able to lobby effectively on the 
sovereignty issue because the manner in which East Timor was incorporated into Indonesia cannot 
be accepted as having been freely determined. 
Furthermore, Halperin et al identify internal self-determination, the right to participate in 
government, as a corollary of external self-determination (the right to choose the sovereign status 
of the state)33. The Indonesian political system offers few avenues of political expression for the 
East Timorese, particularly those who seek to disengage from the state. Armed resistance is not 
considered a legitimate form political expression in Indonesian law although it must be understood 
as that. 
33 Halperin et a!., 1992, p.17. Buchheit further cefines external self-determination as the right of a 
people to pursue political, economic and cultural development without interference or coercion from any 
other state; and internal self-determination as the right of all segments of a population to influence the 
constitutional and political structure of the system under which they live - Buchheit, 1978, p.14. 
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Indonesia and self-determination 
As a member of the non-aligned movement (NAM), Indonesia has committed itself to uphold the 
rule of law and the principles of the United Nations Charter; to ensure respect for the sovereignty 
of nations and strict adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
states34. It is also "committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes in all regions of the world 
through a sustained process of dialogue and negotiation"35. 
Jakarta sees no contradiction between these commitments and its ongoing war with the East 
Timorese guerillas, although the heads of government of the non-aligned movement have twice 
affirmed the right of the East Timorese to self-determination in spite of Indonesia's claim that they 
have already exercised this right. The non-aligned movement endorsed United Nations Security 
Council resolutions 384 (1975) and 389 (1976) calling for the immediate withdrawal of 
Indonesian troops from East Timor at its 1976 meeting in Colombo. At the 1985 meeting in 
Luanda, Angola invited a FRETILIN delegation, provoking heated debate on the Timor issue36. 
Although the delegates were divided on the issue, vindication for Indonesia was far from 
forthcoming. Indonesia takes the position that a legitimate act of self-determination did occur in 
which the East Timorese asked to be integrated into The Republic of Indonesia, and to which 
Indonesia responded. This "act of self-determination" is discussed below. 
No territorial ambitions 
A senior Indonesian diplomat, Samsi Abdullah, was quoted in the New York Times in January, 
1976, as saying: 
Indonesia has no territorial claims on Portuguese Timor (despite the fact that 
it is the heart of Indonesian territory) .. .lndonesia will not take over 
Portuguese Timor but will accept integration, should the people of the area, 
democratically and without terrorists' guns pointed at their heads, choose this 
course37. 
"Terrorists" presumably refers to FRETILIN, not to the Indonesian ' volunteers' who had arrived in 
Dili in December 1975. 
34 In "The Jakarta Message" from The Tenth Non-Aligned Movement Summit, Jakarta, September 
1992. 
35 ibid. 
36 Jose Ramos-Horta, 1987 Funu:The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, The Red Sea Press Inc., Trenton, 
New Jersey, p. l62. 
37 II January, 1976, cited in Kees Lagerberg, 1979, West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism, C. Hurst & 
Co., London, p.27. 
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Denial of territorial ambitions was a common theme in Indonesian political rhetoric leading up to 
the invasion. In October 1974, President Suharto's declared Indonesia's basic stance on East Timor 
was that Indonesia had no territorial ambitions; that it respects the right of the people of East 
Timor; and that should the people of East Timor wish to join Indonesia they could not do so as a 
state but only as part of the unitary state of The Republic of lndonesia38. 
Indonesian support for East Timorese self-determination 
In a 1977 publication, Decolonisation in East Timor, the Indonesian Department of Foreign 
Affairs wrote that, based on its own historic commitment to anti-colonialism and humanitarian 
principles, the Indonesian government had a moral obligation to assist the people of East Timor 
and to ensure that the decolonisation process could be implemented in accordance with the ideals 
and wishes of the entire population of the territory39. Jakarta argued that it firmly supported the 
free and democratic exercise of the right to self-determination by the East Timorese in accordance 
with the provisions of the UN Charter and Resolutions 1514(XV) and 1541(XV) of the General 
Assembly40. These assertions indicate that Indonesia places the East Timor issue fmnly in the 
context of international law. Jakarta attempts to justify its incorporation of the territory in these 
terms. 
Indonesia maintains that East Timor was integrated into the Republic of Indonesia in accordance 
with the wishes of the people of East Timor, and that this is a legitimate form of self-
determination as defined by Resolution 1541 (XV). Indonesia claims the wishes of the people were 
expressed by a Peoples Assembly who formally requested integration in June 1976. Indonesia then 
passed legislation through the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia on July 17, 
1976, making East Timor an Indonesian province. So far as Indonesia was concerned, this 
legitimised its control of the territory. 
Indonesia either protests criticism of its actions in annexing East Timor, or simply refuses to 
acknowledge any such criticism. The former Vice-President of Indonesia, Adam Malik, illustrating 
complete denial of criticism, wrote in his 1980 biography: 
I am gratified that the process of the integration of East Timor into the 
territory of Indonesia has been finalised satisfactorily for all sides concerned. 
It is true that initially the neighbouring countries, including Australia, 
seemed to be doubtful of the good intentions of Indonesia. But when 
38 Kristiadi, 1986 "The Decolonisation of East Timor: A Historical Review" The Indonesian Quarterly, 
Vol.14, No.4, p.551-552. 
39 Department of Foreign Affairs, 1977, Deco ionisation in East Timor, Republic of Indonesia, p.38. 
40 Department of Foreign Affairs, 1984, East Timor After Integration, Republic of Indonesia, p. 52 
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subsequently it was established as a fact that Indonesia had but accommodated 
the will of the people of East Timor to be united with their brothers, then 
the countries in question accepted and consented to the course of action taken 
by Indonesia.41 
When East Timor appeared on the agenda of the 31st session of the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1976, Indonesia objected to its inclusion on the grounds that the decolonisation 
process had culminated in the integration of East Timor with Indonesia and further discussion of 
the issue represented interference in the internal affairs of Indonesia. The issue remained on the 
agenda however, and in 1982 the 37th session of the UNGA had before it a working paper prepared 
by the UN Secretariat and a draft resolution on East Timor. The working paper criticised the non-
involvement of the UN in the act of self-determination which resulted in Indonesia's annexation of 
East Timor. Indonesia protested at this, saying "the Provisional Government of East Timor 
[PGET] had made every effort to have the United Nations participate in the decolonisation 
process"42 and pointed out that United Nations participation in the process of decolonisation is 
not mandatory. 
The PGET referendum was promoted by Indonesia as legitimate. Advice from New Zealand43, 
among others encouraged Indonesia to attempt to gain UN recognition of the referendum to ensure 
it was acceptable to more than just the seven states who sent representatives to witness the act44. 
Jenkins summarises Indonesia's version of events thus: 
[The East Timorese] had thrown off the colonialist yoke and decided on 
integration with their brothers across the border in Indonesia. Jakarta, having 
made strenuous efforts to ascertain that they truly sought such a union, had 
eventually acceded to their request.45 
Portugal and self-determination in East Timor 
Prior to the April Revolution which overthrew the Caetano regime, Portugal had rejected 
successive UNGA resolutions recognising the right of self-determination for East Timor on the 
grounds that East Timor was not a colony but an overseas province of Portugal, similar to any 
41 Adam Malik, 1980, In the Service of the Republic, P T Gunung Agung, Jakarta, p.271. 
42 Department of Foreign Affairs, 1984 East Timor After Integration, Republic of Indonesia, p.85. 
43 See chapter 4. 
44 See chapter 4. 
45 David Jenkins, 1980 "Death of a Dream of Freedom", Far Eastern Economic Review, May 23, p.31. 
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other province46. The government which succeeded the Caetano regime, the Spinola government, 
was keen to rid itself of Portugal's costly colonies and supported the right of self-determination for 
its African colonies and its sole Melanesian colony47. 
The Spinola government initiated the decolonisation process by restoring a measure of civil rights 
in East Timor, dissolving the official Peoples National Action political party, disbanding the 
secret police, and permitting the formation of political parties48. In Dili a Committee for the Self-
determination of East Timor was established in May of 1974, and in August Portugal declared its 
willingness to cooperate with the United Nations in the decolonisation process. In doing this, 
Portugal recognised East Timor as a non-self-governing territory and its own function as the 
administering power. This established the legal framework which the UN continues to recognise. 
The United Nations normally does not recognise a new state until independence has been 
formalised49. Because the struggle for independence goes on in East Timor, Portugal is still 
considered the administering power by the UN. 
Portugal has rejected both the request for integration issued by the PGET as well as the unilateral 
declaration of independence issued by FRETILIN which preceded it by a day. In a letter to the 
Secretary General of the United Nations, the Portuguese representative at the UN argued that the 
declaration of independence lay outside of the process of decolonisation initiated by Portugal and 
therefore endangered the process50. 
In rejecting both expressions of self-determination, and by withdrawing its administrative 
personnel following the Indonesian invasion, Portugal has effectively frozen the decolonisation 
process. It is still considered the administering power by the UN. However Portugal has recently 
initiated proceedings against Australia over its signing of the Timor Gap Zone of Co-operation 
Treaty with Indonesia which indicates it considers itself responsible for East Timor. It also 
indicates Portugal continues to reject as bogus the act of self determination that culminated in East 
Timor's integration into Indonesia. 
46 James Dunn, 1983 Timor: A People Betrayed, Jacaranda Press, Queensland. 
47 ibid. 
48 Kristiadi, 1986, p.547. 
49 Akehurst, 1987, p.298. 
50 Letter dated 28 November 1975 from Antonio DaCosta Lobo, Portuguese representative at the UN, 
reprinted in Department of Foreign Affairs, 1977 Decolonisation in East Timor, p.72. 
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The will of the people 
The right to self-determination is recognised as inalienable, even by Indonesia. Self-determination 
is a continuing process and a choice once made does not bind that group in perpetuity5 1. Even 
those who accept that it was a genuine act of self-determination whlch resulted in the annexation 
of East Timor, cannot deny that the armed struggle represents a renewed call for self-determination. 
At the time of the request for integration with Indonesia and the unilateral declaration of 
Independence issued by FRETILIN, there were undoubtedly conflicting views as to what 
constituted the will of the people. However the ongoing armed struggle against Indonesia is clear 
evidence that some Timorese feel their will has not been taken into account and that their right to 
self-determination has been violated. There are no rules as to how often a process of popular 
consent must take place, but a protracted war of resistance is a manifest demand for a new act of 
self-determination. 
The armed struggle in East Timor is a logical outcome of the decolonisation process. Without the 
interruption by the Indonesian military, the process may have come to a peaceful conclusion. The 
Indonesian invasion cut off all avenues for peaceful resolution of the self-determination debate, 
leaving armed resistance the only viable option for some. Deprived of other avenues for dissent, 
the East Timorese have used armed conflict to extend the process. 
By its very nature, armed resistance in Timor against Indonesia represents an expression of popular 
will. Guerilla fighters are as much a creation of political climate and popular aspirations as they 
are catalysts for the further development of those aspirations52. The Timorese guerillas are a part 
of the civilian population and not professional soldiers. They are dependent on the civilian 
population for survival, making the struggle engage a large part of the population. In ills defence 
statement, imprisoned resistance leader Xanana Gusmao asserted that the Indonesians refuse to 
settle the question of East Timor by a referendum because they know they would lose53. Jakarta, 
he claimed, should recognise it has long since lost in East Timor. 
5 I Lee Buchheit, 1978 Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-determination, Yale University Press, New 
Haven, p.l2. 
52 Robert Taber, 1969 The War of the Flea: Guerilla Warfare in Theory and Practice, Paladin, St Albans, 
p.l9. 
53 Statement issued on March 27, 1993 in Dili. 
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Rejecting Indonesia's claim 
Indonesia's claim to East Timor rests on its assertion that the former Portuguese colony was 
integrated into the Republic of Indonesia in accordance with the wishes of the East Timorese 
people as expressed by a representative assembly in a legitimate act of self-determination. 
However, the legitimacy of the act of self-determination has been rejected by the United Nations 
on the grounds that Indonesia's actions contravene international law. The annexation of the island 
nation has also been condemned by the non-aligned movement, of which Indonesia is a prominent 
member, as we11 as the former colonial power, Portugal, claiming that it has yet to discharge its 
duties as the administrating power. 
Most importantly however, the formal incorporation of East Timor into the Indonesian Republic 
has been rejected by many East Timorese who claim they have yet to exercise their right to self-
determination. That they have this right is beyond doubt. Under international Jaw, as we11 as by 
their own perception, the people of East Timor are entitled to freely determine, without external 
influence, their political status. The international community, as discussed in later chapters, has 
been unwi11ing to act on this principle however, and Indonesia is unable, for historical and 
political reasons, to consider implementing a legitimate act of self-determination in East Timor. 
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Chapter 2 
Indonesia's Inevitable Annexation of East Timor 
As a founding member of the non-aligned movement, anti-colonialism is a central tenet of 
Indonesian political culture. Jakarta thus found itself in a difficult position when decolonisation 
was initiated in East Timor; whilst ideologically Indonesia was bound to support self-
determination for the Timorese, to do so was perceived as being potentially threatening to the 
integrity of the Indonesian state. Jakarta has attempted to reconcile its ideology and action by 
using anti-colonial rhetoric and the language of decolonisation when discussing the invasion and 
subsequent annexation of East Timor. 
In addition to the influence of anti-colonial ideology and security concerns, the ascendancy of the 
armed forces in all aspects of Indonesian civil life has had a decisive effect on the development of 
the Timor conflict. Indonesia's motivations for invading East Timor in 1975 are complex but what 
is clear is that the invasion was not simply an effort to extend the boundaries of lndonesia1. 
Among the many factors that must be considered when attempting to understand the decision to 
invade, rather than continue to seek a diplomatic solution, the army's role as self-appointed 
guardian of the nation's interest is central. Vasquez argues that in traditional International 
Relations theory, political actors will not resort to violence to achieve their ends if there are more 
efficient, less costly , and more legitimate ways of attaining their ends2. This cost/benefit 
approach to conflict involves assigning value to means, as well as ends. In Indonesia, the military 
is a primary political actor and this certainly influenced the value assigned to military intervention 
as against diplomatic alternatives. 
Ideology and politics: the militarisation of government 
The military in Indonesia have become a political force in their own right and are involved in the 
political process at all levels. Crouch argues that the Indonesian military has always been a 
political force as it had its origins as a revolutionary army fighting the Dutch, and therefore was 
amotivated by political concerns3. This view is supported by Jenkins, and McGuire and Hering, 
who suggest that the armed forces emphasise that they first emerged from the people of Indonesia 
1 J.A.C. Mackie, 1986 "Does Indonesia Have Expansionist Designs on Papua New Guinea?", in R .J. 
May (ed), Between Two Nations: The Indonesian Papua Border and West Papua Nationalism, Robert 
Brown and Associates (Aust) Pty. Ltd., Bathurst, N.S.W., p. 73. 
2 John A. Vasquez, "Peace and the New World Order", keynote address to the New World Order 
Conference, Centre for Strategic Studies, Wellington December 8 - 9, 1994; unpublished. 
3 Harold Crouch, 1978 The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 
p. 344. 
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rather than being a creation of civilian government, dependent upon it for legitimacy4. Rather, it 
is the state that relies on the armed forces for its continued existence. The involvement of the 
military in suppressing regional rebellions at the time of the 1957 declaration of martial law, and 
in suppressing or containing other outbreaks of rebellion since then, confirmed the inherently 
political nature of the position of the armed forces . By acting in such internal security matters, the 
army made political choices and became deeply entrenched in civil politics5. 
The integrity of the modern state of Indonesia can be largely attributed to the tight grip the armed 
forces maintain on Indonesian politics. There is little room for dissent or the expression of 
separatist aspirations in Indonesian political life, and therefore limited avenues for the expression 
of discontent. In the case of East Timor, the pervasiveness of military influence in Indonesian life 
influenced the initial Indonesian response to the decolonisation process , and shaped the 
development of the conflict. Foremost among the concerns of the armed forces is the security of 
the vast and ethnically diverse archipelago that constitutes modern Indonesia. Initially East Timor 
was treated as a foreign policy issue. After the Act of Parliament that formally integrated the 
province into Indonesia in 1976, it was considered an internal security issue. An independent East 
Timor was perceived as a threat. The response to this threat, whilst being couched in terms 
consistent with Indonesia's anti-colonial ideology, was designed to attain quite a different end. 
Once the legal integration of the province was achieved, policy was designed to ensure that that 
situation was not reversed. 
Redefining "democracy" 
Having formally become an independent state in 1950, the Republic of the United States of 
Indonesia went through something of a political identity crisis. Although support for the idea of 
democracy was almost universal amongst the Indonesian political leadership at the time, it was not 
necessarily construed as having representative functions, formal opposition, or as being based on 
majority rule6. The principle of democracy was seen as legitimising the new government but the 
ideals of a Western democratic system were not easily transplanted to Indonesia, whose political 
4 David Jenkins, 1984 Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975 - 1983, Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, p. I; G. McGuire & B. Hering, 1987 
"The Indonesian Army: Harbingers of Progress or Reactionary Predators?" in Christine Doran (ed) 
Indonesian Politics: A Reader, Centre for South East Asian Politics, James Cook University of North 
Queensland, Australia, p. 205. 
5 Michael Vatikiosis, 1993 Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for 
Change , Routledge, London, p. 67. 
6 Herbert Feith, 1963 "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy" in Ruth T. McVey (ed) Indonesia , Hraf 
Press, Yale University, New Haven, p. 313. 
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experience to date was of powerful, centralised authority?. Feith suggests that the constitutional 
democratic model was adopted because of a Jack of practical alternatives8. At the time, the army 
had yet to emerge as a modern professional force and no cohesive political party existed to take the 
reins. 
After independence, several coalition governments rose and fell rapidly but were unable to sustain 
political support in the face of a declining economy, widespread corruption, regional rebellion and 
an increasingly coherent communist party9. A concurrent large scale reorganisation and 
rationalisation of the armed forces Jed to the emergence of a modern professional military, very 
different from the piecemeal force of armed civilians that had fought for independence. A shift in 
sentiment among landowners, and others with a stake in the economy, away from support for the 
liberal democratic experiment opened a window of opportunity for President Sukarno who had 
support in the military. A change to the parliamentary system of government was suggested. 
Guided democracy: government by consensus and the transfer of power 
to the armed forces 
Disenchanted with the apparent instability of the party system, Sukarno began to develop an idea 
of "Guided Democracy", a system of government by consensus in which all major parties would 
participate in cabinet. They would sit on a consultative National Council along with 
representatives from workers, peasants, business and other groups. "Representation" would thus be 
by functional groups, one of which was the armed forces, rather than by popular vote. This system 
was presented as reintroducing traditional patterns of authority based on ideas of benevolent 
leadership, governing by consensus rather than being dictated to by the will of the majorityiO. 
This form of government was supported by both the Communist party and the military who saw 
an opportunity to formalise their influence in non-military affairs. Overall, popular participation 
in political matters remained high; between 1959 and 1965 more than 15 million people joined 
mass organisations that focused on issues such as land reform, corruption and income 
distribution 11. 
7 McGuire and Hering ,1987, p. 213. 
8 Feith, 1963. 
9 Richard Robison, 1993 "Indonesia: Tensions in State and Regime" in Kevin Hewison, Richard 
Robison & Garry Rodan (eds), Southeast Asia in the i990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and 
Capitalism, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, p.42; Feith 1963, p.314. 
10 Nawaz Mody, 1987 indonesia Under Suharto, Oriental University Press, London, p. 3. 
II Max Lane, 1994 "Culture of Contempt", New internationalist, No. 253, March, p. 9. 
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In the end, the declaration of martial law in 1957 following the outbreak of regional rebellions in 
Sumatra and Sulawesi pre-empted the introduction of Guided Democracy in giving formal 
recognition to the military's right of participation in political affairs . Through martial law, 
military leaders acquired enormous power in non-military sectors through the appointment of 
officers to the cabinet, administration and Parliament12. The responsibilities of the army under 
martial law demanded the development of a political structure within the military, which in turn 
enabled the army to develop its role as an autonomous political force. Effectively, the armed forces 
became an operational political party 13. 
Following the suppression of regional rebellions, Sukarno and the military had amassed sufficient 
influence to introduce Guided Democracy principles and by 1960, the parliamentary model was 
replaced with a presidential system with Sukarno as head of the unitary Republic of Indonesia14. 
During this era, the armed forces became firmly entrenched in all aspects of government, justifying 
their dominant role with references to nationaliat spirit and their role in the revolution that brought 
Indonesia to independence. Great attention was paid to military-related celebrations and 
anniversaries in an effort to keep the profile of the armed forces high15. This effort was greatly 
assisted by the continuing conflict with the Netherlands over the future of West Papua, and the 
1963 confrontation with Malaysia. The atmosphere in Indonesia was kept tense with talk of a 
military confrontation, air-raid training and the preparation of militias. These perceived threats to 
security and the integrity of the archipelago further justified the pervasive role of the armed forces. 
With most political opposition contained by the functional groups of Guided Democracy, the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) remained the only major barrier to complete military control. 
The dual function of the armed forces 
General A. H. Nasution defined the doctrine of the "dual-function" of the armed forces which is the 
ideological basis of the military's role in non-military matters. This dual-function promoted the 
armed forces as a socio-political force, active not only in the military arena but in cultural, 
religious, economic, social and political spheres16. The dual-function was rationalised by General 
Nasution as a military tactic - the military will fail if limited to military matters. It must also be 
12 Lane 1994, p. 9; Jenkins 1984, p. 2; Crouch 1978, p. 344. 
13 "Forum for Realising the True Sovereignty of the People", Conference, Jakarta, August 22, 1991, 
Indonesia, No. 53, April, 1992, p. 156; M. Caldwell & E. Utrecht, 1979 Indonesia: An Alternative 
History , Alternative Publishing Cooperative Ltd. , Sydney, p. 125. 
14 Hewison et al ,1993, p.43 ; Feith ,1963, p.344. 
15 Feith , 1963, p. 336. 
16 Crouch, 1978, p. 345. 
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able to carry out political propaganda and economic warfare if the integrity of the nation was to be 
ensured17. 
The relationship between the armed forces and civilian political leaders has never been clearly 
defined and the role of the armed forces has thus never been limited to military issues. In the 
military code of ethics established in 1950 at the time of independence, the pre-eminence of the 
elected government is not explicitly recognised18. There has therefore been no constitutional basis 
on which to challenge military interference in civil affairs. Despite this, the extent of military 
involvement has been a source of controversy19. To protect their position, the armed forces have, 
since independence, enshrined many of the doctrines that support their non-military functions in 
law. The doctrines of 'Defence of National Security' and 'Total Security ' present the participation 
of the armed forces in all aspects of Indonesian life as absolutely necessary. Laws such as the 1982 
Basic Provisions for the Defence and Security of the Republic of Indonesia which enable the 
military to perform this role in effect make the government of Indonesia, not withstanding its 
civilian head of state, a military government. 
The armed forces frequently reconfirm their dual function, as in a 1988 document entitled Broad 
Guidelines for the Nation' s Direction which states that "in accordance with the Doctrine of the 
Defence of National Security, the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia form the core of the 
system for maintaining Total Security among the people" and that as such, they constitute a social 
force in addition to their capacity as a security force20. In a sub-section entitled "Defence and 
Security", the document claims that in implementing its socio-political function , the development 
of the capacity of the armed forces will be geared towards securing their ability to act as a 
"stabiliser and dynamicist" of national life and to fill a role as an active participant in national 
development21 . Economic development was perceived as the central factor in preventing the 
dissolution of the new state, and the military presented itself as the only truly national force, 
capable of transcending the partisan interests of the political parties, to ensure that economic 
development occurrect22. 
1 7 cited in McGuire & Hering, 1987, p. 207. 
18 ibid. 
19 Vatikiosis, 1993, p. 70. 
20 cited in "Forum for Realising the true Sovereignty of the People", 1992, p. 155. 
21 ibid. 
22 Crouch, 1978, p. 273; Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti & T.A.M. Simatupang, 1987 "The Indonesian 
Experience in Facing Non-armed and Armed Movements: Lessons from the Past and Glimpses of the 
Future" in Kusuma Snitwongse & Sukumbhand Paribatra (eds) Durable Stability in Southeast Asia , 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, p.103 . 
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As a stabiliser and dynamicist, the military maintains an influence in village, provincial and 
regional politics in order that Total Security is not compromised by local politicking. The 
doctrines of dual-function and Total Security did not establish this role for the armed forces, it has 
its roots in the struggle for independence when the nature of the fight made necessary close 
cooperation between the guerillas and local leaders. The doctrines redefined this relationship in 
terms of the maintenance, rather than the creation, of an independent state. Threats to the territorial 
integrity of Indonesia have tended, since the inception of the state, to have come from within its 
borders rather than from an external aggressor. Thus, security policy is directed at controlling 
perceived threats, often through forms of 'territorial management' such as the relocation of 
indigenous populations and the settling oflndonesian migrants in troublesome areas23. Kuntjoro-
Jakti and Simatupang suggest that the military has been convinced by the relative political and 
security stability in Indonesia, the conflict in East Timor not withstanding, of the correctness of 
these doctrines24. 
President Suharto 
The supreme role of the armed forces was cemented by the transfer of power on the 11th of March 
1966, to General Suharto. At this time Sukarno conferred almost unlimited authority on the 
General. Sukarno had been effectively ousted in the wake of a 1965 coup attempt which the PKI 
was accused of masterrninding25. The truth behind the coup attempt of 30 September, and the 
counter-coup of 1 October that placed Suharto and the armed forces in control, remains murky. 
While Sukarno survived the coup, six generals did not, suggesting it was not Sukarno but the 
army leadership that was the target of the coup attempt. Whether it was indeed a PKI plot to check 
the growing cohesion of the military, the result of internal army rivalry, a plot by a conservative 
alliance of generals, or a Suharto plan to advance his own position in the armed forces may never 
be resolved26. 
23 The transmigration program (resettlement of Javanese) has been widely used in remote parts of 
Indonesia as a tool for extending military influence down to village level. In border areas, such as the 
Indonesian - Papua New Guinea border, and other locations where unrest occurs or is expected, the 
military command structure is supported by the population of transmigration sites with active or retired 
military personnel and their families . Transmigration has a cultural aspect as well : the program is 
designed to disseminate the dominant culture, which is Javanese, and encourage the assimilation of 
minority groups - Marie! Otten, 1986, Transmigrasi: Indonesian Resettlement Policy /965 - 1985; 
Myths and Realities, IWIGA Document #57, Copenhagen;. 
24 Kuntjoro-Jakti & Simatupang, 1987, p.I03. 
25 Jenkins, 1984, p. 3. 
26 McGuire & Hering, 1987, p. 208; W.F. Wertheim, 1987 "Fissures in the Girdle of Emeralds" in Doran 
(ed), p. 66. 
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Longstanding tensions between the PKI and its union supporters, and conservative military and 
Islamic forces, deteriorated into violence after the coup. The purge of the PKI that followed all but 
destroyed the party as an effective political force, removing the major check on the military's 
power as well as destroying Sukarno's base of popular support. Any remaining military support 
for Sukarno was also purged; thousands of officers and soldiers were arrested, suspended or 
transferred to parts remote from Java. Commander of KOSTRAD, the Army Strategic Reserve 
Command, General Suharto, became the new president of the Republic and quickly consolidated 
his position by appointing personal allies to key posts made vacant during the coup and counter-
coup27. Suharto's position was further strengthened by a streamlining of the armed forces, and an 
affirmation of the ideology governing the army's role of minimising religious, ethnic and regional 
divisions in favour of commitment to central government. 
By blaming the PKI for attempting to overthrow the government, the armed forces were able to 
vilify the Communist Party and communism generally, something that military personnel had a 
great deal of antipathy toward. Simultaneously, they reasserted their own role as guardians of the 
national interest, supporting this with action taken to prevent a communist takeover and save the 
government of President Sukarno. The temporary continuation of Sukarno as the head of state 
legitimised this claim. The orderly and legal transfer of authority from an increasingly less 
powerful President to the consolidating Suharto leadership kept a veneer of constitutionality over 
what was as much a coup d'etat as the defeated coup attempt itself had been. The anti-communist 
fervour that had been whipped up during the purge of the PKI was revived as a weapon against 
FRETILIN in the months leading up to the invasion of East Timor, and was later used as 
justification for the invasion. 
Conceivably, the army's take-over could have improved the prospects for a return to representative 
democracy, restoring some of the electoral processes removed under Guided Democracy28. In 
practice however, this did not occur. Military influence continues to permeate the political 
structure, down to the village level. Although elections are now held regularly in Indonesia, they 
are carefully managed and their sole purpose has been to legitimise the military-backed government 
of President Suharto both at home and in the eyes of Indonesia' s foreign investors, allies and 
creditors29. Respect for authority and hierarchical structures remains a central tenet of Indonesian 
political culture. Military ideology reinforces this and ensures there is little room for political 
activity outside state-defined structures. Legislation compels political parties to embrace the 
27 Herbert Feith , 1987 "Political Control, Class Formation and Legitimacy in Suharto' s Indonesia" in 
Doran (ed) , p.222. 
28 McGuire & Hering, 1987, p.210. 
29 Robison, 1993, p.45 ; Andrew Macintyre, 1993, "Indonesia in 1992: Coming to Terms with the 
Outside World", Asian Survey, Volume 33, No. 2, p. 209. 
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national ideology of unity , rejecting separatist or religious values . As East Timor is now 
considered to be the 27th province of Indonesia, this means that even if an indigenous Timorese 
party were sanctioned, it would be prohibited from advocating self-government or calling for a 
referendum on self-determination. 
The impact of military rule on the Timor conflict 
The decolonisation process in East Timor was begun at a time when communist governments had 
recently been established in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Indonesia' s own communist demons 
still lingered; the purge of the PKI had occurred only ten years previously. All this added to the 
sense of crisis sparked by the coup in Portugal (seen as taking Portuguese politics to the left of 
centre) which suddenly made the future of East Timor unclear. Of the emerging Timorese political 
parties, one of the most popular, FRETILIN, was also seen as being the most leftward leaning30. 
This raised the spectre of a "Cuba-in-the-south", a nest of communist influence, a haven for 
Indonesian exiles and an example to other provinces with separatist aspirations, right on 
Indonesia's doorstep31. If this were the case, an independent East Timor might have become a 
source of sedition within Indonesia itself. Furthermore, the political ties established by an 
independent East Timor may have threatened Indonesia's interests in the region32. Mackie argues 
that a major factor in the decision to intervene was the commitment of military policy-makers to 
their own anti-communist rhetoric33. They were unable to take a longer term view of the situation 
and to set aside their concerns for the security of Indonesia long enough to consider other options. 
Even if the charges of communism proved false and the worst fears of the Indonesian military 
leaders were not realised, it was clear that the chronically underdeveloped state of East Timor would 
need outside support to become economically viable34. The concern was that if FRETILIN, 
30 Heraclides suggests that ideology is one of the great unknowns of separatist or armed resistance 
movements. He notes that it is generally accepted that whatever the professed ideology of a separatist 
movement, as a whole they tend to be ideologically ambivalent. This is partly due to the need to accept 
assistance from any source and partly due to the diffuse ideology of nationalism. The left wing ideology 
attributed to FRETILIN, and the anti-Indonesianism, was not always supported by events. FRETILIN 
appears to have been more flexible in its ideological approach than Indonesia and other state 
governments believed - Heraclides, 1991 , p.34. 
31 Mackie, 1986, p.75; Crouch, 1978, p.341. 
32 Leifer, 1983, p. l55. 
33 Mackie, 1986, p.75 . 
34 Exploration of the Timor Gap had not commenced at this stage, and the extensive researves of oil and 
natural gas had yet to be discovered (see chapter 3). The potential revenue from these resources 
significantly affects the projected GNP of an independent East Timor. 
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perceived as being anti-Indonesian, should emerge from the decolonisation process as the new 
government, Indonesia would be deprived of an influence in the future direction of the state35. 
This particular concern seems to have been groundless. After receiving assurances from Foreign 
Minister Adam Malik in June 1974 that Indonesia would support independence and self-
determination for East Timor, FRETILIN representative Jose Ramos-Horta told Australian Consul 
James Dunn36, and recorded in his autobiographical account of the conflict, that a FRETILIN 
government would involve Indonesia in East Timor's foreign affairs and defence policies whilst it 
took care of domestic affairs37. As it was, Indonesia failed to take a long-term view of the 
situation in East Timor. By neglecting to take an early and active interest in the future of the 
small Portuguese colony, Indonesia lost its opportunity to have a positive influence the direction 
of the decolonisation process. 
Had Indonesia actively campaigned for decolonisation in East Timor prior to the initiatives of the 
Portuguese, East Timor may have voluntarily become the 27th province of the Republic, although 
this seems unlikely, or may have entered into a "free association" arrangement, much as New 
Zealand has with the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau. After all, it was a small state whose 
economic condition was marginal at best. Statements were made by Generals Nasution and 
Mokoginta in 1963 that Indonesia would support the East Timorese in their struggle to integrate 
with Indonesia, the perception being that this is what a Timorese struggle against the Portuguese 
would seek to achieve, but these statements were not supported with either financial or military 
assistance38. 
Archipelagic Outlook 
Indonesia's reasons for seeking the integration of East Timor were thus not an expression of 
expansionism but an effort to maintain the integrity of the archipelagic state by neutralising any 
possible threat. As recently as 1973, the Consultative Assembly had reaffirmed the commitment 
of the government and armed forces to the "Archipelagic Outlook", a doctrine of territorial unity 
that views the seas and straits of the archipelago as being as much a part of Indonesia's territory as 
the islands, bridging the physical separation between the different islands, regions and ethnic 
35 New Zealand political scientist, Stephen Hoadley, also considered these fears groundless. His 
arguments are discussed in Chapter 4. 
36 James Dunn, former Australian consul to Indonesia and political columnist, in a speech given at 
Turnbull House, Wellington, June 29, 1994. 
37 Ramos-Horta, 1987, p.42. 
38 Donald E. Weatherbee, 1966 "Portuguese Timor: An Indonesian Dilemma", Asian Survey, Vol. 6, 
No.l2 p.691. 
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groups39. The fragmented nature of Indonesia's territory and society made apprehension about a 
possible threat, particularly a communist threat, all the more acute. 
Indonesia and decolonisation in East Timor 
It is ironic that Indonesia, founding member of the non-aligned movement, champion of anti-
imperialist movements and fierce upholder of the right of colonies to self-determination, should 
find itself in the position of occupying power in East Timor. Furthermore, the situation is largely 
one of Indonesia's own making. Prior to the initiation of a decolonisation process by Portugal, it 
seems little thought had been given as to if, when, and how East Timor might be decolonised. 
Mackie40 suggests that those in Indonesia who had considered the subject of decolonisation in 
East Timor naturally assumed that the Timorese would want to become a part of their large 
neighbour, particularly as that neighbour shared the same island. Few Indonesians had considered 
that East Timor may have evolved very differently under Portuguese rule than West Timor had 
evolved under Dutch and Indonesian rule, or that the East Timorese considered themselves to be a 
distinct people with a distinct culture that they had every intention of preserving. 
Under Sukarno, Indonesian foreign policy was firmly opposed to any continuation of Western 
influence in former Asian and African colonies. In his 1959 Independence Day address, President 
Sukarno confirmed that Indonesia was "actively opposed to, and hitting hard at, all forms of 
imperialism and colonialism wherever they occur"41. This policy manifested itself in the 
confrontation with Malaysia over apparent British influence, and in the conflict with the 
Netherlands over West Papua. At the same time, however, little was said or done about the 
continuing Portuguese presence in East Timor. The colonial regime in East Timor was an 
anomaly which Indonesia chose to ignore, to all intents, rather than act on. 
In fact some thought had been given to the problem of East Timor, albeit not much. Reference to 
the undesirable Portuguese presence in the region was made by the Vice Chairman of Sukarno's 
Supreme Advisory Council in 1961 at a protest rally supporting Angolan independence (Indonesia 
clearly did not feel threatened by the independence of this distant Portuguese colony), and in 1962 
by General Nasution who described the situation of the East Timorese as one of enslavement42. In 
spite of these condemnations, little action was taken to change the situation. This was not for lack 
39 Leifer, 1983, p.143. 
40 Mackie, 1986, p.74 
41 cited in Weatherbee, 1966, p.683. 
42 Weatherbee, 1966, p.689. 
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of opportunity; continuing skirmishes along the border with West Timor could have been 
interpreted as provocation had Indonesia sought a pretext for intervention at that time. Instead, 
Indonesia continued to assert that although it opposed colonialism in East Timor, it made no 
claim to the territory. It made this position clear to the First Committee of the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1957, reaffirmed it in an address to the General Assembly in 1960, and 
continued to assert that this was Indonesia's position in 1974, only a year before the invasion of 
the territory43. Even as it became clear that armed intervention was imminent, Indonesia continued 
to assert that it had no territorial ambitions but was acting only at the request of the Timorese 
people44. 
Defence Chief General Ali Murtopo said in an interview in October of 1975 that "Indonesia is not 
an expansionist nation and has absolutely no territorial ambitions"45. In a sense, these assertions 
were true. Indonesia did not seek to integrate East Timor because it considered the territory to be an 
inherent part of Indonesia, or because it was felt that the Timorese were "brothers", although 
Indonesia later advanced both these reasons to justify its actions. Indonesia's ambitions were 
territorial only to the extent that by having control over the territory, Indonesia prevented a hostile 
power, including the Timorese themselves, from establishing itself there. 
A security matter 
The dominance of the military in Indonesian government ensured that the security aspect of the 
situation was kept to the fore. If Indonesia had not attempted a liberation of East Timor from 
Portuguese colonialism earlier, it was because such action may have endangered Indonesian 
interests in the region and internationally46. With the advent of decolonisation, the perceived 
potential of an independent East Timor to inflict greater damage on those interests meant that 
some form of intervention had to be considered. It seems that Indonesia made a decision to 
integrate East Timor soon after the initiation of a decolonisation process by Portugal, only the 
means of doing so remained in dispute47. By leaving the decision to actively promote the 
integration of East Timor so late, Indonesia limited its options. Of those avenues open to it, 
43 Dunn, 1983, p.103-104; Ramos-Horta, 1987, p. 43. 
44 Department of Foreign Affairs, 1984, p.36. 
45 Coggin, 1975, p.13. 
46 Weatherbee, 1966, p 694. Indonesia ' s interests included, among others, mant1me boundary 
negotiations with Australia and substantial development assistance provided by the Inter-governmental 
Group on Indonesia (IGGI). 
47 Keith Suter, 1978 "The Conquest of East Timor", Contemporary Review, Vol. 232, No. 1346, March, 
p.138; Nichterlein, 1977, p.486; Leifer, 1976, p.348; Coggin, 1975, p.IO. 
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Indonesia has taken several. Whilst a forcible annexation of the territory was clearly an option 
from the beginning, the cost of a military operation was formidable, both financially and 
politically. President Suharto's authority was derived from his ability to deliver on promises of 
economic development; an unfavourable response to an invasion of East Timor from Indonesia's 
creditors, or an impression of instability that such an invasion might create, would threaten 
Suharto's position. Although the military influenced the decision to work towards the integration 
of East Timor, military means were not initially seen as the most suitable method of achieving 
this aim. A political solution was sought which would negate the need for military intervention. 
The decolonisation process led to the formation of political parties in East Timor. Of the parties 
that emerged, only one was firmly in support of integration with Indonesia. Whether the Popular 
Association for a Democratic Timor (APODETI) was created at the behest of Indonesia, or whether 
it spontaneously supported integration, is not clear from the available literature on East Timor. 
What is clear is that the party attracted the support of Indonesia, although not the popular support 
of the Timorese. Although Indonesia claimed otherwise, APODETI supporters might have been 
counted in hundreds, but never in thousands48. Indonesia's enthusiastic support for APODETI as a 
way of voluntarily integrating East Timor backfired; one of the motivations for a coalition 
between the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) and FRETILIN was apprehension at the 
possibility of intervention in support of APODETI 49 . The breakdown of the coalition hurtled 
East Timor toward civil war and removed any chance of peaceful integration of the territory. In the 
early stages of decolonisation, neither of the two political parties that attracted the bulk of popular 
support, UDT and FRETILIN, were advocating integration. It soon became apparent that East 
Timor would not become a part of the Republic within the framework of decolonisation. 
There was some tension between those who continued to advocate a negotiated settlement, notably 
Foreign Minister Adam Malik whom FRETILIN representatives had found reassuring, and those 
who preferred to take more decisive action. Ultimately policy was determined by the armed forces. 
Defence Minister General Panggabean warned that Indonesia would not hesitate to take action if 
the situation in East Timor threatened the stability of the region50. A military presence had been 
building up along the border with West Timor for some time, but negotiation with Portugal and 
the Timorese political parties continued. Pressure for a military solution reached its peak after the 
collapse of the FRETILIN-UDT coalition and subsequent civil war. In October of 1975 when the 
civil war was entering its fifth week, Coggin believed regional and international support was 
48 Dunn, 1983, p. 71; Nichter1ein, 1977, p.487. 
49 Nichter1ein, 1977, p.350. 
50 Crouch, 1978, p.340. 
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quietly in favour of armed interventionS!. Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam had made 
his position quite clear; he did not consider an independent East Timor either viable or desirable 
and had inclicated that Australia would not look unfavourably on armed intervention52. The United 
States had similarly indicated that they would not protest an Indonesian incursion into East 
Timor53. Assured of support for a military response, Indonesia had only to find an acceptable 
reason for entering the territory. 
Indonesia was provided with a legitimate excuse for intervention when Portugal rejected 
FRETll.JN' s unilateral declaration of independence. Portugal's failure to confer legitimacy on the 
FRETILIN government meant Indonesia could argue that the rights of the other parties in East 
Timor had been denied and that intervention was needed to protect the bulk of the population from 
FRETILIN atrocities54. On 7 September, 1975, following FRETILIN's victory in the brief civil 
war, the other four parties, UDT (recently persuaded to seek integration), Kota, Trabalhista and 
APODETI, jointly presented a petition to Indonesia requesting integration. This, and a later 
declaration of integration by a hastily assembled Peoples Assembly, was the basis of Indonesia' s 
claim that FRETILIN' s claim of independence did not represent the will of the majority55. 
From Indonesia's standpoint, the declaration of independence had closed all avenues for a peaceful 
solution. Portugal's rejection of the declaration legitimised Indonesian arguments that the 
declaration was not a valid result of decolonisation. Indonesia argued it had "a moral obligation to 
assist the people of East Timor and to ensure the decolonisation process could be implemented in 
accordance with the ideals and wishes of the entire population of the territory" 56. The statement 
added that Indonesia would take whatever steps it decreed necessary to safeguard Indonesian 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. As East Timor had never been a part of Indonesian territory, 
its independence was not a threat to the integrity of the Indonesian state per se. Rather, this 
statement, made a week before the invasion, indicates that an independent East Timor was 
considered provocative to separatist movements in Indonesia. The establishment, and survival, of a 
small island state would demonstrate the possibilities of political independence, and possibly 
become a political ally or refuge for separatist movements. 
51 Coggin, 1975, p.IO. 
52 Taylor, 1991, p.32. 
53 Torben Retboll , 1987 "The East Timor Conflict and Western Response", Bulletin of Concerned 
Asian Scholars, Vol. 19, No. I, Jan-March, p.30; Dunn, 1983, p.347-350. 
54 Department of Foreign Affairs, 1984, p.49. 
55 ibid, p.47. 
56 ibid. , p.47. 
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During the civil war Portugal had evacuated its administrative personnel to the island of Atauro off 
the coast of Dili. By December 8, Portugal had withdrawn its personnel from East Timor entirely. 
As the Indonesian army ransacked Dili, the Portuguese were sailing toward Darwin. Indonesia saw 
this as an abdication of responsibility by the administering power, the denial of any further claim 
to sovereignty and a green light for the formal of incorporation of the territory. Dunn argues that 
the Portuguese did not abandon their post but were forced out and that Portuguese sovereignty over 
the territory remains intact57. In that case, Portugal's consent, itself dependent on the consent of 
the Timorese, would have been required for formal integration to take place. By refusing to 
recognise continuing Portuguese sovereignty, Indonesia did perceive any further barriers to the 
incorporation of East Timor into the Republic. A 1981 television documentary screened in 
Portugal implied that the Portuguese government had acquiesced in the integration during secret 
talks with the Indonesians held in Hong Kong in June 197558. The Socialist Party, which formed 
the government at that time, denied these allegations. Whether there is any truth behind these 
claims or not, no formal recognition of the integration of East Timor by Portugal was 
forthcoming. 
57 Dunn, 1983, p.290. The argument that Portugal abandoned its colony and thereby forfeited its role as 
administering power was raised by Australia before the International Court of Justice in the Timor Gap 
case; see chapter 3. 
58 R etboll, 1983, p.60. 
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Chapter 3 
Australia, Indonesia and East Timor. 
Australia and Indonesia are profoundly different in terms of history, language, population and 
political and social cultures, yet their geographical proximity has forced them into an intimate 
relationship which requires significant cooperation and compromise. Indonesia is Australia' s 11th 
largest trading partner, and the second largest amongst the ASEAN countries. The total volume of 
trade is worth more than A$3 billion, and has almost tripled in the past five years; Australian 
exports, including crude oil, wheat, aluminium and cotton, are worth almost A$2 billion 
annually I. Australia is also a prominent investor in Indonesia, notably in the mining industry. 
Mining and petroleum interests in the Timor Sea have forced Australia to confront the issue of 
East Timor' s ambiguous sovereignty. Apprehension about the territorial ambitions of its large and 
powerful neighbour were put aside when Australia entered into treaty negotiations over the gap in 
the maritime boundary south of East Timor. This step required Australia to extend de jure 
recognition to Indonesian rule there, overriding previous reservations about the legality of such 
rule. Indonesia welcomed this belated recognition of its position in East Timor, and the 
opportunity to share in the exploitation of an estimated 5 billion barrels of oil in the Timor Sea2. 
Australia and Indonesia concluded the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty in 1989. The 
legality of the Treaty was challenged by Portugal which alleged that as it has yet to discharge the 
responsibilities of administrative authority through an internationally recognised act of self-
determination, it should have been party to the negotiations. Portugal brought the case before the 
International Court of Justice which drew it firmly back into the Timor sovereignty debate. The 
case highlighted Australia's relationship with Indonesia and its response to the conflict in East 
Timor. 
The existence of the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty is indicative of the ambiguity of the 
status of East Timor in the international community. According to its parties, the Treaty is a legal 
and binding instrument. It is considered a violation of East Timor' s sovereignty and Portuguese 
authority by its detractors . Regardless of viewpoint, the treaty prompted a re-examination of 
sovereignty, self-determination, aggression and state obligation as understood in international law; 
and of the legality of a treaty which disposes of the resources of a people whom the United 
Nations considers non-self-governing. 
!John Hamilton, 1995 "Suharto: The Puppet Master", Herald Sun , July I , p. 23. 
2 In Cold Blood- The East Timor Massacre, Yorkshire Television, 1992. 
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The Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty 
The Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty was signed on December 11, 1989 by Australian 
Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and his Indonesian counterpart Ali Alatas aboard a Royal 
Australian Airforce Jet as it flew across the gap in the Indonesian-Australian maritime boundary to 
the south of East Timor3 . Described by Gareth Evans as symbolising "the spirit of practical 
cooperation and friendship"4 which has characterised Indonesian-Australian relations, the treaty is 
unique in that pending the permanent delimitation of the seabed boundary, it creates an zone of 
joint jurisdictionS. The treaty overcomes differences of opinion between the parties as to the 
criteria for delimiting the boundary and enables both Australia and Indonesia to explore and exploit 
the resources in the Timor Gap, and share in the profits. 
The zone is divided into three sections: a northern section for exclusive exploitation by Indonesia, 
a southern section for exploitation by Australia, and a central section, straddling the boundary 
where the eastern and western parts of the permanent maritime boundary join across the gap, is for 
joint exploration and exploitation by Australia and Indonesia under the aegis of a Ministerial 
Council. Representation on this council includes the Australian Foreign and Resource Ministers, 
with their Indonesian counterparts, namely the Foreign Minister and the Mines and Energy 
Minister. 
The two states took more than ten years to reach this agreement; the nature of the arrangement 
means implementation of the treaty provisions will not always be smooth, as Fonteyne points 
out: 
the arrangement could be seen as somewhat less than ideal (it certainly 
represents a substantial compromise, for each side, of what it believes it is 
legally entitled to) and will, more than likely not, lead to episodic operational 
difficulties, given the legal, fiscal, economic, and political disparities 
between the two partners. 6 
Neither Australia nor Indonesia have publicly articulated misgivings about the arrangement 
however, and Gareth Evans has characterised the treaty as "a creative solution to the kind of 
3 "Timor Gap Treaty: Timorese Refugees Challenge the Commonwealth of Australia", Matebian News, 
Vol. 1, No.3, June 1993, p. l. 
4 Gareth Evans, 1991 "Australia-Indonesia Ties: Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation", Department of 
Foreign Affairs Monthly Record, Feb 1991, p. 45. 
5 AustraHan Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1989 Annual Report 1988-89, p. 89. 
6 Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, 1991 "The Portuguese Timor Gap Litigation Before the International Court of 
Justice: A Brief Appraisal of Australia's Position", Australian Journal of International Affairs, 45:2, p. 
170. 
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problem which has often led to conflict elsewhere"?. Unfortunately the treaty is not only creative 
in its allocation of resources, it is has also created a sovereign jurisdiction where none existed 
before. 
The negotiating background 
In 19728 Australia negotiated a maritime boundary with Indonesia, leaving a gap to the south of 
East Timor. Australia had attempted to close the gap through negotiations with Portugal, then 
accepted by Australia as the administering power of East Timor, but these did not go well. Each 
party sought to define the boundary by different criteria: Australia according to the 1958 Geneva 
Convention of the Continental Shelf, and Portugal according to the 1958 Geneva Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone9. 
Australia claims jurisdiction over its adjacent continental shelf, the Sahul shelf, to a distance 96 
kilometres from the coast of East Timor, more than 320 kms from the Northern Territory coast. 
Here, the Timor Trough stretches 800 km between Timor and North West Australia and is up to 
3400 metres deep!O. This geomorphological feature was at the heart of the Australian claim as its 
existence, Australia claimed, clearly demarcates the edge of the Australian continental shelf; the 
principle of natural prolongation of the shelf taking precedence over claims made by Portugal, and 
later Indonesia, that all countries are entitled to jurisdiction over 200 nautical miles from the coast, 
or to a median point in a case such as that of East Timor, where the opposite coastlines are less 
than 400 nautical miles apart II. Portugal refused to concede the median line and negotiations had 
ground to a halt by 1969. To emphasise its unwillingness to agree to any boundary demarcation 
other than a median line, the Portuguese government issued a decree in November of 1969 which 
stated: 
Unless an agreement has been concluded with a state whose coasts are 
adjacent or opposite to those of the Portuguese State, and providing that no 
special circumstances justify a different boundary line, the boundary of the 
continental shelf is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from 
the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadths of the respective 
territorial seas are measured.12 
7 Gareth Evans, 1993 Cooperating for Peace: the Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond, Allen & 
Unwin, St Leonards, p. 42. 
8 R D Lumb, 1981 "The Delimitation of Boundaries in the Timor Sea", Australian Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol 7, p. 73; this supplemented an earlier I97I agreement. 
9 Sections I and IV respectively of the Law of the Sea, UN Doc.NConf. I 3/L.52-L.55 
10 Keith Suter, 1993 "Timor Gap Treaty: The Continuing Controversy", Marine Policy, July, p. 299. 
II Suter , I 993, p. 300; Lumb, 1981, p. 72. 
l2 ibid 
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At the time this decree was made, Portugal regarded East Timor as an integral part of the 
Portuguese state and this decree therefore impinged directly on the Australian boundary claims. 
Although Portugal now recognises East Timor as a non-self-governing territory, it remains the 
titular administrative power and claims it should be party to any discussions intended to delimit 
the maritime boundary. However, even before the decree was issued, Portugal seems to have put 
only limited resources into negotiating a maritime boundary with Australia. Suter13 suggests that 
Portugal was content to await the outcome of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) in the hope that this might clarify the criteria needed to consider in the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries between opposite or adjacent states. Talks were revived in 
1971 but proved unsatisfactory. By the time UNCLOS deliberations assumed treaty form in 1982, 
Portugal was excluded from negotiations on the maritime boundary in the Timor Gap. Australia 
had chosen to negotiate with Indonesia instead. 
Portugal's changed attitude toward East Timor, from regarding it as an overseas province integral 
to the metropolitan state to regarding it as a non-self-governing territory, did affect Portugal's 
attitude toward the maritime boundary negotiations. Expecting the initiation of a decolonisation 
process in East Timor, Portugal reasonably assumed that the government of an independent East 
Timor would negotiate with Australia in its own right. The Indonesian invasion signalled not only 
the end of the Portuguese-implemented decolonisation process, but the end also of Australia's 
interest in further negotiations with Portugal. 
Martin and Pickersgi1114 suggest Australia abandoned negotiations with Portugal because it was 
anxious to begin exploration of the sea-bed and exploitation of its mineral reserves. Access to 
these required clear title. In the wake of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor, it was apparent that 
neither Portugal nor the self-declared provisional government of East Timor had sufficient control 
over the territory to negotiate a treaty giving title to the resources in the Timor Sea, thereby 
determining future rights and obligations under international law. Indonesia appeared to entrench 
itself as the governing authority, assuming the power to negotiate access to the seabed. 
Discussions to close the Timor Gap proved far more complicated than those which led to the 1972 
Indonesia-Australian boundary. Then, Indonesia conceded the principle of natural prolongation of v 
the continental shelf. The boundary, which excludes the Timor Gap, gives Australia control of 
around 70 percent of the seabed between the coast of the Northern Territory and that of West 
13 Suter, 1993, p. 299 
14 William Martin and Dianne Pickersgill, 1991 "Recent Developments: The Timor Gap Treaty", 
Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 32, p.580. 
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Timor. Australia conceded around 1350 square nautical miles of the continental slope, but this 
does not represent a substantial concession to Indonesia's demands for a boundary based on the 
median line15. The boundary was clearly defined and no cooperation across the boundary was called 
for. In the Timor Gap negotiations, Indonesia took a more aggressive stance. More than ten years 
were needed to formulate the Timor Gap agreement. Mills suggests this indicated dissatisfaction on 
the part of Indonesia with the existing maritime boundary - the area appears richer in minerals than 
Indonesia was aware at the time of the earlier boundary negotiations16. 
Formal recognition of Indonesian rule 
When the Fraser government began negotiations with Indonesia in 1979, it took the unprecedented 
step of extending de jure recognition to Indonesian rule of East Timor. Although it "remained 
critical of the means of incorporation", Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock said Indonesian rule in 
East Timor was a reality with which Australia must come to terms 17. Having recognised 
Indonesian jurisdiction, the Australian government no longer felt it necessary to include Portugal 
in the boundary negotiations. According to both Australia and Indonesia, Portugal's legal 
relationship with East Timor had ceased. This position contradicted UN General Assembly and 
Security Council resolutions passed after the Indonesian invasion which affirm Portugal's role as 
administering authority . No other state has extended formal recognition to Indonesian jurisdiction 
in East Timor although many maintain relations with Indonesia as though they had. 
Australia's decision to conclude the Timor Gap treaty with Indonesia, recognising its sovereignty 
over Timor's resources, has significant legal and political ramifications. As Bot notes, non-
recognition of a state is no longer automatically associated with an absence of bilateral relations. 
Normal treaty relations, indistinguishable from those with recognised states, are maintained with 
unrecognised governments18. However, in this instance Australia's action had alienated a third 
party. Portugal protested Australia's action before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), arguing 
that Australia is obliged "to refrain from any negotiation, signature or ratification of any 
agreement with a State other than the administering Power"19 . By negotiating with Indonesia 
15 Lumb, 1981 , p.74. 
l6 Andrew Mills, cited in Geoffrey C. Gunn 1994, A Critical View of Western Journalism and 
Scholarship on East Timor, Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, Australia, p.90. 
1 7 Andrew Peacock, Minister of Foreign Affairs, cited in Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
Annual Review 1978, p.29. 
18 B.R. Bot 1968, Non-Recognition and Treaty Relations, Oceana Publications Inc, Dobbs Ferry, New 
York, p.244. 
19 "Portugal vs. Australia, Cases Before the Court", International Court of Justice Yearbook 1992-93, 
p.170. 
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Australia ignored this obligation. Portugal regards the treaty as "violating the right of the people 
of Timor to self-determination and their sovereign right to their resources"20 as well as 
disregarding Portugal's status as administrator. 
The International Court of Justice 
The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It is the 
successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice and its statute is an integral part of the 
UN Charter21. Thus, all UN member states are parties to the statute of the ICJ and can be parties 
to cases before it, but can reject its jurisdiction in all, or some, instances or areas of law. Article 
36 of the Court's statute allows states to recognise as compulsory ipso facto the jurisdiction of the 
Court, or to recognise that jurisdiction only on condition of reciprocity of another state, or for a 
limited period of time22. Fewer than a third of UN members have accepted compulsory 
jurisdiction in all instances23 . Other states exclude themselves from accepting jurisdiction in 
some, or all, cases. Indonesia does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36 (2) nor 
does it accept Portugal's claim to East Timor and the grievance arising from it. 
The Court has two types of proceedings: advisory opinions which enable UN bodies to seek 
clarification of a legal question; and litigation, in which the Court will preside over disputes 
between states, delivering a ruling which is binding but rarely enforceable. Both types of 
proceeding require the Court to define and interpret international law, and it is through Court 
proceedings that the law of the international community is clarified. Portugal's application to the 
Court invited clarification of several legal issues of current importance, notably the obligation of 
states not to extend recognition to political entities which were formed by an act of aggression; 
and the principle of self-determination. Herein lay the weight of Portugal's case. 
Litigation may be brought before the Court by prior acceptance by both parties of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court (acceptance of Article 36(2)), as was the case in the Timor Gap 
20 From Portugal's submission to the International Court of Justice, cited in Martin and Pickersgill, 
1991 , p.579. 
21 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter XIV, Article 92; Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
Article I. 
22 Article 36 (2) and 36 (3) 
23 Evan Luard and Derek Heater, 1994 The United Nations: How it Works and What it Does (2nd ed), 
MacMillan, Basingstoke , p.91 . 
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litigation24; by the defendant agreeing to accept the writ of the Court; under a treaty clause which 
provides for referral of disputes to the ICJ; or by special agreement between parties. All these 
methods rely upon the consent of the parties involved and the Court will not deliver a judgement 
without it. Unless Indonesia had reversed its position regarding the competence of the Court, it 
could not have been be named as a defendant in the case. Though the case did not address 
Indonesia's transgression directly, if the Court had ruled in Portugal's favour, the illegality of 
Indonesia's annexation would have been implied. 
To avoid questions regarding Indonesia's lack of consent, Lisbon was careful to direct its complaint 
against Australia specifically. However, Lisbon's claim that Australia violated an obligation not 
to recognise Indonesia's annexation of Timor would have required the Court to assess the legality 
of Indonesia's action. Australia pointed out that without Indonesia' s consent, the Court had no 
authority to rule on Indonesia's actions25. As hearings began in the case, Australia reiterated that 
Lisbon's real dispute was with Jakarta and that the case should have been brought against 
Indonesia26. A precedent for the Court to overturn Australia's objection was set in the 1986 Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua. The Court rejected an 
objection by the United States that the absence of third parties implicated in the case meant the 
Court could not adjudicate, arguing the third parties were not 'truly indispensable'27. In the Timor 
Gap case however, the Court considered Indonesia's consent was necessary. The Court ruled by a 
14 - 2 majority that its statute barred it from ruling on Portugal's suit as it would first have to 
judge the legality of Indonesia's presence in East Timor, which it could not do without Indonesia's 
consent28. 
Australia viewed the Court's decision as a vindication of its position. Senator Evans said: "It just 
puts beyond doubt the status of the Timor Gap Treaty"29. In fact, the Court made no comment on 
the status of the Treaty. Portugal's case was rejected for procedural reasons, not for substantive 
24 In its application to the Court to institute proceedings against Australia, Portugal referred to the 
Declarations made by itself and Australia under Article 36 (2) in establishing the jurisdiction of the 
Court. 
25 Sasha Stepan ,1992 "Portugal's Action in the International Court of Justice Against Australia 
Concerning the Timor Gap Treaty" , Melbourne University Law Review, Vol. 18, p.920. 
26 "Portugal Says Timor Oil 'Tainted With Blood'" , Reuters News Service, January 30, 1995. 
27 Roger S. Clark 1992, "Timor Gap: The Legality of the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area 
Between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia" , Pace Yearbook of International 
Law 1992, p.85. 
28 Andrew Kelly, 1995a "Australia Wins World Court Ruling in Timor Oil Row", Reuters News Service, 
June 30. 
29 Gareth Evans, 1995, "Australian Foreign Minister on International Court Ruling on Timor Gap 
Treaty", Radio Australia, 1100 GMT, July 4. 
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ones. In its ruling, the Court emphasised that East Timor remained a non-self-governing territory 
and that its people retain the right to self-determination30. Thus, the Court indicated that the 
international community does not accept the claims of Indonesia and Australia that East Timor is 
de jure a part of Indonesia. Until East Timor's legal status is resolved, the legality of the Timor 
Gap Treaty is dubious at best. 
Before the Court 
In its case before the ICJ, Portugal argued that the conclusion of the Timor Gap Zone of Co-
operation Treaty breached Lisbon's rights as administering power of East Timor, as well as the 
East Timorese right to self-determination and sovereignty over Timor's natural resources31 . 
Portugal also alleged that Australia is obliged by UN General Assembly and Security Council 
resolutions taken at the time of the invasion, and in the years following, to recognise Portuguese 
authority over the territory, thereby rejecting Indonesia's claim to have jurisdiction over the 
resources in the Timor Sea. 
Portugal's case appeared fairly straightforward: decolonisation was being carried out under the 
auspices of the UN; Indonesia had committed an act of aggression against another state (at the 
time, Portugal); UN resolutions had condemned the invasion and called for the immediate 
withdrawal of Indonesian forces. It seemed clear that Australia had infringed international law in 
recognising Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, and that the Timor Gap treaty, which flows 
from this, was likewise illegal. The case was not so simple however. Australia raised many 
complicating issues and was likely to have raised others had the case proceeded. 
Stepan suggested Australia might have argued before the Court that the reality of Portugal ' s 
position as administrator of East Timor was a legal fiction32; the practical reality of Indonesian 
control gave Jakarta's claim legal weight. However, the argument that the government in control 
of a territory should be recognised as sovereign could easily have been countered by Lisbon which 
may have claimed Indonesia does not have (nor has it ever had) complete control over the 
territory33. In spite of Indonesian claims to the contrary, evidence continues to emerge that 
FALANTIL, the armed wing of resistance group FRETILIN, controls large sections of East 
30 Kelly, 1995a. 
31/CJ Yearbook 1992-93, p.I68-170. 
32 Stepan, 1992, p.922 
33 Martin & Pickersgill ,1991, p.580. 
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Timor's interior and that Indonesian troops stationed in East Timor are still waging war against 
them34. 
The retreat of the Portuguese administration to Atauro during the civil war in 1975, and its 
evacuation during the Indonesian invasion, invites speculation as to whether Portugal abdicated 
responsibility for its former colony at that time. Fonteyne argues that whether: 
such legal status as the initial United Nations resolutions may have provided, 
could be regarded as having been preserved in the face of nearly ten years of 
United Nations neglect of the situation and the reality of Indonesian control 
for over fifteen years, is highly doubtful.35 
The delay between Australia's recognition of Indonesia's annexation in 1978, and Portugal's 
registering of a diplomatic protest in 1985, was considerable and cast doubt on the sincerity of 
Portuguese concern over the matter. Martin and Pickersgi1I36 suggest Australia might have argued 
before the Court that it never recognised Portuguese interest in East Timor prior to the Indonesian 
takeover but its own attempts to negotiate an agreement over the Timor Sea prior to the 
Indonesian takeover negate this. 
Portugal's capacity to act in this matter stemmed from Security Council Resolution 384 of 
197637 which called on Portugal to co-operate with the UN to bring about self determination for 
the East Timorese. The right of self-determination being understood as perpetual, and recognised 
by the Court in its ruling, the time delay between the commencement of negotiations and the v 
lodging of a protest was irrelevant to the case. Indeed, Portugal's protest was launched two weeks 
after the domestic implementation of the Treaty in Australia. Stepan argues that until the treaty 
was implemented, no violation of Portuguese rights had occurred, and therefore no significant time 
delay38. 
Portugal's rights were less central to the case than those of the East Timorese, on whose behalf 
Portugal brought the suit. The structure of the UN and its agencies means that nations which have 
not achieved statehood cannot petition the Court directly; they must act through a member state or 
34 Reports of military and resistance activity are published regularly by non-governmental 
organisations, newspapers and official sources; for example, see Michael Casey "Soldier's Diary Tells of 
War in the Field", West Australian, December 17, 1994, p.6-7; Jill Joliffe "Jakarta Launches New 
Offensive" Sydney Morning Herald, August 26, 1994, p.10. 
35 Fonteyne, 1991, p.42 
36 Martin and Pickersgill, 1991, p.580 
37 cited in Stepan, 1992, p.920 
38 ibid 
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UN agency. Portugal thus acted not only on its own behalf as administering power of East Timor, 
but as a representative of the East Timorese people. Fonteyne suggests: 
the United Nations and, ultimately, the world community, by reference to the 
alleged violation by Australia of the East Timorese people's rights of self-
determination and permanent sovereignty over natural resources39. 
The outcome of the case, and the opinion of the court, would have given insight into the current 
status of Timor's sovereignty, and in so doing, delimit the right of self-determination as it stands 
in international law today. As the state which bears international responsibility for East Timor, it 
is appropriate that Portugal brought the case before the Court. 
Canberra's Pragmatic Approach 
In developing a relationship with Indonesia regarding East Timor and its resources, Australia 
appears to have ignored some customary international law, of which the 1970 Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States 
may be considered. Australia was active in the seven year drafting process of this Resolution and 
co-sponsored it when it was introduced into the General Assembly40. It was adopted unanimously 
and sets forth the principle that "no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force 
shall be recognised as legal"41 . In addition to the declaration on Friendly Relations, the 1974 
Resolution on the Definition of Aggression states that "no territorial acquisition or special 
advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be recognised as lawful"42. Both resolutions 
establish propositions of international law or of international treaty law and, as Clark has 
suggested, represent an authoritative interpretation of the UN Charter43. 
Parties to treaties and negotiated instruments such as the Declaration on Friendly Relations intend 
that they should have legal consequences in the form of legal obligations. As a sponsor of that 
Declaration, Australia clearly intended that it be bound by the obligations resulting from it, yet 
instead denies that it is. Gareth Evans questions the relevance of the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations to East Timor's situation, saying: 
39 Fonteyne, 1991, p.173 
40 Clark, 1992, p.76-77. 
41 UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV) 
42 General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) , Article 5 (3) 
43 op cit 
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There is no binding legal obligation not to recognise the acquisition of a 
territory that was acquired by force. Such a recognition does not, of course, 
imply approval of the circumstances of the acquisition. In international law 
the legality of the original acquisition has to be distinguished in subsequent 
dealings between the state acquiring that new territory and other states - in 
this instance, Australia.44 
Fonteyne supports Evans' assertion that there is no binding legal obligation not to recognise 
Indonesian acquisition of East Timor, arguing "non-recognition of 'illegal situations' is highly 
debatable"45. Clark, however, argues that the Declaration on Friendly Relations represents either a 
customary rule of law or an authoritative interpretation of the UN Charter and should therefore 
have the full force of internationallaw46. Clark is supported in this view by Stepan and Suter, and 
by legal precedent in the Advisory Opinion Concerning Namibia. The ruling, delivered by the ICJ 
in 1971, stated that states were obliged to refrain from entering into treaty relations with South 
Africa in cases where it purported to act on behalf of Narnibia47. Stepan writes: 
This ICJ opinion on Namibia is clearly analogous to the East Timor 
situation, where Indonesia maintains a continued illegal presence and 
Australia has entered into treaty relations with Indonesia in respect of an area 
pertaining to East Timor's interests.48 
Although South Africa's presence in Namibia had been established under a legal frame work (that 
of mandated trust territories), South Africa's position at the time this opinion was delivered was 
similar to that of Indonesia - it maintained a presence there in contravention of international law 
and in spite of condemnation by the UN. Although international hostility toward the apartheid 
policies pursued by South Africa were a factor in this condemnation, and far outweigh hostility .... 
toward Indonesia's policies in East Timor, the legal issues are similar. 
The decision to abandon the principles espoused in the Declaration on Friendly Relations and deny 
the existence of an international duty not to recognise Indonesia's acquisition of East Timor is 
characteristic of Australia's response to the conflict since it first erupted. Australia's has 
consistently reacted in favour of practical realities at the expense of moral and legal principles 
44 Hansard, Senate (Australia) , I November, 1989, cited in Clark 1992, p.78. 
45 Fonteyne, 1991 , p.177. 
46 Clark, 1992, p.81; Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice directs it to apply 
"international conventions ... establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting States;" and 
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law". 
47 Stepan, 1992, p.924; Suter, 1993, p.301 ; ICJ Rep 16 [1971] 
48 Stepan, 1992, p.925 
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involved. This especially true of the Timor Gap issue as this 1975 quote from the Australian 
Ambassador to Indonesia, Richard Woolcott, indicates: 
It would seem to me that [the Department of Minerals and Energy] might 
well have an interest in closing the present gap in the agreed sea border and 
this could be much more readily negotiated with Indonesia than with 
Portugal or independent Portuguese Timor. I know I am recommending a 
pragmatic rather than a principled stand but that is what national interest and 
foreign policy is all about.49 
Australia's support for self-determination 
When Portugal first initiated decolonisation procedures in East Timor in the wake of the 1974 
Lisbon coup, Australian government policy was to support self-determination for the East 
Timorese50. Australia's initial response to the invasion was critical, and it supported the first UN 
General Assembly Resolution of December 12, 1975, calling for a withdrawal of Indonesian 
troops, although it did abstain from the paragraph deploring Indonesia's military interventionS!. 
This position changed as it became clear that Portugal was not going to play an active part in the 
decolonisation process and incorporation into Indonesia came to be seen as the 'tidiest' solution to 
the decolonisation problem52. 
In the United Nations, Australia's position of qualified support reverted to one of abstention in 
following resolutions; in 1976 and 1977 on the grounds that the resolutions suffered from defects 
and in 1978 on the grounds that the resolution did not reflect a realistic appreciation of the 
situation in East Timor and no practical purpose was served by it. In 1982 it opposed a resolution 
requesting the Secretary General of the UN to initiate consultation with all parties concerned with 
a view to achieving a comprehensive settlement of the conflict, on the grounds that it effectively 
disputed Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor 53. 
Australia's voting m the UN took place in the context of an ambivalent relationship with 
Indonesia on the one hand, and concerns about Cold War politics on the other. While Canberra was 
49 Cable from Mr Woolcott to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, August 17, 1975. 
Reprinted in Documents on Australian Foreign and Defence Policy 1968-1975, 1981 :197 
50 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 1983 The Human Rights and Conditions 
of the People of East Timor, Government Publishing Service, Canberra, p.72 
5l ibid, p.75. 
52 ibid, p.75. 
53 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs Annual Report 1977, p.40; Annual Report 1978, p.29 
Annual Report 1982, p.49. 
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concerned that the Indonesian leadership still had expansionist ideas54, it was also concerned that 
an independent East Timor would pose a threat to the territorial integrity and political stability of 
Indonesia, and endanger regional stability. Good relations with Indonesia were also considered to be 
of prime importance55. Australia's position was also influenced by the posture adopted by the 
United States. Attempts to balance internal opposition to the Indonesian government with foreign 
policy concerns led to a somewhat ambivalent approach to the Timor conflict. 
Criticism of Australia's position 
Australia's Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence has been critical of 
Australian policy regarding East Timor and of the extent to which the Department of Foreign 
Affairs has influenced that policy. The Committee noted that the Department had adopted "a less 
than even handed approach in discussing conditions in East Timor" and that the Department was 
uncritical in its assessment of Indonesian activity there56. The Committee did support the 
pragmatic approach taken by Canberra, agreeing that de facto recognition of Indonesian 
administration of East Timor was something Australia must accept. However the Committee drew 
the line at de jure recognition, arguing that such recognition discredits Australia in the field of 
human rights and in the United Nations. The Committee took the view that "the Indonesian 
occupation of East Timor is an illegal act which the mere passage of time cannot legitimise", and 
recommended that an internationally recognised act of self-determination be made the condition for 
formal recognition of Indonesian rule in East Timor57. To an extent, this word play over the 
distinction between de facto and de jure recognition amounted to tacit approval of Australia's 
bilateral relations with Indonesia; criticism by the Senate Standing Committee is thus somewhat 
hypocritical. 
Australian policy regarding East Timor also attracted criticism from the opposition Labour Party, 
although the party's position altered significantly when it came to power. Following Prime 
Minister Fraser's acceptance of Indonesia's de facto control, Opposition leader Bill Hayden 
described Indonesia's occupation of East Timor as unjustifiable, illegal, immoral and inexcusable, 
54 Harold Crouch, 1990 "Indonesia and the Security of Australia and Papua New Guinea" in Desmond 
Ball and Cathy Downes (eds), Security and Defence: Pacific and Global Perspectives [publ.isher], Sydney, 
NSW., p.379. 
55 John Fuhrman, 1993 "East Timor: An Intractable Problem", New Zealand International Review, 
Vol.l8, No.I, p.26. 
56 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence 1983, p.78. 
57 ibid, p.78-80 
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and recognition of it as inconceivable58. Following their victory in the 1983 Federal elections, the 
Labour Party under Bob Hawke began to take a more conciliatory approach to Indonesia and the 
East Timor issue. A resolution adopted by the Labour Party in 1982 calling for a reversal of the 
Liberal government's recognition of East Timor was overturned during the 1984 Federal Labour 
Party Conference. The Labour Party voted to officially recognise Indonesian incorporation of East 
Timor59. The 1982 Conference had confirmed the Labour Party's support for the "inalienable 
rights of the East Timorese to self-determination and independence" and rejected Australian 
Government recognition of annexation, but by 1986 all reference to self-determination, 
independence and human rights had been removed from the Party's platforrn60. The Liberal and 
Labour parties now concur on recognition of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor, arguing that 
whilst the circumstances of the annexation were regrettable, it is now a fait accompli and must be 
accepted as such. The Timor issue is still prominent in Australia's party politics, within parties if 
not between them61 . 
Fuhrman suggests that recognition of Indonesian annexation of East Timor is still a divisive issue 
within the Labour Party62. These divisions were aggravated by the restrained response of the 
Labour government to the 1991 Dili massacre, particularly in light of Hawke' s tearful outburst 
decrying China's use of force in putting down the 1989 Tiananmen Square democracy protests. 
Although Prime Minister Hawke did not go so far as to renew the question of self-determination, 
he did call on the Indonesian government to abandon the use of military force and attempt to reach 
a negotiated settlement in East Timor63. More recently , the left wing of the Labour Party has 
described government policy toward East Timor as "bankrupt"64. 
It appears that the Clinton administration ' s stance on East Timor has influenced Australia's 
position on human rights issues at least. In March, 1993, Australia followed the US lead and 
supported a resolution critical of Indonesia in the Uited Nations Commission on Human Rights . 
This position must have been uncomfortable however, because when Prime Minister Paul Keating 
visited Washington in September, 1993, he urged President Clinton to be more "balanced" in his 
58 Cited in Gunn ,1994, p.143 
59 Peter Hastings, 1984 "Two Weeks in Politics" Far Eastern Economic Review, July 12, p.13; Gunn 
1994, p.146 
60 Gunn, 1994, p.149. 
61 Karen Middleton, 1995, "Left Slams Policy on East Timor'', The Age, July 3. 
62 Fuhrman, 1993, p.28. 
63 ibid. 
64 Middleton, 1995. 
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approach to human rights in Indonesia. Jakarta received these remarks warmly and Foreign 
Minister Ali Alatas praised Keating's "moral fibre"65. 
Australia's recognition of Indonesia's annexation, though consistent with its response to the Timor 
conflict generally, is inconsistent with past decisions to withhold recognition of governments who 
control territory or came to power as a result of force; it withheld recognition of the Vietnamese-
backed regime in Cambodia, of the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan, and of the Soviet 
annexation of the Baltic states. In this last instance, Australia withheld recognition for over 30 
years, negating any suggestion that the duration of Indonesia's de facto control over East Timor 
can be accepted as de jure controJ66. Unlike other instances of Canberra withholding recognition, 
in this case "both governments [Australian and Indonesian] have sought to 'contain' differences 
over East Timor and not Jet it affect other aspects of their relationship"67. Suter points out that 
Australia has a vested interest in seeking to maintain stability in lndonesia68 and, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, support for East Timor's independence would run counter to this aim. 
Sovereignty over Resources 
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf recognises, in Article 2, the sovereign 
rights of a coastal state over its continental shelf for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its 
natural resources . These rights are exclusive and do not depend upon any proclamation or 
occupation69. Indonesia's claim to the oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea rests on the claim 
that Indonesia is the sovereign authority in East Timor. It has been demonstrated that this claim is 
flimsy at best. 
The dubious legality of Indonesia's claim to East Timor, and of the Timor Gap Zone of 
Cooperation Treaty, has not deterred oil companies from commencing oil and gas exploration, 
however. By March, 1986, the Australian government had reportedly received A$31.5 million 
from bids from oil companies wanting rights to drilling sites in the Timor Gap area70. There have 
been two commercial oil discoveries in the Zone of Cooperation since since the treaty came into 
65 Herbert Feith, 1993, The East Timor Issue Since the Capture of Xanana Gusmao, East Timor Talks 
Campaign, Melbourne, p.8. 
66 Stepan, 1992, p.924. 
67 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, 1979, Annual Report 1978, p.29. 
68 Suter,J993, p.297-298 
69 Rene-Jean Dupuy, 1974 The Law of the Sea, Current Problems, Oceania Publications Inc, Dobbs 
Ferry, New York, p. 137. 
70 Sydney Morning Herald, March 4, cited in Taylor. 1991 , p. 208. 
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force in February, 1991. The largest, expected to yield an estimated 50 million barrels of oil, is 
operated by Australian-based mining giant The Broken Hill Pty Company. Nine other companies 
are exploring the area, at an estimated cost of A$400 million 71 . 
Suter suggests that oil companies have no interest in which government controls access to oil 
resources, as they are able cooperate with any government, but they do require a degree of stability 
before making the considerable investment needed for exploration and exploitation72. Taylor 
disagrees. He notes that in December, 1974, a party of American officials travelled to Lisbon on 
behalf of the Oceanic Company of Denver, Colorado, to sign a Timor Gap exploration agreement 
with the Portuguese government. Adobe Oil and Gas, another American company, had already 
signed a similar agreement73. The potential of the Timor Gap not been widely realised at this 
time, and the concessions attracted little interest. Australian oil interests were an exception, 
however. Their explorations in areas adjacent to the Timor Gap had indicated that the sea-bed could 
contain substantial oil and gas deposits. Taylor argues the Australian oil lobby perceived that its 
interests would be best protected by Indonesian annexation of East Timor. The oil lobby pursued 
an intense campaign of backroom lobbying in favour of integration and later devoted considerable 
resources to reversing the Portuguese - American exploration agreements 74. 
Magalhaes also notes a convergence of the interests of the oil lobby and those of Australia and 
Indonesia in supporting Indonesian annexation of East Timor75. But this convergence of interests 
should be understood in terms of a perceived likelihood that an Australian-Indonesian agreement 
over the Timor Gap would be reached long before an independent East Timor emerged to dispense 
exploration contracts. East Timor's sovereign rights over its continental shelf are permanent76. If 
an independent East Timor was established, Indonesian control over the seabed, the resources 
therein, and East Timor's territorial waters, would cease in practice as they have no basis in law. 
71 Reuter News Service, 1995, "Australia Welcomes World Court's Timor Decision", June 30. 
72 Suter, 1993, p.301. 
73 Taylor, 1991, p. 37 - 38. 
74 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Canberra, February 25, 1978; 
cited in Taylor, 1991, p. 38. 
75 A. Barbedo de Magalhaes, 1992 East Timor: Indonesian Occupation and Genocide, Presidents Office, 
Oporto University, p.51. 
76 In 1955, the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted a draft article, as part of the 
Human Rights Covenants, on the right of self -determination. The second paragraph of the article 
provides: ''The peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources 
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the 
principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means 
of subsistence. 
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The Australian High Court Challenge 
Australia's right to make a treaty with Indonesia concerning East Timor's resources came under 
attack domestically as well as in the International Court of Justice. Representatives of the 
Australian-based Timorese resistance organisation, the National Council of Maubere Resistance, 
challenged the validity of the 1990 Federal legislation implementing the Zone of Cooperation 
Treaty in Australia's High Court, arguing the treaty "is, and at all material times has been, void in 
accordance with internationallaw"77. These allegations had much in common with those made by 
Portugal before the ICJ in that they focused on Australia's right to make the treaty. The case 
brought before the domestic court also cited Australia's domestic legislation and constitution, 
challenging the right of the executive to make tax payments to Indonesia (in accordance with the 
agreement to share profits from the different sections of the Timor Gap), and arguing the 
Commonwealth of Australia did not have the executive power to make the treaty78. 
Although the Court upheld the legislation's validity, important legal and political issues were 
raised. The High Court was required by this case to delimit the extent of Australia's sovereign 
authority. The case questioned the point at which the Commonwealth ceases to be guided by its 
constitution and domestic law and instead becomes bound by international law. The High Court 
was required to determine the extent of the Commonwealth's external affairs power as allowed for 
in section 51(29) of the Australian Constitution79. Although Portugal's suit in the International 
Court of Justice named Australia as the defendant, the suit was as much directed at Indonesia as 
Australia, and this was Portugal's downfall. The High Court challenge was more clearly directed at 
Australia itself. The case was politically embarrassing for Australia and the government questioned 
the jurisdiction of the Court in this case. However, because the allegations are related to the 
constitution and tax laws, the High Court was the most appropriate forum for the case to be heard. 
The importance of defining East Timor's legal status 
The case brought before the ICJ by Portugal regarding the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty 
was important not only in terms of the settlement of the Timor conflict but in terms of the legal 
principles it involved. It came at a time when renewed attention was being paid to international 
law, which is becoming sought after as a tool for clarifying relations among states since the 
77 cited in Ian McPhedran, 1993 "Self-determination Basis of Court Move", The Canberra Times June 
26, p.15 
78 Matebian News , November 1993, p.4 
79 Verge Blunden, 1994, "Treaty With Indonesia Challenged", Sydney Morning Herald, August 10, p.8. 
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dichotomy of the cold-war order has collapsed80. Law is increasingly being promoted as universal 
in nature and beyond nationalistic interpretation. Janis writes "nothing catalyzes the transformation 
of international law more substantially than the decline of the sovereign state"81 though the 
challenge is not so much to the state itself as to the extent of its sovereignty - as could be seen in 
both the ICJ case and the case in Australia's High Court. 
The case highlighted Australia's relationship with Indonesia and, like the case in Australia's High 
Court, questioned the extent to which states can promote bilateral relationships at the expense of 
international legal principles designed to regulate such relationships. As Lord McNair points out, 
states enter into agreements, such as the Declaration on Friendly Relations, by exercising their 
sovereignty, and they intend the effect of that act to be a limitation of their sovereignty82. 
Membership of the United Nations, and ratification of its resolutions, means acceptance of the 
body of customary international law. Such acceptance means no state is sufficiently independent or 
sovereign to use force, recognise advantage gained from the use of force, or in any other manner 
disregard international law. 
In addition to clarifying the obligations of third parties involved in the East Timor conflict, the 
case before the ICJ effectively required the Court to clarify the current legal status of East Timor 
itself; whether the Decolonisation framework established by the United Nations still applies to 
East Timor or whether, as Australia argues, Indonesian rule must be accepted as afait accompli. 
The value of this case would not have been found in the practical application of the Court's ruling, 
whatever it may have been, but in the clarification of international Jaw as it affects the parties 
involved, especially East Timor. The elucidation of legal principles would have provided a firm 
basis for future efforts to win self-determination for East Timor. A ruling in Portugal's favour 
would have been unlikely to affect bilateral relations between Indonesia and states such as 
Australia and New Zealand however, both of which have chosen to reinterpret or ignore principles 
of their respective foreign policies in order to develop relations with Jakarta. 
80 Mark W. Janis, 1991 "International Law?" Harvard International Law Journal, 32:2, p.364. 
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82 McNair, 1961 , p.754. 
60 
Chapter 4 
New Zealand and East Timor 
New Zealand's response to the East Timor issue is in many ways typical of the international 
community. New Zealand has consistently supported the political rights of the East Timorese to 
self-determination as well as their human rights. But, in common with other states, this support 
has been verbal rather than concrete. New Zealand maintains relations with Indonesia and is active 
in developing the relationship. 
Several factors have influenced New Zealand's response to the Timor conflict. Relations with 
ASEAN and economic interests in Southeast Asia have been an important factor, as have security 
interests in the region. New Zealand is a small state with a characteristic interest in the rule of 
international law yet the legal principles raised by the conflict have not had a great impact on this 
country's response. Relations with Australia and the United States have been of prime importance; 
New Zealand is to a certain extent, constrained by their approaches to the conflict!. 
New Zealand in the wider world 
New Zealand's relations with the US have their origins in the Second World War. McMillan 
identifies the fall of Singapore to the Japanese in 1942 as the catalyst which led New Zealand to 
explore the possibility of a security relationship with the US. Realising that Britain did not have 
the capacity to protect New Zealand's security interests, New Zealand sent an envoy to 
Washington2. Like Australia, New Zealand became aware during the Second World War that the 
future security and development of the Pacific, important for its own security, could only be 
achieved with US cooperation. 
Following World War II, New Zealand and Australia became responsible for managing the Pacific 
region in the interests of the Western alliance. US hegemony in the region meant little was 
required of New Zealand to maintain Pacific stability3 . This changed somewhat in the 1980s as 
island states became more independent and outward looking in their foreign policy. Soviet interest 
1 However, Maurice East argues that in the post cold war era, small states have fewer constraints on their 
foreign policy as the dichotomy of the cold war collapses, and regional and multilateral issues become 
more important - Seminar: "The Foreign Policy of Small States", October 4, 1994, Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Wellington. 
2 Stuart McMillan, 1987 Neither Confirm Nor Deny: The Nuclear Ships Dispute Between New Zealand 
and the United States, Allen & Unwin/Port Nicholson Press, Wellington. p.6. 
3 David Hegarty, 1991 "Australia, Indonesia and Stability in the South Pacific", in Desmond Ball and 
Helen Wilson (eds), Strange Neighbours : The Australia-Indonesia Relationship, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney, p.68. 
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in the region increased in the early 1980s, expressed in fishing agreements with Kiribati and 
Vanuatu, and was finally articulated by Gorbachev in 19864. Concern that an increased Soviet 
presence might extend superpower conflict into the area, and into the Asia-Pacific region as a 
whole, increased interest in the stability of anti-communist Indonesia, a powerful influence in the 
region. 
After the Cold War 
Young argues that during the Cold War, the US viewed the Asia-Pacific region solely in the 
context of superpower relations5. As the containment and denial strategy which was the basis of 
America's policy in Asia and the Pacific was relaxed, so pressure on allies like Australia and New 
Zealand to view conflict in the region in ideological terms decreased. Lehmann identifies a shift 
from the geopolitics of the Cold War to the geoeconomics of the post-Cold War as important to 
relations in the Asia Pacific region6. The realist perspective of the world as a dangerous place 
where security is defined as military security and politics as a power play has made room for 
economic considerations. Security has been redefined as secure access to markets and politics as a 
means of securing this. This is particularly true of the Indonesia - New Zealand relationship. The 
emphasis in policy making has shifted from strategic to economic concerns, and bilateral relations 
are less dominated by security agreements. New Zealand's relationship with Indonesia is 
characterised by economic rather than security concerns which contrasts with Australia's more 
ambivalent relationship with Indonesia. 
Although trade is of increasing importance in regional relations, security issues are still a 
prominent feature of policy discussions?. New Zealand' s special defence relationship with 
Australia, its involvement in the Five Power Defence Arrangement with Britain, Singapore, 
Malaysia and Australia, and in the ANZUS agreement, mean that New Zealand's security views are 
linked to those of its trans-Tasman neighbour. New Zealand participates in military exercises with 
Australia and Indonesia. However, without the pressure of having Indonesia as a neighbour, and 
4 Jusuf Wanandi, 1991 "Developments and Challenges in the South Pacific" in Desmond Ball and Helen 
Wilson (eds), p.53. 
5 Thomas-Durrell Young, 1994 "Prospects for Future Australian-United States Defence Cooperation", 
The Pacific Review, Vol.7 , No.2, p.197. 
6 Jean-Pierre Lehmann, 1994 "Reorganizing Western Cooperation: A Prescription for Collective Pax 
Americana", The Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 2. p.l45. 
7 Tony Kevin, 1991 "Major Power Influences on the Southeast Asian Region: An Australian View" in 
Ball & Wilson (eds), p.ll. 
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being less firmly ensconced in the Western AllianceS, New Zealand could potentially pursue an 
independent policy on East Timor. New Zealand has not done this and instead consistently refuses 
to condemn Indonesian rule there and confines itself to commenting on human rights abuses and 
development issues. This can perhaps be attributed to the fact that despite a change in emphasis 
from geopolitics to geoeconomics as the basis of the regional policies of Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States, New Zealand's interests are seen as best served by a continuation of its early 
policy of supporting de facto Indonesian rule in East Timor. Although the justification for it has 
changed, the policy itself has not. 
New Zealand in the Asia-Pacific region 
Although a small state in global terms, in the Pacific New Zealand is a major actor and directly ..c. 
affected by conflict and instability in the region. Pacific politics have also contributed to the 
maintenance of New Zealand's East Timor policy. Concerns about stability were highlighted by 
the May 1987 coup in Fiji. In Papua New Guinea, the conflict in Bougainville, shifting coalition 
governments, law and order problems and restiveness in the army are identified as potentially 
destabilising factors9. 
Against this background, political instability in Indonesia is even more unwelcome as it could 
become a catalyst for conflict in the South Pacific, particularly in Papua New Guinea where it 
shares a border. Political principles such as self-determination seem relatively unimportant against 
the perceived threats to security which might come from upholding them. Regional security issues 
have replaced Cold War alliances as a major influence on New Zealand's policy toward East Timor, 
but the policy itself has remained largely unchanged. Hegarty suggests Indonesia has attempted to 
gain support for its East Timor position through closer relations with South Pacific nations and 
has expanded diplomatic links in an effort to gauge pan-Melanesian support for the Organisasi 
P~pua Merdeka resistance movement in West Papua I 0. 
Wanandi suggests that ASEAN nations will increasingly become involved in development in 
South Pacific nations, previously the preserve of Australia and New Zealand, in order_ to reduce 
their economic vulnerability II. As a member of the South Pacific Forum, and a primary source of 
8 The breakdown of the ANZUS alliance following the introduction of New Zealand's nuclear ships 
policy is an example of this. Also, unlike Australia, New Zealand does not have US defence research and 
communications facilities such as those at Pine Gap and Nurrangar on its territory - Young, 1994, 
p. l98 . 
9 Hegarty 1991 , p.75. 
10 ibid, p. 73. 
11 Wanandi , 1991. 
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development assistance for many Pacific island states, New Zealand will be closely involved in 
any such developments. Echoing New Zealand's Foreign Ministry, Australia's Foreign Minister, 
Senator Gareth Evans, identified economic development as the key to political stability in the 
region and argued the development of democratic political processes should be encouraged 12. 
Formulating New Zealand's East Timor Policy 
New Zealand's official response to the conflict in East Timor has been remarkably consistent. 
Successive governments have considered the stability of the region, and Indonesia in particular, as 
their primary concern. While New Zealand insists it has never condoned the 1975 invasion, it 
regards Indonesia as having de facto control of the former Portuguese colony. New Zealand has not 
been able to avoid addressing the Timor question altogether, however, particularly following the 
death of a New Zealand citizen in the 1991 Dili Massacre, the reporting and filming of which 
raised the conflict's profile in world-wide. New Zealand can hardly be characterised as an outspoken 
critic of the Indonesian regime however; the policy stance of successive governments suggests 
good relations with Indonesia have consistently had most priority. 
The bilateral framework in which New Zealand first developed its East Timor policy was 
constructed from ideological and Cold War concerns. Kerr suggests that at the time of the 
invasion, 'security' was a broad concept, incorporating economic development, state and nation 
building, and regime maintenancel3. In addition to these aspects, New Zealand identified stability, 
especially in the extensive, fragile state oflndonesia, as the key to regional security. 
When Indonesia invaded East Timor, "regional stability and security"l4 were thus stressed by New 
Zealand as being of primary importance. New Zealand noted that Indonesia was troubled by 
separatist movements in other parts of its archipelago, and that an independent East Timor could 
aggravate this threat to stability by providing a base for those seeking a disintegration of 
Indonesia, or for dissidents such as the PKI who could operate with impunity from an independent 
Timor15 . This was similar to Indonesia's view of where an independent East Timor might lead, 
suggesting that information received by the Ministry came from the Indonesians themselves, or 
from other sources supporting such views. 
12 Gareth Evans, 1988, cited in Hegarty 1991 , p.69. 
13 Pauline Kerr, 1994 "The Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific" , The Pacific Review, 7:4, p.397. 
14 Briefing for a visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Southeast Asia, 16 March - 8 April, 1976, 
dated February 12, 1976; document released under the Official Information Act. 
15 ibid. 
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By the time the Cold War order collapsed, diminishing the ideological and balance-of-power 
concerns that had influenced New Zealand's policy of support for the Indonesian regime, the 
relevant relationship had developed to the extent that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered it 
"too important for it to be dominated by [the East Timor] issue"l6. Consequently, New Zealand's 
East Timor policy did not alter in any fundamental way. "Stability" gained less mention in 
government communiques as the reason for supporting Indonesian rule in East Timor, but 
remained a concern for the New Zealand government. 
The government characterised its response to the invasion as "restrained", particularly in its 
criticism of Indonesia 17. Annexation of East Timor was quickly accepted as a fait accompli, and 
whilst New Zealand has since raised human rights concerns with Jakarta, successive governments 
have avoided commenting on political questions, being careful to distance human rights issues 
from other aspects of the bilateral relationship. 
Events in East Timor were said to have "cast a shadow over our attitude toward Indonesia" 18, but 
officials noted that despite having the lowest per capita GDP of the ASEAN countries, Indonesia's 
total GDP is equal to 40% of the combined GDP of all other ASEAN countries, making it a 
leading economic and political power in the region 19. Trade between the two countries has grown 
apace; the value of New Zealand exports to Indonesia increased from NZ$99 million in 1986 to 
NZ$173 million in 1991. The volume of trade that year was NZ$239 million20. 
New Zealand allocates some bilateral development assistance to Asia of which NZ$5 million goes 
to Indonesia21. Following the invasion of East Timor, the percentage of New Zealand aid spent in 
Indonesia increased from 31% in 1975-6 to 43% in I 976-7722. Following a visit to East Timor in 
l6 Perspectives on New Zealand's Foreign Policy , Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Bulletin No. 
19, November, 1986, p.38. 
17 Report of a call from the New Zealand Ambassador in Jakarta to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, May ' ,_.......,.... ~ 
5, 1976; document released under the Official Information Act. 
18 ibid. 
I9 ibid. 
20 Asean and New Zealand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Bulletin No. 40, September, 1992, 
p.6. 
21 Sarah Crichton, 1994 "Push for East Timor Aid Likely- MP", The Dominion, November 2, p.l5 . '"" 
22 Briefing prepared prior to visit by the new Indonesian Ambassador, October 18, 1976; document 
released under the Official Information Act. 
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October, 1994, MP Roger McClay, leader of a parliamentary delegation, suggested a portion of 
New Zealand's aid to Indonesia be ear-marked for East Timor to improve its infrastructure23. 
New Zealand also maintains a defence cooperation programme with Indonesia. Infantry officers, 
small arms and combat instructors, marine patrol pilots, Skyhawk technicians and flying 
instructors have all received New Zealand training24. These military links have become 
increasingly contentious as concern about human rights violations by the Indonesian military 
intensifies. The Bolger government has rejected calls from its Labour and Alliance opponents to 
curtail military links in protest at such abuses. 
Other states and New Zealand 
New Zealand's stance is hardly unique. Like Australia and some other states, New Zealand bas 
weighed the advantages possibly gained from standing by self-determination principles and 
supporting independence for East Timor in the United Nations, via pressure on Indonesia, as 
against the considerable benefits derived from maintaining good relations with Jakarta. 
Nevertheless New Zealand was reluctant to get itself identified as an outright supporter of 
Indonesia. In June, 1976, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Frank Corner advised the Minister that "it is 
doubtful, however, whether any New Zealand interest would benefit tangibly by identifying New 
Zealand too closely with the [blacked out] way the Indonesians are setting about achieving their 
objective"25. New Zealand was anxious not to attend the Provisional Goverenment of East Timor 
(PGET) referendum calling for integration unless representatives from other states also attended. 
Foreign Affairs Minister Brian Talboys was informed by the Ministry in 1978 that Indonesia's de 
facto control of East Timor had been accepted by several other states including five ASEAN 
nations and Australia26. 
Compared with Australia, New Zealand's response has remained deliberately muted, possibly more 
consistent. Its relations with Indonesia are less intimate (and therefore less turbulent) than 
Australia's; New Zealand has never entered into a treaty relationship with Indonesia concerning 
23 Crichton, 1994; Catrionna MacLennan, 1994 "NZ's Diplomacy over East Timor Defended", The 
Dominion, November 17, p.2. 
24 Tim Howard 1994, East Timor: New Zealand's Waterloo ?, Background Paper 11119, Foundation for 
Peace Studies Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
25 Recommendations from Frank Corner, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to the Minister, June 21, 1976; 
document released under the Official Information Act. 
26 Memorandum for Cabinet from the Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 8, 1975; 
document released under the Official Information Act. 
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East Timor, and has not seen it necessary to extend de jure recognition to Indonesian annexation of 
East Timor. When, on the 40th anniversary of Indonesia's independence, Australian Prime 
Minister Bob Hawke announced publicly that Australia recognised Indonesian sovereignty in East 
Timor, New Zealand chose not to follow suit. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that while it 
was prepared to accept de facto Indonesian control, it was "unwilling to be as forthcoming" as 
Australia over the sovereignty issue, especially while the United Nations remained involved27. 
Hoping for "a logical solution" 
The New Zealand government had not publicly expressed any view on the decolonisation of East 
Timor when, in February 1975, newspaper reports first suggested that Indonesia was preparing to 
invade28. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised Acting Prime Minister Hugh Watt that if 
questioned by the press he should point out that New Zealand believed the right of the Timorese to 
self-determination was fundamental and that while several options for the future of Portuguese 
Timor were available, New Zealand would welcome integration with Indonesia as "a logical 
solution", providing of course this was a decision made by the Timorese themselves29. 
Sympathy for Indonesia's situation 
Prime Minister Bill Rowling was informed in August, 1975, of the increasing likelihood that 
Indonesia would ignore international criticism and intervene militarily in East Timor30. Whilst 
officials considered Indonesia's concern about having instability on its borders understandable (a 
view shared by Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam31 ), it recommended that, in the event 
of an invasion, the Prime Minister reiterate New Zealand's long-standing support for the principle 
of self-determination. In the event however, concern for stability outweighed such support. 
The desire to balance its reputation with its interests led New Zealand to be very specific about the 
language it used when referring to events in East Timor. When the invasion eventuated in 
27 Briefing for a meeting between the Deputy Prime Minister and Indonesian Foreign Affairs Minister, 
September 1985; document released under the Official Information Act. 
28 Phil Goff, 1978 "The Australian and New Zealand Response to the East Timor Controversy", paper 
presented to the Political Science department, Auckland University; unpublished. 
29 Message from Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Frank Corner, to the Acting Prime Minister, 26 February, 
1975; document released under the Official Information Act. 
30 Reports from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister, dated 18 August, 1975, 22 
August, 1975, and August 27, 1975; released under the Official Information Act. 
31 Report from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister, August 27, 1975; released under 
the Official Information Act. 
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December 1975, New Zealand was reluctant to acknowledge it as such. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs avoided the word "invasion" and described Indonesia's action as "intervention in support of 
the integrationists". Officials reported to the Minister that the position in East Timor was that 
"the integrationists, with Indonesian military support, control the capital, Dili , and have the upper 
hand in the rest of Portuguese Timor"32. The word "invasion" did not replace the preferred phrase 
"military intervention" until April, 197733 . 
Following the invasion, New Zealand continued to indicate its support for the principle of self-
determination, but did not challenge Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. Rather than calling for 
an immediate withdrawal of Indonesian troops, New Zealand argued the need to restore stability so 
that the people of East Timor could exercise their right to self-determination "free from threats or 
fear of force or violence"34 and that peace and stability were most likely to be assured by 
integration35. 
New Zealand took the position that whilst it could not condone Indonesia's armed intervention and 
"regretted" the action36, it hoped Indonesia would be fair in implementing an act of self-
determination under the auspices of the United Nations. Although New Zealand asserted that 
Indonesia had not, by virtue of its intervention, assumed the status of 'administering power' over 
East Timor, this position implied that New Zealand considered Indonesia as having sufficient 
authority and presence in East Timor to implement an act of self-determination. 
Limited information 
At the request of Roskill MP Phil Goff, documents relating to East Timor were released in 1994 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Official Information Act. These give the impression 
that little "intelligence" was being received from sources such as the United States and Australia, 
although both states are known to have been closely monitoring developments (Australia had a 
consulate office in Dili) . Indeed, US President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
had left Jakarta only hours before the invasion commenced. 
32 Report to the Minister from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, December 23, 1975, paragraphs 3 and 5 
respectively; document released under the Official Information Act. 
33 "Timor: Disposal of New Zealand Relief Funds", April 29, 1977; document released under the Official 
Information Act. 
34 ibid 
35 Briefing, October 18, 1976 
36 Former Prime Minister, Bill Rowling, cited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 23 , 1975; 
document released under the Official Information Act. 
69 
? 
. 
Much of New Zealand's understanding of the situation in East Timor prior to the invasion came 
from a visit by staff of the New Zealand Embassy in Jakarta during July, 1975. New Zealand does 
not seem to have much concerned itself with the underdeveloped Portuguese colony until trouble 
erupted, raising the spectre of a disintegrating Indonesia. It is perhaps understandable that the 
Ministry of Foreign Mfairs should concur with Indonesia's view, given the political climate at the 
time the invasion took place and New Zealand's desire to see East Timor integrated without delay. 
Alternative scenarios had been proposed, however. Writing prior to the invasion, Hoadley 
suggested that Indonesia's fears were largely groundless. He noted that both Russia and China 
(supposed supporters and sponsors of a 'Cuba of the South') had recently attempted to improve 
relations with lndonesia37 and refuted suggestions that East Timor would become a base for 
Indonesian dissidents and a source of subversion; the PKI were seen as lacking support, and 
FRETILIN had taken care to distance itself from radical ideology and its radical Mozambican 
cousin FRELIMO. If anything, FRETILIN promoted itself as a democratic socialist party. During 
a visit to Australia in December, 1974, its representative, Jose Ramos Horta, identified his party's 
ideology with that of Australia's Labour Party38. 
Hoadley's arguments did not influence the New Zealand position and sympathy for the plight of 
what is seen to be a fragile state has remained a feature of the official response to the invasion and 
subsequent annexation of East Timor. A letter from New Zealand's Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
his Indonesian counterpart, Adam Malik, dated July 8, 1976, assured him that New Zealand "fully 
understands" the reasons for Indonesia's concern to resolve the Timor issue39. Eighteen years later, 
in May, 1994, Prime Minister Jim Bolger reaffirmed New Zealand support for Indonesia's control 
of East Timor when visiting Jakarta40. This suggests that public pressure and reports of gross 
human rights violations which emerged in the interim has had scant effect on New Zealand's East 
Timor policy. 
Accepting integration 
Once Indonesian control was accepted as de facto, the legal status of East Timor declined as an 
issue of concern in New Zealand policy, except that it remained unresolved in the United Nations. 
37 J. Stephen Hoadley , 1975b The Future of Portuguese Timor Occasional Paper #27, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, p.24. 
38 Hoadley, l975b, p.25. 
39 Document released under the Official Information Act. 
40 NZPA 1994 "Stud Bulls Take Bolger's Mind Off Human Rights" Christchurch Press, May 18; p.3. 
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New Zealand's sympathy with Indonesia, and desire to maintain good relations led it to condone 
the 1976 'referendum' calling for integration held by the Indonesian-backed PGET. Although 
ostensibly concerned that no internationally recognised act of self-determination had taken place, 
the New Zealand government accepted Indonesia's assurances that integration did indeed represent 7 
the will of the majority of East Timorese41. 
A New Zealand diplomat from the Embassy in Jakarta joined representatives from Iran, India, 
Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Malaysia and Thailand in Dili to witness the passage of a resolution 
seeking integration by the PGET, the result of the 'referendum' which New Zealand's 
representative, Alison Stokes, found procedurally suspect. Stokes was in Dili for less than two 
hours and her report described the event as being highly stage managed. Prior to arrival in Dili, 
Stokes reported, observers were given a pamphlet produced by the PGET which claimed "the East 
Timor people are fully behind the provisional government in the preparation for full integration 
into the Republic of Indonesia", a rather rash presumption given that the delegates , supposedly 
representatives of "the East Timor people" had yet to make their preference known42. She noted 
the actual vote was taken in secrecy, that there was no way of knowing who the delegates were or 
how they'd been selected, and that no option for the future political status of East Timor was 
discussed, other than integration. 
Stokes' observations about the highly restricted nature of her visit were echoed in March the 
following year by American Congresswoman, Helen Meyner. A member of a delegation from the 
US House Committee on International Relations, Meyner explained that the delegation was 
required to go where it was taken, and at no time were any of the members allowed to converse 
privately with the East Timorese43. 
In spite of reservations about the manner in which the resolution was passed, Stokes recommended 
that New Zealand encourage Indonesia to make the ' referendum' appear legitimate by attempting to 
get UN support for the result. New Zealand's official position, as of July 21, 1976, was that 
although it regretted the lack of UN involvement, it had "no evidence to show that integration 
with Indonesia is not the result desired by the majority of Timorese people". FRETILIN claims to 
the contrary were discredited by New Zealand which described the group as having "all the marks of 
4 I Report to the Minister following the Act of Integration, dated 21 July, 1976; document released under 
the Official Information Act. 
42 Report made by NZ observer Alison Stokes following the Peoples Representative Council Meeting 
in Dili , June 1, 1976; document released under the Official Information Act. 
43 Scott Sidell , 1981 "The United States and Genocide in East Timor", Journal of Contemporary Asia, 
Vol.ll , No.I , p.SO. 
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a hard core communist guerrilla organisation"44. New Zealand stated it would continue to deal 
with the de facto government of East Timor, formerly the PGET but now considered effectively 
Jakarta. 
Seeing the referendum as genuine was an expedient conclusion for New Zealand to reach given the 
doubts expressed by Stokes, who witnessed the act, and given Indonesia's continued engagement 
with FRETILIN guerrillas. To take Taber's assertion that guerilla war is an extension of politics 
by means of armed conflict45, the very existence of FRETILIN testifed to the political protest 
against an act of integration with Indonesia. A sufficient minority of the population thus cast 
doubt on New Zealand's argument that it had "no evidence" that integration was not the result 
desired by a majority of the Timorese. 
New Zealand at the United Nations 
New Zealand has never voted to condemn the invasion in the United Nations and in fact supported 
Indonesia by rejecting resolutions which condemned its actions. In 1978, New Zealand's Minister 
of Foreign Affairs , explaining New Zealand's vote in the United Nations, echoed Australian 
Ambassador Richard Woolcott46, saying: 
[New Zealand has] made it clear we do not regard this use of force as a 
satisfactory way of solving international disputes . But you have to be 
realistic. No useful purpose is served by denying this fact of integration.47 
New Zealand abstained on the Resolution, passed by a majority in the United Nations General 
Assembly on December 10, which deplored the military intervention of Indonesian armed forces in 
Portuguese Timor and called upon Indonesia to withdraw. New Zealand objected to preambular 
paragraph 5 of the Resolution which reads: 
Mindful that all states should, in conformity with Article 2, paragraph 4 of 
the Charter, refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or national independence of any state ... 
44 Report on a visit by the NZ Ambassador to Indonesia, Roger Peren, on a visit to East Timor, 5-9 
January 1978, dated January 13, 1978; document released under the Official Information Act. 
45 Taber 1969, p.26. 
46 Quoted in "Timor Gap" chapter. 
4 7 Report prepared for the Minister of Foreign Affairs , May 13, 1991; document released under the 
Official Information Act. 
72 
New Zealand objected that this paragraph accorded East Timor a status which it did not have48, 
although it can be understood to refer to Portugal, who, as administering power, could claim that a 
part of its territory and independence had been violated. 
Following a general election on November 29, 1975, only a week before the invasion of East 
Timor, New Zealand had had a change of government. Whilst the previous Labour government had 
announced it was determined to base its foreign policy on firm moral principles, the incoming 
National government questioned the very idea of a "moral" foreign policy49. The alleged tendency 
of small states to support moral causes and the rule of international law in international fora 
appears to have influenced New Zealand' s initial response to the East Timor conflict prior to the 
invasion50, particularly as it was a Labour government which had espoused New Zealand's 
support for self-determination, but the pragmatic approach of the National government certainly 
influenced the effort to redefine the conflict as a legitimate act of intervention, removing any 
intimation of a violation of international law. McCraw notes that New Zealand's security and 
economic prosperity have been the main foreign affairs interests of the National party51. 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Frank Corner considered the wording of the Resolution to be an 
uneasy compromise "between those who understand Indonesia's motives and those who wish to 
support FRETILIN, come what may"52. Being very critical of FRETILIN's aims and supportive 
of Indonesia, New Zealand rejected the resolution. That New Zealand should support Indonesia's 
position in East Timor is not surprising in view of its sympathy and desire to maintain good 
relations with the government of South-East Asia's most populous country. It is also unsurprising 
that New Zealand rejected the wording of the UN resolution calling for a withdrawal of Indonesian 
troops given its reluctance to recognise that it was an invasion which had established them there; 
and in view of New Zealand's close relations with Australia and the United States. 
With hindsight, it seems inconceivable that the government should have expected Indonesian rule 
to free the East Timorese from threats or fear of force or violence. At the time however, New 
Zealand appears to have accepted Indonesian assurances that it "will facilitate and not hinder the 
free expression of the will of the people of East Timor about their own future, in an atmosphere of 
48 Report to the Prime Minister from Frank Corner, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, December 10, 1975; 
document released under the Official Information Act 
49 David J. McCraw, 1994, "New Zealand's Foreign Policy Under National and Labour Governments: 
Variations on the Small State Theme?", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 1, p.21. 
50 ibid. 
51 ibid. 
52 Report to the Prime Minister from Frank Corner, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, December 10, 1975 
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normality, order and peace"53 in the hope that both its desire to see integration with Indonesia, and 
its paradoxical desire for a legitimate act of self-determination to occur would be satisfied. 
Similar, though more softly worded resolutions were passed in the UNGA in each of the following 
seven years but support dropped from 72 votes for, 10 votes against, and 43 abstentions in 1975, 
to only 50 votes for, 46 votes against and 50 abstensions in 1982. The following year the General 
Assembly deferred the debate and no resolution calling for Indonesian withdrawal has since been 
put before the UNGA54. 
Condemnation of FRETILIN 
New Zealand joined those opposing the UN resolution in 1979 after adopting the position that 
integration was "irreversible" and supported deferment of the resolution in 1983, arguing that 
moves in the UN to condemn Indonesia and encourage withdrawal only spurred FRETILIN on to 
greater efforts in their struggle. New Zealand is supported in this view by the Asiaweek which 
argued that the refusal of the UN to accept Indonesia's annexation merely keeps alive "a lost dream 
of left-leaning independence"55. 
New Zealand considers FRETILIN's actions to be "both futile ... and damaging in their effects on 
the daily life of the Timorese"56, because FRETILIN action draws retaliatory attacks from 
Indonesian armed forces which impacts greatly on the lives of civilians. The Ministry blames 
FRETILIN's actions for delaying the restoration of some measure of civil rights to the East 
Timorese and impeding work being done to improve their living conditions57. 
Reports that FRETILIN guerrillas terrorise the population in areas where they operate have 
emerged constantly during the years since Indonesia invaded, but these are frequently discredited as 
Indonesian propaganda by human rights groups and church sources. After six civilians were killed 
on January 12, 1995, near Dili for example, Indonesia's Human Rights Commission found Army 
53 ibid 
54 David Robie, 1989 Blood on Their Banner: Nationalist Struggles in the South Pacific, Pluto Press, 
Leichhardt, NSW; p.57. 
55 International Affairs editorial , "Facing Facts", Asiaweek, March 23, 1994, p.27. 
56 Report for the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Ministry, dated 7 September, 1984; document 
released under the Official Information Act. 
57 Background report on NZ's position in the UN prepared for the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
November 9, 1984; document released under the Official Information Act. 
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reports that the six were guerrillas killed in a battle were false. It concluded that the men had been 
tortured and killed by Indonesian soldiers58. 
Opposition groups in Indonesia are not above blame however. Amnesty International, a human 
rights monitoring organisation, has documented several cases of human rights abuse by opposition 
groups, including FRETILIN who admitted having killed those suspected of collaborating with 
Indonesia59. Nevertheless, it is misguided for New Zealand to condemn FRETILIN for delaying 
restoration of civil and political rights when, throughout Indonesia, the systematic curtailment of 
civil rights is well-documented with state terror used as a means of containing dissent. 
An ineffective approach 
A July 1984 briefing prepared for incoming Prime Minister David Lange by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs noted that there was "little evidence to suggest that representations by Indonesia's 
friends help improve the human rights situation in East Timor"60. This negates arguments put 
forward by both New Zealand and Australia that the best means of improving the lot of the East 
Timorese is through contact with Indonesia. Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans stated: 
Australia's recognition of Indonesia's acquisition of East Timor has enabled 
Australia to pursue its concerns for human rights and economic development 
of the people of East Timor. 61 
New Zealand describes its approach as "quiet diplomacy"62, arguing that New Zealand can best 
help the East Timorese by maintaining ties with Indonesia, offering advice and humanitarian 
assistance where possible. New Zealand places strong emphasis on the belief that behind-the-
scenes persuasion is likely to have more effect that confrontational tactics. Whether such 
persuasion is actually attempted by New Zealand's representatives often cannot be proved, though 
it would seem that New Zealand is more likely to do so when the government is under domestic 
pressure to act. 
58 Catrionna MacLennan, 1995 "Horror Stories Keep Coming In East Timor", The Dominion, March 8, 
p.8. 
59 Power and Impunity: Human Rights Under the New Order, Amnesty International, 1994, p.34. 
60 op cit 
61 cited in Matebian News, June 93, p.2. 
62 Suzanne Blumhardt, Southeast Asia division director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited in Catrionna 
MacLennan, 1994, "NZ's diplomacy over East Timor defended" The Dominion, November 17, p.2. 
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New Zealand's argument for maintaining relations with Indonesia is similar to that advanced by 
Australia for its continued relations with Indonesia, but is an argument that has been rejected by 
Timorese resistance organisations who point out that such relations did not prevent the Dili 
Massacre, November 12, 199163. Alliance foreign affairs spokesperson, Keith Locke, has also 
rejected such claims, saying that rather than enabling New Zealand to influence Indonesian officials 
on human rights, our close bilateral relations mean the reverse is true64. 
Continuity through changes of government 
It was a Labour government which first articulated New Zealand's support for self-determination 
prior to the invasion. By the time Indonesian troops landed in Dili, New Zealand was governed by 
the National Party under Robert Muldoon. New Zealand foreign policy ceased to be guided by the 
antimilitarism and antiimperialism which was characteristic of the Labour party65. New Zealand's 
quick acceptance of the of East Timor integration as de facto cannot be attributed solely to a 
change of government, however. When Labour again came to power in 1984, it continued the 
policy of de facto recognition, despite previous Labour Party resolutions recognising the right of 
the Timorese to independence and citing FRETILIN as the legitimate representative of the 
Timorese peopJe66. Prime Minister David Lange said in a December 1984 radio interview that the 
annexation of East Timor was irreversible and that to suggest an alternative government was 
unrealistic67. He echoed Australian Prime Minister Bill Hayden who had earlier said that 
FRETILIN was declining in influence and losing support from the Timorese68_ 
The Prime Minister's stance was based on information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in July, 1984, that the integration of East Timor into Indonesia is not only "irreversible" but 
"incontrovertible"69. Mr Lange was informed that New Zealand had occasionally taken the 
opportunity to express muted reservations about the means of incorporation but had attempted to 
maintain good relations with Indonesia. Mr Lange was also informed that "policies adopted toward 
63 Matebian News, 3: I, June, 1993, p.2. 
64 cited by Catrionna MacLennan, 1995 "Two sides to East Timor story, says McKinnon", The 
Dominion, March 22, p.2. 
65 W. David Mcintyre, 1985 "Labour Experience in Foreign Policy", in Hyam Gold (ed) New Directions 
in New Zealand Foreign Policy, Benton Ross, Auckland, p.ll. 
66 Robie, 1989, p.56. 
67 ibid. 
68 Sydney Morning Herald, September 10, 1984; cited in Robie, 1989, p.56. 
69 Preliminary briefing paper prepared for Mr Lange, July, 1984; document released under the Official 
Information Act. 
76 
East Timor are regarded by the Indonesians as the touchstone of a country's relationship with 
Jakarta"70. Relations with Jakarta being considered of great importance, the policy advice from the 
Ministry was accepted without reference to the Labour party's position on East Timor. The New 
Zealand position has been unaffected by subsequent changes of government. 
The 1994 New Zealand Parliamentary Delegation 
Recently, however, Ministry of Foreign Affairs influence on government policy on East Timor 
has been challenged from within Parliament. Labour MP Phil Goff initiated a petition in April, 
1994, deploring the deaths of Timorese at the hands of the Indonesian military and calling on 
Indonesia to grant the Timorese their right to self-determination. Phil Goff, and co-sponsor, MP 
Nick Smith, said they wanted to ensure that the Prime Minister was receiving an alternate view 
point to the official Foreign Affairs advice that the annexation of East Timor was irreversible71. 
Fifty-one Members of Parliament, a majority of the House, and representatives from all four 
parliamentary parties represented, signed the petition. It was presented to the Indonesian Charge 
d'Affaires in Wellington on May 5th, 1994. A joint statement issued by the six MPs * who undertook 
to circulate the petition stated: 
New Zealand cannot honestly express outrage about events in Bosnia .. .if we 
continue to remain silent about blatant violations of human rights that are 
occurring in our own back yard . Indonesia must be held to account 
internationally for its ruthless subjugation of East Timor people [sic].72 
The petition echoes the UN Resolutions which New Zealand either abstained on, or opposed, in 
calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor and the granting to the people of 
East Timor a right to self-determination. Jakarta reacted strongly to the petition. Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said the MPs who signed the petition were "reflecting the voice of the 
minority group which receives false reports about the 27th province of Indonesia"73. 
70 ibid. 
71 "MPs Urge Prime Minister to Raise Problem of East Timor During Indonesian Visit" , joint Press 
Release from Phil Goff and Nick Smith, May 6, 1994. 
* Phil Goff, MP for Roskill ; Richard Northey, MP for Onehunga; Dianne Yates, MP for Hamilton East; 
Nick Smith, MP for Tasman; John Robertson, MP for Papakura; and Christine Fletcher, MP for Eden. 
72 "MPs Unite to Condemn Indonesian Human Rights Violations in East Timor", Press Release from MP 
Phil Goff, April 15 , 1994. 
73 "Human Rights Row" The Dominion, May 7, 1994, p.3. 
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The petition prompted the Indonesian government to issue an invitation to MPs to visit East 
Timor, and inform themselves first hand, of conditions there. After much debate about the value of 
such a visit, whether or not MPs would be able to meet with Timorese without inviting reprisals 
against them, and who should pay for the visit, a delegation visited at the end of October, 1994. 
The delegation reached something of a consensus in supporting continued New Zealand ties with 
Jakarta in order to influence Indonesian policy concerning East Timor. Leader of the delegation, 
Roger McClay, was quoted as saying: 
I really feel very strongly that we need to continue to be a nation friendly 
with Indonesia so we can continue to bring about influence and suggest other 
ways in which things might be done.74 
After his return from East Timor, delegation member Phil Goff stated that "what is absolutely 
clear is that integration is not working"75. He noted that growing tensions between the East 
Timorese and Indonesian transmigrants and military personnel are bound to unleash further public 
protest against integration. In tum this would provoke a harsh reaction from the government and 
further repression, and suggested that the escape from this cycle of resistance and repression lay in 
an inter-regnum of benevolent rule by Jakarta. He argued that this was Jakarta's best option for 
ensuring a favourable vote in the act of self-determination which, he believes, must still occur76. 
The action taken by Goff and his colleagues suggests that lobbying of parties and pressure on -/ 
government from the public is effective to a limited extent. Under the mixed member proportional 
electoral system recently introduced in new Zealand, it is possible that such challenges to Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs policy recommendations will increase as the number of parties represented in 
parliament increases. However, given the importance placed on good relations with Jakarta by 
governments in the past, then regardless of party policy, it seems unlikely that such actions will alter 
government policy any more substantially than those of Phil Goff. 
74 Sarah Crichton, 1994 "Push for East Timor Aid Likely- MP", The Dominion, November 2, p.15. 
75 Phil Goff, 1994 "Benevolent Rule the Answer" , The Dominion, November 15, p.5. 
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Human rights and New Zealand's response: redirecting public attention 
Once Indonesia's presence in East Timor was accepted as "irreversible", human rights and "the lot 
of the Timorese"77 became the primary focus of the New Zealand government's policy regarding 
East Timor. Other issues of concern were the withholding of recognition by the UN and the state 
of Australian-Indonesian relations. 
Although the government has been criticised for its response to human rights violations in 
Indonesia 78, concern has been expressed (albeit, in the case of the MP's petition and the Governor-
General's comments, only vicariously). However unsatisfactory New Zealand's response, by 
engaging in the debate over how it should respond the government indicates it is aware of the 
issues involved. The debate itself, reported in the media, is sufficient to mollify public demand for 
official action. 
The debate, at times heated, over how to best respond to human rights abuses obscures the more 
crucial issue of sovereignty for East Timor. To a certain extent this can be attributed to the 
emotive nature of the human rights issue. Evidence of human rights violations is tangible; spoken 
and written testimony, photographs and especially video footage incite public outrage and 
sympathy. In comparison, sovereignty is an abstract issue, ill-defined and only occasionally 
debated in popular forums79. Nevertheless, that sovereignty does not excite public interest to the 
same extent as human rights violations does not alter the obligation of governments to abide by 
international legal conventions, particularly those they had consented to abide by. 
Re-inventing official policy on East Timor 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared in May 1983 that East Timor "is likely to be of 
decreasing political interest to us and internationally"80. Shortly afterwards, the Ministry noted an 
increase in public queries on East Timor. The government was faced with the problem of how to 
reconcile its opposition to the means of incorporation with its desire to maintain good relations 
with Indonesia and to respond to public outrage at reports of human rights abuses. 
77 Report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the New Zealand Embassy in Jakarta, September 7, 
1984; document released under the Official Information Act. 
78 See, for example, "Opposition slams view of East Timor" The Dominion, March 17, p.2. 
79 An exception to this is Maori demand for tina rangatiratanga, which has made sovereignty an issue 
of public interest. 
80 Report from NZ Ambassador to Indonesia, M. J. Powles, to Minister of Foreign Affairs Warren 
Cooper on a visit to Indonesia's Eastern provinces, dated May 20, 1983; document released under the 
Official Information Act. 
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New Zealand, like Australia and other states, has accomplished this by emphasising its respect for v 
human rights and condemning violations of them, whilst avoiding public comment and debate on 
the means of incorporation, i.e., the violation of East Timor's territorial integrity and right of the 
people to self-determination. Accepting Indonesia's de facto control has prevented any upset in 
relations with Indonesia, many of the human rights violations have been attributed to rogue v 
elements in the military, to resistance fighters, or to provocation, as in the case of the 1992 Dili 
Massacre81 . 
Human rights are mentioned for the first time in communications from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Jakarta Embassy in June 1983. New Zealand's Ambassador reported that violations 
of human rights appeared to be decreasing to levels similar to those in other parts of Indonesia, 
implying that New Zealand had been aware of widespread abuses prior to this time, but had chosen 
not to consider them as issues for comment82. 
What is striking about the collection of documents released under the Official Information Act is 
that, after an initial dearth of information, and well aware of the impact of Indonesian rule in East 
Timor, with Indonesia unlikely to ever win a complete military victory against FRETILIN, New 
Zealand continued to support Indonesia's presence there. Amnesty International reports received by 
the government about human rights abuses, including reprisals and extra-judicial killings, were 
accepted as "probably correct"83 . Concern ran high in the Ministry as well as among the public 
about the welfare of the East Timorese, yet at no time does New Zealand appear to have 
reconsidered its policy of de facto recognition of the integration, in spite of that integration having 
been achieved in contravention of international law, giving a firm legal basis for any protest it 
sought to make. 
Confusing the issue 
The right to self-determination can arguably be considered as fundamental in international law, yet 
the violation of this most fundamental human right seems to have been accepted and subsequent 
violations which stem from it have instead been the object of criticism. New Zealand has 
81 Eye-witness, Bob Muntz of Community Aid Abroad, refuted claims by the Indonesian military that a 
hand grenade, which did not explode, had been thrown at soldiers, and that a shot had been fired (cited in 
Gunn 1994, p.l77) 
82 Report by the New Zealand Ambassador in Jakarta on the situation in East Timor, June 9, 1983, 
paragraphs I 0 & II; document released under the Official Information Act. 
83 Ambassador Powles in a report received by the Ministry on December 4, 1984; document released 
under the Official Information Act. 
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attempted to cure the symptoms of the denial of sovereignty while feeding the cause - the violation 
of East Timor's right to self-determination. 
In November, 1994, Prime Minister, Jim Bolger attended the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) forum in Jakarta. He said prior to leaving for Jakarta that he did not intend raising the 
issue of human rights violations with President Suharto as this was a trade forum. Although 
consistent with New Zealand's stance on the issue, and with its reluctance to link concerns about 
human rights to other aspects of its relationship with Indonesia, it does seem unlikely that an 
opportunity to make informal comment did not arise. During the forum, protesters occupied the 
area in front of the United States embassy and widespread rioting broke out in Dili following the 
death of a Timorese at the hands of an Indonesian transmigrant. The Prime Minister instead 
emphasised trade and regional stability, the two issues which have shaped New Zealand's 
relationship with Indonesia and response to the conflict in East Timor. 
Entering the human rights debate 
The decision to favour discussion of human rights over sovereignty in East Timor is problematic. New 
Zealand has had to engage in the emotive discourse which seeks to define human rights and their 
extent; and to defend perceived differences in Asian and Western values. 
International debate on human rights is characterised by an East-West divide; the individual human 
rights ideals articulated by Western states being dismissed in Asia as Western concepts to which 
Asians merely react84, or down-played in favour of community rights to economic development, 
peace and security. Pressure from Western states to improve human rights records is frequently 
described as meddling by states with little understanding of local realities, as the Myanmar delegate 
to the preparatory conference in Bangkok prior to the June, 1993, World Human Rights 
Conference in Vienna indicated: 
Asian countries, with their own norms and standards of human rights, should 
not be dictated [to] by a group of other countries who are far distant 
geographically, politically, economically and socially. 85 
Applying international Conventions 
At the Bangkok Conference, former Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai said the path towards 
realising the ideals of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights lies through economic 
84 Kishore Mahubani , Singapore's deputy foreign secretary, cited by Ching, 1993, p.27. 
85 cited in" Rights Thinking", Editorial of Far Eastern Economic Review, June 17, 1993, p.5. 
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development, democratisation and social justice86, implying that these steps can be prioritised in 
that order. The declaration resulting from the Bangkok conference, presented in Vienna, calls for 
human rights to be: 
considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international 
norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of regional particularities and 
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds87. 
The declaration insists on the principle of non-intervention and on economic development 
objectives. In Vienna it was criticised by the United States which saw it as justifying breaches of 
human rights standards, subordinating civil and political rights to economic, social, cultural, and 
development rights; and for making economic aid a precondition for improvements in human 
rights records88. Amnesty International warned before the Vienna conference that Asian 
governments would use the occasion to challenge the legitimacy of international action against 
human rights violators and assert the primacy of development issues over civil and political rights, 
claiming that individual rights are alien to their culture89. Such differences in perspective place 
parameters on the extent to which Western countries such as New Zealand can influence Indonesia 
without being dismissed as ignorant of local realities. 
Indonesia has reacted strongly to attempts to link human rights to development assisatnce. The 
Netherlands especially, former colonial ruler of the Indonesian archipelago, has attracted the 
Jakarta's ire. Following the Dili Massacre, several countreis, including Canada, Denmark and the 
United States, as well as the Netherlands, suspended aid to Indonesia pending an investigation into 
the incident. Only the Netherlands had all of the development assistance it provided rejected by 
Indonesia "as a consequence of the reckless use [by the Dutch] of development assistance as an 
instrument of intimidation"90. Jakarta dissolved the Inter - Governmental Group on Indonesia 
(IGGI), a donor consorium presided over by the Dutch government. It requested the World Bank, 
itself a member of IGGI, to establish a new donor group including all former members of IGGI 
except the Netherlands. 
86 cited by Frank Ching, 1993 "Asian View of Human Rights is Beginning to Take Shape" Far Eastern 
Economic Review, April 17, 1993, p.27. 
87 UN Document A/Conf.157/ASRM/7. 
88 Susumu Awanohara eta!, 1993, "Vienna Showdown", Far Eastern Economic Review, June 17, p. 17. 
89 Ching, 1993, p.27. 
90 A senior Indonesian official, cited by Allert van den Ham, 1993, "Development Cooperation and 
Human Rights", Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 5, p.532. 
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Bilateral relations between the two countries have always been characterised by tension but, van 
den Ham argues, it is difficult to identify a single cause for the decision to reject the Netherland's 
development assistance. He writes: 
It seems there was a combination of sincere irritation with the Dutch policy and 
its implementation on the one hand, and political considerations in both the 
international and national arenas on the other. Indonesia needed a scapegoat and 
the Netherlands was an easy target at relatively limited costs.91 
Domestically, Jakarta's rejection of Dutch assistance was popular. Macintyre suggests that as far 
as newspaper editorials and political cartoons are a guide, Western (and especially Dutch) sermons 
on human rights were not appreciated by Indonesians92. Internationally, Jakarta's action could be 
seen as a warning to other small aid donors to refrain from criticising Indonesia on human rights 
issues. 
State Terrorism in Indonesia 
Human rights standards as articulated in United Nations Conventions on Human Rights, although 
widely ratified, have been palpably ineffective in curbing abuses. This is particularly true of state-
sanctioned violence; Amnesty International has reported an increase in the use of torture and 
arbitrary detention and, in 1993, reported abuses in more countries than ever before in its 
history93. 
Suharto's New Order government has been accused of human rights violations "on a staggering 
scale"94 since coming to power in 1965, not only in East Timor but throughout the archipelago. 
Amnesty argues that violations of human rights in Indonesia "have been part of the official 
response to political opposition and 'disorder', and the means of removing perceived obstacles to 
economic and development policies"95 . The organisation notes that trade unionists, farmers, 
human rights workers, community leaders, students and journalists have all been subjected to 
91 ibid., p. 538. Dutch aid to Indonesia in 1992 represented only 1.9% of the US$ 4.8 billion donated 
by IGGI. When the World Bank convened the new Consultative Group on Indonesia in July, 1992, the 
group agrred to an increased level of support, committing over US$ 4.9 billion for the following year, a 
net increase in aid of US$ 909 mill.ion - Andrew Macintyre, 1993, "Indonesia in 1992: Coming to Terms 
with the Outside World", Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 2, p.206. 
92 Macintyre, 1993, p. 206. 
93 Amnesty International Report, /993 . 
94 Amnesty International New Zealand News, September/October 1994, p.1. 
95 
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severe human rights violations96 implying that economic growth is a goal which will be achieved 
not for the benefit, but at the expense, of human rights in Indonesia. 
The newly constructed roads, schools and administrative buildings are displayed as evidence of 
Indonesia's efforts to develop East Timor. According to the misguided argument advanced by New 
Zealand that economic growth and development will improve human rights, these trappings of 
development should have brought about an improvement in the situation of the East Timorese. 
The new facilities have instead enabled the Indonesian state to extend its presence in East Timor. 
New Zealand's Ambassador noted, after a visit to East Timor, that most new construction was 
designed to house the "administrative machine, civil and military, that seems so essential to the 
Indonesian governmental system"97, the very system which perpetrates the abuses New Zealand is 
quietly attempting to curb, and were therefore not of benefit to the East Timorese. 
New Zealand continues to support the Indonesian regime, whilst simultaneously professing 
concern about its abuses of human rights. This apparently untenable position is framed in terms of 
regional economic and security interests with some support from the Bangkok declaration that 
economic growth and development is the path to improved human rights. To a certain extent, New 
Zealand's concern for the 'welfare' of the Timorese is an effort to reconcile a tradition of defining 
human rights in terms of democratic government and personal liberty with support for the 
economic development oflndonesia. 'Welfare' suggests provision of services and the fulfilment of 
basic needs. It does not necessarily imply the extension of the individual political and human 
rights which are expected in a democratic society. New Zealand can thus call for improved welfare 
without implying criticism of Indonesia's political system. 
The existence of international human rights Conventions and continued criticism of Indonesia's 
record from non-governmental organisations, governments, and the United Nations has had little 
impact on the frequency or severity of human rights violations in the archipelago, although it has 
encouraged Jakarta to emphasise the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs. With regard to 
East Timor, it is important for Jakarta that the territory is accepted as an integral part of Indonesia 
and thus better shielded from international scrutiny. However human rights, like ecological issues 
and labour laws for example, are increasingly being seen as sufficiently important international 
issues to override the principle of non-intervention. Concern for human rights does mask other 
motives, as Tremewan notes: 
96 'b 'd 1 I I . , p .. 
97 Report of a visit by Col. J.S. Harman to East Timor, 26-30 November, 1984; document released under 
the Official Information Act. 
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The dominant criteria for cntJcJsm of human rights abuses and for 
humanitarian intervention are likely to continue to be the degree of threat to 
the interests of industrialised countries and the relative willingness of third 
world states to cooperate with these countries rather than the severity of 
human rights violations or the scale of human need98. 
Communications between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and New Zealand's Jakarta Embassy, 
statements from Ministry officials, Members of Parliament and Parliamentary staff all indicate that 
the New Zealand government is well aware of the impact of Indonesian rule in East Timor 
including development initiatives, transmigration programmes and the extensive military presence. 
They also suggest that where East Timor is concerned, our relationship with Jakarta is of primary 
importance and cannot be put at risk. 
The implication that New Zealand cannot afford to jeopardise its relationship with Indonesia 
suggests that the government would be more willing to take a stand on issues such as self-
determination and human rights violations if this could be done with impunity. New Zealand has 
been portrayed by successive governments as a passive player, keeping its opinion to guarded. ? 
This impression is misleading. New Zealand has actively shown support for Indonesian annexation 
of East Timor on a number of occasions and has supported Indonesia in international fora. Howard 
suggests "East Timor is a touchstone for New Zealand' Foreign Affairs policy, whether it is to be 
measured on self-interest or on principle"99. To date, New Zealand foreign policy regarding East 
Timor has clearly been measured against self interest. 
98 Tremewan 1993, p. 27. 
99 Howard, 1994. 
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Chapter 5 
Heading for Change 
The United States 
Like New Zealand, the United States fonnally supported self-detennination for East Timor but 
within a short time indicated it accepted Indonesia's de facto controJl. Britain, too, has declared its 
support for self-determination for the East Timorese and does not officially condone Indonesia's 
annexation of East Timor. But, in what is a familiar pattern, Britain did not interrupt relations 
with Indonesia and had, by 1985, become the largest Western European supplier of arms to the 
Suharto government2. 
The United States' position on self-determination, although an internationally respectable 
statement to make, was belied by the apparent condonation of the invasion by President Ford and x_,__ 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during their official visit immediately prior to the invasion. 
Strategic and economic interests have shaped the American relationship to Southeast Asia, and 
Indonesia in particular. President Eisenhower said in 1953, defending US$400 million in aid to the 
French colonial government in Indochina, that losing Vietnam and Malaysia would also mean the 
loss of "the rich empire of Indonesia"3. Rubber, oil and tin were the key strategic minerals which 
excited interest in Indonesia. Vice-President Nixon described Indonesia as "containing the region's 
richest hoard of natural resources"4. Six years later, Indonesia was considered by the US to be 
"endowed with what is probably the most strategically authoritative geographic location on 
earth."5 
Indonesia was seen as a valuable prize and one easily lost. US policy toward Indonesia was thus 
concerned with maintaining access to strategic sea-lanes and raw materials, and with building anti-
communist alliances. Human rights, decolonisation, economic development and political freedom 
were not issues with which the US chose to concern itself at that time. McConnick argues that 
strategic considerations were an important motivating force in the foreign policy of the Nixon and 
Ford administrations, and that this led to a reluctance to bring concerns about human rights 
I Robert Pringle, 1980 Indonesia and the Philippines: American Interest in Southeast Asia, Columbia 
University Press, New York, p.I03. 
2 Retboll 1987, p.3l. 
3 cited in Franke 1983, p.44. 
4 Richard M. Nixon, 1967 "Asia After Vietnam", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 1, p.lll. 
5 cited in Franke 1983, p. 44. 
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violations to the governments seen as important to the establishment of global order6. The global 
order envisaged by Kissinger, secretary of state in both the Nixon and Ford administrations, was 
predicated on preserving the nation state system, and attempting to manage that system by 
moderating conflict among major powers. Falk sees a conceptual flaw in this approach: 
It accepts as inevitable the persistence of large-scale misery and repression. It 
enables the disfavoured many to be kept under control by the favoured few. 
The global structure of control that Kissinger envisages and endorses tempts 
change-minded groups to adopt some variant of "desperate politics" to 
achieve their goals of liberation from social, political and economic 
oppression.? 
Certainly, when assessing the threat posed to the integrity of Indonesia by an independent East 
Timor, the United States considered the preservation of the nation-state to be of greater importance 
than the principle of self-determination. During his visit to Jakarta prior to the invasion of East 
Timor, President Ford announced an increase in military assistance to Indonesia of 450 percentS. 
During congressional hearings on East Timor in March, 1977, Lt General Howard Fisk of the US 
airforce testified that US military equipment was used in the invasion of East Timor9. 
The Carter administration took a more idealistic approach to foreign policy and emphasised human 
rights. Aid, particularly military aid, was suspended to nations whose human rights records were 
offensive to the US. Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Uganda and Mozambique had aid grants reduced or cut completely!O. In spite of a desire to see an 
improvement in human rights, Indonesia was not pressured to conform. No such suspension of aid 
to Indonesia was implemented 11. The Carter administration did not change US policy toward East 
Timor in any fundamental way, nor did it criticise the invasion of East Timor. The US did not, 
under Carter, support UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops form East 
Timor, or the implementation of an act of self-determination. 
6 James M. McCormick, 1992 American Foreign Policy and Process, F.E. Peacock Publishers Inc. , 
Itasca, Illinois. 
7 Richard A. Falk, 1975 "Whats Wrong with Henry Kissinger's Foreign Policy?" cited in McCormick, 
1992, p.l35 . 
8 Sidell, 1980, p.48. 
9 Congressional hearings had commenced on March 13, 1977. Former Australian Consul to East Timor, 
James Dunn, provided accounts of Indonesian atrocities in East Timor based on interviews with refugees 
- Taylor, 1992, p.202. 
10 McCormick, 1992, p. 145. 
II Pringle 1980, p. l 06. 
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Compared with its response to human rights abuses in the Philippines, the US seems to have 
acquiesced in oppression by the Suharto regime. Institutionalised restrictions on the press, 
individual liberties and academic freedom grew more widespread in Indonesia, and the number of 
political detainees greater12, yet Indonesia was not subjected to the degree of public protestation of 
human rights abuses that the Philippines was, nor did the US abstain from international financial 
institution loans as it did for the Philippines 13. Aid to Indonesia was not curtailed, and military 
assistance continued, including the provision of aircraft which had a particularly counter-insurgent 
function 14. 
The anti-communist credentials of Suharto, and the apparent leftist character of the East Timorese 
resistance movement, ensured support for the Indonesian regime during the Reagan administration. 
President Reagan expressed concern about the existence of military rule in Poland, about human 
rights violations in Nicaragua, and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, but set these 
same concerns aside when he considered Indonesia15. During a visit to Washington by President 
Suharto, Reagan stated that he viewed Indonesia as a force for peace, stability and progress and 
praised Suharto's efforts at nation-building16_ The strategic value of Indonesia meant the stability 
of the Republic was important. Chomsky has noted that the US government and media had little 
to say about the conflict in East Timor, particularly when compared with the interest taken in 
Cambodia 17. 
It would be incorrect, however, to present a11 members of the US government as having been 
disinterested the East Timor issue, or having dealt with it expediently, prior to the Clinton 
administration. Members of the US Congress have been active on this matter through successive 
administrations. Secretary of State George Schultz was pressured by 22 senators to raise East 
Timor as an issue during a 1984 visit to Jakarta. The following year, 131 members of Congress 
expressed their concern about the situation in East Timor to President Reagan prior to a visit to 
Lisbon. In 1987, 40 members of the Senate publicly criticised Indonesia's occupation of East 
Timor and in 1989, 100 members od Congress called on the State Department to launch an official 
I 2 Pringle, 1980, p.1 04. 
1 3 Pringle 1980, p.l 06. 
14 OV- I 0 Bronco aircraft can carry a heavy ordnance including bombs, rockets, machine guns and 
napalm (reportedly used in East Timor), as well as infra-red detectors. They have been described as the 
most versatile and deadly counter-insurgency aircraft in the world. They are slow moving and 
specifically designed for use against an enemy lacking anti-aircraft capabil.ity - Sidell 1981 , p.47-48. 
15 Retboll, 1987, p.31. 
16 ibid. 
17 Necessary Illusions, Manufacturing Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media, 1992. 
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enquiry into claims of torture of East Timorese by the Indonesian military after a visit to Dili by 
the Pope18. The interests of the legislative and executive branches of the US government have 
coincided on this issue under the Clinton administration, as discussed shortly. 
The United States in the United Nations 
Following the invasion on December 7, 1975, diplomatic activity shifted from the embassies of 
the US, Australia, Portugal and Indonesia, to the United Nations. Approval for Security Council 
Resolution 384 of December 22, 1975, calling for withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East 
Timor, had been unanimous. However, Security Council Resolution 389 which repeated this 
demand the following April, was not. Both America and Japan had abstained from voting19. In 
December, 1976, the US voted against the General Assembly Resolution calling for the 
withdrawal of Indonesian troops, establishing the pattern followed by New Zealand and Australia. 
And like Australia and New Zealand, the US continued to vote against General Assembly 
Resolutions including 34/40, which declared that "the people of East Timor must be enabled freely 
to determine their own future under the auspices of the United Nations"; and resolution 35/598, 
which reaffirmed "the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and 
independence, in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514(XV)"20. 
Once again, official rhetoric supporting the right of the Timorese to self-determination was not 
supported by government action. In fact, Franke argues, the US made a concerted diplomatic effort 
to weaken support for East Timor in the United Nations. Not so much because Indonesia was a 
valuable trading partner and an important component in US security designs, but because a US 
foreign policy goal was to break up blocs of nations, mostly the new UN member states who were 
the most vehement supporters of the principle of self-determination, which collectively posed a 
threat to US interests21 . In his memoirs, American Ambassador to the United Nations at that 
time, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, was specific about the role of the US in confounding UN action 
on East Timor, writing that the "Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly 
ineffective in whatever measures it undertook"22. 
18 Taylor, 1991, p.212. 
19 Franke 1983, p.53. 
20 Franke 1983, p.53. -find a reference in UN Library instead of Franke. 
21 Franke 1983, p.53-54. 
22 Daniel P. Moynihan, 1978 A Dangerous Place , Little Brown & Co. , Boston. p.247. 
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New Zealand's efforts to define the problem of East Timor's sovereignty out of existence had a 
precedent in the United States. In March, 1977, State Department officials acknowledged that the 
annexation of the East Timor was a fait accompli; the United States recognised the annexation and 
the legality of the exercise of sovereignty there by the Indonesian government23. And just as in 
New Zealand, American policy on East Timor has remained essentially unchanged under both 
Democratic and Republican administrations. The Carter administration continued the policy 
established by President Ford and Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. It is only under President 
Clinton that East Timor has again become a contentious issue in United States' foreign policy. 
Practical support for Indonesia: the arms trade 
Sidell argues that American military support has been crucial to Indonesia's capacity to maintain 
its position in East Timor. A generous supply of counter-insurgency equipment, including aircraft, 
vehicles, patrol craft, arms and ammunition, enabled Jakarta to extend its authority over most of 
East Timor, at the expense of FRETILIN24. Although the US is the primary source of arms for 
Indonesia, several European countries have given military assistance to Indonesia. The arms trade 
continues despite European parliament resolutions condemning abuses of human rights in East 
Timor by armed forces personnel. 
Indonesian Minister for Research and Technology, B.J. Habibie, was charged with the task of 
creating an Indonesian high-technology industry, with a special focus on military equipment. 
Production was stimulated by obtaining manufacturing licenses from overseas companies, many of 
them European25. Belgian companies produce arms under license in Indonesia, including rifles, 
machine guns and rockets26; German company MBB became involved in a joint venture to 
produce helicopters. The Lurssen Shipyard has also entered into a joint venture under the auspices 
of Habibie, building attack craft and patrol boats for the rnilitary27. The practice of building arms 
locally under licence enables German arms manufacturers to circumvent German law, which allows 
arms exports only in exceptional circumstances28. Exports of arms are not uncommon however; 
total German exports to ASEAN in 1993 equalled DM 45 276 million. 
23 Franke 1983, p.54. 
24 Scott Sidell, 1981 "The United States and Genocide in East Timor", Journal of Contemporary Asia, 
Vol. 11, No.1, p.48. 
25 Buko, 1994 "Germany" in Martin Broek (ed), Stop Arming Indonesia: A European Perspective on 
Arms Trade to a Military Regime, European Campaign Against Arms Trade, Amsterdam, p.46. 
26 Ernst Gulcher, 1994 "Belgium", in Broek (ed), p.45. 
27 Buko 1994, p.47. 
28 ibid., p.46. 
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Sweden supplied arms to the colonial administration of the Dutch East Indies and trade continued 
following independence. Swedish governments have not always been comfortable with arms trade 
with Indonesia, however. Exports were stopped during the confrontation with Malaysia (1963-66) 
and did not resume until 197529_ Following the invasion of East Timor, the Social Democrat 
government advised arms manufacturers not to enter into export agreements with Indonesia, but did 
not prevent them. When the Social Democrats returned to power in 1982, after a four year period 
in opposition (during which they were highly critical of continued arms exports), Prime Minister 
Olof Palme approved the continued sale of arms to Indonesia, stating that "according to reliable 
sources, there is no fighting in East Timor at this moment"30_ Opposition to arms exports was 
renewed following the 1991 Dili massacre, but by this time the Social Democrats were again in 
opposition, and exports continued. 
The Netherlands has maintained a close relationship with Indonesia since independence, although 
this has been marred by Sukarno's nationalisation of Dutch industries in 1956, the bloody 
aftermath of the 1965 and 1966 coups, and the 1975 invasion of East Timor. Military ties have 
never been severed, however, only suspended31 . Indonesia is a principle target for Spanish arms 
exports, receiving 80% of Spain's arms exports to Asia in the 1980s32_ Indonesia is also a major 
recipient of Spanish development aid; only Mexico and China receive more33. 
Between 1988 and 1992, Indonesia was the sixth biggest recipient of British weapons systems. 
Only Saudi Arabia, India, the United States, Oman and Denmark received more. In addition to 
arms, Britain provides training for Indonesian military personnel, both in the UK and in 
Indonesia34. The British government does not consider military links to be a contributing factor in 
human rights abuses in Indonesia, and says it does not grant export licences for equipment likely 
to be used in internal security operations35. In spite of these assurances, East Timorese have 
reported seeing British Aerospace Hawk aircraft being used in counter-insurgency operations36. 
29 Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society, 1994 "Sweden" in Broek (ed), p.58. 
30 ibid. , p. 59. 
31 Niek van Essen, 1994 "Netherlands" in Broek (ed), p.51. 
32 Arcadi Oliveres, 1994 "Spain: Interests in the Region" in Broek (ed), p.55. 
33 ibid. 
34 Campaign Against Arms Trade, 1994 "United Kingdom", in Broek (ed), p.66. 
35 ibid. 
36 Death of a Nation - The East Timor Conspiracy, Independent Television, Britain, 1993. 
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Following the change of government in Portugal, Britain, like the United States and Australia, had 
considered the possibility of an Indonesian invasion of East Timor and reached the conclusion that 
it was in Britain's interest that Indonesia should absorb the territory as quickly and unobtrusively 
as possible. The British Ambassador to Jakarta also noted that "if ... there is a row in the United 
Nations, we should keep our heads down and avoid siding with Indonesia"37. Once again, a 
government decided that whilst it desired an Indonesian East Timor, it did not wish to be seen to 
be ignoring the political and moral principles at stake. Britain does not officially condone 
Indonesia's annexation of East Timor but has accepted Indonesian rule there as de facto. 
It is not only arms which are exported, but expertise, prototypes and manufacturing equipment. 
These ensure that Indonesia will able to keep its military supplied with the equipment necessary 
for its internal security activities, regardless of whether foreign governments suspend military 
assistance. 
That Indonesia continues to exist as a unitary state can largely be attributed to the role of the 
military in government. The military has been able to sustain its position, and its internal security 
operations, because of the arms and training supplied by foreign governments. Without the 
capacity for repression of internal unrest which imported military hardware provides, it seems 
unlikely that Jakarta would have would have been able to maintain its control over East Timor in 
the face of widespread and persistent resistance. Thus, members of the international community 
have ensured Indonesian control of East Timor through concrete action, as well as through 
diplomatic inaction. This further undermines the professed support for the right of the East 
Timorese people to self-determination. 
Governments have not been unaware of reports of human rights violations and atrocities in East 
Timor, particularly following the reporting and broadcast of the Dili Massacre in 1991, yet have 
maintained trade and security links with Indonesia. Sidell notes that: "the United States' official 
support for Indonesia has done little to curtail human rights violations in East Timor, and 
conversely has sustained and encouraged harassment, degradation and devastation of the East 
Timorese people"38. The Dili massacre prompted the European Parliament to recall its resolutions 
on the "internationally condemned illegal invasion by the Indonesian forces" and express its shock 
at the the evidence presented in a 1993 documentary Death of a Nation- The Timor Conspiracy, 
3 7 cited in Retboll, 1987, p. 30. 
38 Sidell 1981, p.53. 
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and at subsequent reports of further killings39_ Portuguese representatives have been instrumental 
in keeping the Timor issue alive in the European Parliament. 
The Clinton administration 
Human rights have been an important theme in the foreign policy of the Clinton administration, 
and this has had a tangible effect on relations with Indonesia. For example, the transfer of F5 
fighters in August, 1993, was blocked40, and the sale of small arms to Indonesia was banned by 
the US Senate in July, 1994, until significant progress was made on human rights violations41 . 
An amendment to the Foreign Aid Authorisation Bill, which linked human rights to arms sales in 
East Timor, also increased pressure on Jakarta42. The Feingold amendment would have prohibited 
government and commercial arms sales until the President certified that Indonesia has granted 
access to East Timor by human rights groups, that violations of human rights by the military 
have ceased, and Indonesia has complied with Security Council resolutions calling for the 
withdrawal of troops from East Timor and the implementation of an act of self-determination43. 
The Foreign Aid Authorisation Bill was not passed, which, Feith notes, has been usual in recent 
years44 so to Jakarta's relief, the Feingold amendment did not become law. 
The Clinton administration also reversed the US position in the UN Commission on Human 
Rights; in 1993, the US co-sponsored resolution 1993/97 with the European Community and 
Canada, camng on the Secretary General to present a comprehensive report on the question of East 
Timor45. Congress has been instrumental in keeping the East Timor issue alive, and in pressuring 
Clinton to take action. Congressional prompting led Clinton to raise the issue of East Timor with 
Suharto at the 1993 G7 summit meeting in Tokyo, and at the APEC summit in Jakarta in 
November, 199446. Indonesian labour practices have also attracted the attention of the United 
States. In June, 1993, US Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor, announced that US$800 million 
39 
"Resolution on the exposure of the massacre in East Timor" March 10, 1994, reproduced in Broek 
(ed), 1994. 
40 McMahon, 1994, p. 10. 
41 Patrick Walters, 1994 "Clinton Steps Up Protest on East Timor", The Australian, July 19, p.l. 
42 McMahon, 1944, p.l 0. 
43 Matebian News, Vol. I, No.5, p.6. 
44 Herbert Feith, 1993 The East Timor Issue After the Capture of Xanana Gusmao, East Timor Talks 
Campaign, Melbourne, p.7 
45 "United Nations Move Further on East Timor", Matebian News, Vol.l , No.IO, February, 1994, p. 2. 
46 ibid. 
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per annum of Indonesian exports to the US were threatened unless Indonesia demonstrated a 
committrnent to labour rights, especially freedom of association47. 
America's confrontational handling of human rights issues in Asia has attracted criticism from 
Australia. Senator Evans criticised the US decision to link China's most favoured nation status to 
human rights activities, noting that Australia favoured the use of dialogue and international fora 
and believed that economic growth is the key to political freedoms48. Australian Ambassador to 
the US, Dr Don Russell, has questioned American handling of its relationship with Indonesia, 
particularly. He believes the US does not appreciate the importance of Indonesia in ASEAN and in 
the region49. In spite of the re-evaluation of what the US perceives to be its interests in the Asia 
Pacific region, the bilateral relationship with Australia remains strong50. 
Australia's geographical proximity to Indonesia has clearly led to it forming a different perspective 
on Indonesia's strength and importance to regional stability. Australia' s pragmatic approach to 
Indonesian rule in East Timor does not appear to match the more idealistic approach taken by the 
Clinton administration, with its emphasis on human rights. However McMahon argues that US 
concern over human rights masks an approach to Indonesia' s declining strategic importance which 
is based in realism, providing an excuse to disengage with the Suharto regime51. McGregor notes 
that by identifying democracy and human rights as security concerns in Asia, Washington has 
indicated it is concerned with how states in the region govern, and in who governs them52. Ruling 
elites are thus threatened for being anti-democratic, rather than protected as stable allies. 
Unfortunately this analysis is unlikely to be of comfort to Australia, which will almost certainly 
experience the effects of political upheaval in Indonesia. 
47 Feith, 1993, p.6-7. 
48 Joseph M. Siracusa, 1994 "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy January- July 1994", Australian 
Journal of Politics and History , Vol.40, No.3, p.300. 
49 Siracusa, 1994, p. 301. 
50 Paul Dibb cited in Siracusa, 1994, p.298. 
51 McMahon, 1994, p.1 0. 
52 Charles McGregor, 1993 "Southeast Asia's new Security Challenges", The Pacific Review, Vol.6. 
No.3, p.269. 
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Conclusion 
The changing face of government in Indonesia 
Much has changed since Indonesia first cast a covetous eye over East Timor. Not least is the position 
of the military in Indonesian political life. Although still pervasive, military influence in Suharto's 
government appears to be on the wane. A change in the international environment has made tacit 
support for Indonesia's position with regard to East Timor less certain. Continuing reports of human 
rights abuses by Indonesia in East Timor have attracted criticism from many quarters, including the 
European Union, the United States and New Zealand (however faint). There are indications that 
Indonesia recognises the status quo cannot be maintained; UN sponsored talks between Indonesia and 
Portugal over the future of the territory have resulted in an agreement by Indonesia to open informal 
links with Timorese opposed to Indonesian rule1. Indonesia is reducing the number of troops stationed 
in East Timor and is making an effort to make the remaining military presence less obvious2. Such 
actions are tactical concessions however, and do not necessarily indicate a change of attitude by Jakarta. 
Vatikiosis and Robison argue the military is divided over the extent to which it must redefine its role, 
and the ideological basis for its role, in order to ensure its continuing ability to influence government; 
it must address popular demands for a greater degree of democracy but is unwilling to initiate any 
reforms that might result in a reduction of its own power or lead to a questioning of its continued 
influence in civil affairs3. Persistent reports of atrocities committed in East Timor have highlighted 
tensions within the military leadership between those who recognise the need to address international 
criticism of Indonesia's human rights record, and those whose main concern remains the security and 
integrity of the Republic. The Dili massacre of November 1991 threw into sharp relief the difference 
between Indonesia's new image as an example of successful economic development and the repressive 
tactics used to maintain the image of political and economic stability. The closure in June 1994 of 
three weekly magazines critical of the government (Editor, Tempo, and De Tik) the subsequent protests 
and harsh police response hardly suggest that the government has resolved this internal argument or 
become any more accommodating of dissent since then. 
Robison notes the growth of important new social forces in Indonesia: a capital owning class, a middle 
class, a working class and a ubiquitous urban underclass of unemployed, underemployed and petty 
traders. He notes however that the groups which elsewhere have proven the progressive forces of 
Reuter News Service, "Indonesia Captures Timor Underground Leader" , May 20, 1994, Jakarta. 
2 Cohen 1993, p.24. 
3 Vatikiosis, 1993, p.76; Robison 1993, p.54. 
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democratic reform, the middle and capital owning classes, have been less effective in Indonesia where 
fears that a retreat from authoritarianism will engender instability predominates4. Changes in the global 
and local economic climate have serious implications for Indonesia's political order, however. The 
privileges accorded to senior military personnel, politicians and civil servants who controlled the 
monopolies which were characteristic of Indonesia's import-substituting development strategy are being 
curtailed. As Indonesia moves toward an export-oriented development strategy, foreign investment is 
becoming increasingly widespread5 and the influence of the state is declining. Greater reliance on 
foreign loans and investment has made the state susceptible to demands from foreign investors for 
reforms to the state apparatus to allow for better accountability and transparency6. 
Corea warns that the pressures of global capitalism are a powerful challenge to integrity of modern 
states, particularly less developed states. He writes: 
Third world countries are one by one becoming ungovernable. No matter what 
the complexion of the governments - right wing, left wing, democratic, 
military - they are all in situations of not being able to respond adequately to 
the expectations of their people; expectations aroused by the media, 
communications, education ... ? 
Reduced military influence in civil affairs will not necessarily bring about a change in the status of 
East Timor. As long as armed resistance by Timorese continues, the military will use this to justify 
their extensive security measures. The perpetuation of the Timor conflict has served many in the armed 
forces well. It has provided an opportunity for career-minded personnel to obtain field experience, 
invaluable when seeking promotionS. It has also enabled those who have limited career prospects in the 
armed forces to secure prestigious civilian positions on retirement; middle-ranking military personnel 
who serve for extended periods in East Timor are able to build up local bases of support and power9. 
The development of local power bases by military personnel has gone unchecked. The editors of the 
journal Indonesia, in their annual report on the Indonesian military, argue that the extent to which these 
power groups were operating independently from the central military command was evident at the time 
of the 1991 Dili massacre. Although Suharto publicly dismissed the two senior military personnel in 
East Timor, Brigadier-General Warouw and General Panjaitin, thereby distancing himself from those 
4 Robison, 1992, p. 338. 
5 Jonathan Rigg, 1991 Southeast Asia: A Region in Transition, Unwin Hyman Ltd., London, p.l82. 
6 Robison,1992, p.348. 
7 Gamani Corea, chair of the UNGA Committee on International Development Strategy for the 4th United 
Nations Development Decade - cited in Falk & Camilleri, 1992, p.57. 
8 Editors, Indonesia, 1993, p.l20. 
9 Editors, Indonesia, 1992, p.98. 
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who supported the hard line taken in Dili, the editors argue that the massacre occurred without their 
orders, and probably without their knowledge. Rather, it was ordered by local military commanders 
eager to discredit Warouw whose assigned task was to clean up the local military establishment. 
Indonesian military and administrative personnel may prove reluctant to give up their local interests and 
actively discourage efforts to resolve the conflict. 
President Suharto, in his twenty-ninth year in power in 1995, was under increasing pressure to 
resign.1 0 When his term in office ends in 1998, he will be 76 years of age. Although he continues to 
hold almost absolute constitutional and political authority in Indonesia, apparent tensions between 
Suharto and the military over the appointment of a successor, and Suharto' s efforts to replace key 
figures in the bureaucracy with civilian appointments, suggest he is unlikely to retain the support of 
the armed forces should he decide to stand for another term II. Furthermore, Suharto' s successor is 
unlikely to sustain the concentration of power currently invested in the presidency. 
No capacity to resolve the Timor conflict 
The conflict in East Timor has lost its ideological edge, if indeed it ever had one. As discussed in 
chapter four, FRETILIN did not identify itself as ideologically radical; left-wing radicalism was 
projected onto the organisation by Indonesia and others to provide justification for Indonesia' s 
reluctance to see East Timor become independent. Resistance against Indonesian rule is nationalist in 
character, and is also a protest against the structural dominance of Indonesians, and widespread 
corruption, which exclude East Timorese from power. There is no room for expression of political 
dissent in Indonesia's political system however, so the fight for social justice, like that for self-
determination, must occur outside the framework of civil debate. This means that protest by the 
Timorese is exactly the sort of threat to Indonesia's integrity which the military, in its dual role, is 
charged to counteract. But as long as Indonesia continues to use military tactics to quell political 
unrest, resistance to Indonesian rule will continue. Indonesia has indicated it is unwilling to make the 
fundamental changes in its political structure which would enable participation in government by the 
East Timorese to a degree which would address Timorese grievances and award a sufficient degree of 
autonomy to make calls for self-determination redundant. Taylor points out that in the case of East 
Timor, demands for recognition as a nation entail demands for state sovereignty as well12. Autonomy 
is not enough which creates a psychological barrier to reaching a settlement. 
10 James Dunn, Turnbull House, Wellington, June 29, 1994. 
II Murdoch, 1994. 
12 Taylor, 1989, p.190. 
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Nor is the government willing to make the psychological shift necessary to see the resistance of the 
East Timorese as a political protest which cannot be solved by measures aimed at improving the 
economic welfare of the East Timorese. Regional commander, Major General Adang Ruchiatna, said in 
1994 that the Timorese had been ungrateful for Indonesian development; that Jakarta had provided more 
money and resources to develop East Timor than any of its other 26 provinces; and that seven 
battalions of soldiers were in East Timor to improve the lives of the people13. He explicitly identified 
economic development as the key to addressing resistance, ignoring the legitimate legal and political 
grievances of the East Timorese. This fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of Timorese 
resistance does not bode well for attempts to resolve the conflict. Rather, it suggests that the cycle of 
resistance and repression will continue. 
The international community: not a catalyst for change 
Dunn has characterised the international response to Indonesia's annexation of East Timor as "a cruel 
conspiracy against a small and vulnerable people"l4. When decolonisation was initiated in East Timor 
by the Portuguese, support for Indonesian annexation was immediately forthcoming from Australia and 
the United States. Enthusiasm for the outcome of Indonesia's invasion and formal incorporation of the 
territory was masked by professed support for the right of the East Timorese to self-determination. 
Statements to this effect were made during the period of decolonisation by Portugal and following the 
invasion by Indonesia. 'Self-determination' can thus be understood to mean the right to freely decide the 
future political status of East Timor. Little has been done ensure the exercise of this right however. 
Unwillingness to actively support this principle stems from the perception that an integrated East 
Timor, and a stable Indonesia, is in the best interests of individual governments, be they strategic or 
economic interests . These interests tend to be defined narrowly, and therefore place narrow parameters 
around the response of governments. A broader definition of security and state interests might include 
political, cultural and social relations within other states as well as between them. The human rights 
debate is symptomatic of a broad approach to security. This approach oversteps the traditional bounds 
of international relations, which views states as the smallest unit of analysis and relegates 'domestic' 
affairs to other disciplines. It also challenges the power politics, or realist approach which 
governments tend to adopt. However, the pragmatic approach taken by members of the international 
community, coupled with the principles espoused by them, suggests that if an independent (or even 
autonomous within the Republic of Indonesia) East Timor comes to be seen as beneficial to the 
interests of the international community, active support for self-determination will become a feature of 
foreign policy. 
13 Lindsay Murdoch, 1994 "Timor Not Tamed, Indonesians Admit", The Age, April 18, p.11 . 
14 Dunn, 1983, p. xiii. 
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Because the status quo is perceived to be satisfactory, governments currently respond to allegations of 
human rights abuses by the Indonesian military, and reports of ongoing armed resistance by the East 
Timorese, as if East Timor is, de jure, a part of Indonesia. They are seen as a domestic issue. Thus, 
despite professed support for the principle of self-determination, Jakarta is the focus of efforts to 
improve the well-being of the Timorese. Better discipline in the military and economic development are 
prescribed as remedies for what is rotten in the province of East Timor. Other common features of the 
response of members of the international community - notably attempts to redefine events in East 
Timor, or deny a link between support for the Suharto regime and the actions of the military, in such a 
way that they do not implicate the government in the abuses. For example, Britain's assertion that 
military ties are not a contributing factor in human rights violations 15, and Gareth Evans argument 
that the Dili massacre was carried out by rogue elements in the armed forces 16. Governments are 
clearly sensitive about being seen to support a regime which perpetrates abuses of human rights, using 
equipment readily supplied by them. 
The catalyst for change in East Timor is unlikely to come from the international community, but 
from within Indonesia. Imminent changes in Indonesia' s political landscape offer the potential for East 
Timorese to assert their right to self-determination and express their dissatisfaction with the status quo. 
Whether this happens in a context of political upheaval and turmoil in Indonesia, or following a 
democratic process involving referenda, is unclear. What is clear is that the status quo is untenable. 
Resistance to Indonesian rule is persistent, and is costly for Jakarta. Resistance to Indonesian rule has 
become a part of the culture of East Timor. The sense of being an oppressed people is an important 
part of East Timorese identity. Such pivotal events as the capture of guerilla leader Xanana Gusmao, 
the murder of Sebastio Gomes 17 and the subsequent Dili massacre, provide a focus for Timorese 
frustrations . 
Taber argues that few governments can withstand the political, psychological and economic stresses of 
guerilla war, no matter how strong they are militarily IS. Indonesia is in the six-sided box described by 
15 op cit 
16opcit 
17 Following a memorial service for Sebastio Gomes who had been shot by Indonesian troops, mourners 
walked toward the Santa Cruz cemetary. Banners protesting Indonesian rule and calling for self-
determination, which had been prepared for the visit of a Portuguese parliamentary delegation (which had 
been cancelled), were unfurled during the procession. Indonesian troops opened fire on the mourners , 
although eyewitness Alan Nairn of New Yorker magazine said there was no provocation from the crowd who 
had arrived at the cemetary and were milling around peacefully - "In Cold Blood - The East Timor Massacre", 
Yorkshire Television, 1992. 
18 Taber 1969, p.27. 
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American official Sorenson, referring to the US position in the Vietnam war 19: the primacy of the 
Indonesian military cannot produce a complete victory, yet Jakarta's political primacy cannot permit a 
withdrawal; Jakarta cannot 'Indonesianise' the East Timorese, nor can it break their will to resist; 
escalation of the conflict risks censure from the international community, yet negotiations threaten the 
stability of the archipelagic state. 
Beyond the geo-politics and geo-economics which have formed the basis of the responses of Indonesia, 
Australia, New Zealand and others to the decolonisation of East Timor lie fundamental legal issues. 
Indonesia's invasion and occupation of East Timor are illegal. Although the international community 
has attempted to avoid addressing the questions raised by the conflict by behaving as if Indonesian 
control of East Timor is indeed irreversible and beyond its control , the conflict, and the questions, 
persist. How Timorese demands will be met, what the role of the United Nations will be, and who will 
respond first to calls for justice from the East Timorese people have yet to be decided. The answer to 
one question is clear: no, resistance to Indonesian rule cannot be crushed. 
The final statement of this dissertation belongs to Agio Pereira of the National Council for Maubere 
Resistance20: 
I believe, ultimately, that the Indonesian armed forces will have to withdraw and the 
Timorese people will finally exercise their right to self-determination and 
independence. I believe that one day Xanana Gusmao will come out of his Indonesian 
prison and lead a healthy, democratic and happy nation. He will be able to say, like 
Nelson Mandela said after the recent South African elections: Free at last! 
!9 Theodore Sorenson, adviser to President Kennedy, likened the US position to "a six-sided box which we 
did not intend to make and cannot seem to break". He described the box thus : "Our worldwide military primacy 
cannot produce a victory, and our worldwide political primacy cannot permit a withdrawal. We are unable to 
transfer our will to the South Vietnamese and unable to break the will of the North Vietnamese. Any Serious 
escalation would risk Chinese or Soviet intervention, and any serious negotiations would risk a Communist 
South Vietnam" - cited in Taber 1969, p.l5 . 
20 Agio Pereira, 1994 "Against Selective Amnesia: The Tragedy of East Timor", Evatt Papers, Vol. 2, No. I , 
p. l17 . 
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Appendix 
Progress on the Lictenstein Initiative on Self - Determination 
Outcome of the Informal Meeting of Experts, pursuant to the 19~1 UN General Assembly's Discussion of 
the Liechtenstein Proposal on Self-Determination._ 
The following is a Summary Report by the Chair. 
The informal Meeting of Experts was convened by the Government of Liechtenstein, and was held in 
Schaan, Liechtenstein, from 16 to 18 March 1993. The Government of Liechtenstein appointed Ambas-
sador Claudia Fritsche (Permanent Representative of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the United 
Nations) and Sir Arthur Watts QC (Adviser to the Government of Liechtenstein) jointly to take the Chair 
for t he Meeting . 
The purpose of the Meeting was to assist the Government of Liechtenstein in further developing 
the ideas in the matter of self-determination advanced initially by His Serene Highness Prince Hans-
Adam II, Head of State of the Principality of Liechtenstein, in his statement at the 46th session of the 
General Assembly in 1991, and further explained in subseql!ent statements by representatives of Liecht-
enstein . The meeting was attended by His Serene Highness and by 46 participants, nominated in their 
personal capacities by State Members of the Unit~d Nations and by States with Observer status, and by 
certain governmental and non-governmental organisations. 
Included in the documents wh ich participants had before them at the Meeting was a Memoran-
dum summarising the main elements of the suggestions being put forward by Liechtenstein. A copy of 
that Memorandum is attached . 
General discussion 
The meeting began with a general discussion of issues ra ised by the Liechtenstein initiative. Overall, it 
was widely welcomed by participants as a valuable contribution : problems having their roots in the frus-
trations of distinctive communities within States were recognised to be urgent and important. At the 
same t ime, it was recognised that the whole subject was of considerable sensitivity, and that some par-
ticular ideas gave rise to certain difficulties. 
Several participants noted that 'self-determination' was a complex concept, based on broad 
notions of democracy and the rights and liberties of individuals. 
It was also w idely commented that 'self-determination had primarily developed in the struggle 
against colonialism. and the eventual atta inment of independence in that context. But the concept had 
evolved, and its meaning in the modern world was more complex. A new generation of self-
determination problems had arisen. and the international community had to re-th ink its approach . Self-
determination now sometimes seemed to carry with it the danger of the fragmentation of States; this 
had to be avoided . The outcome of se lf-determination was not necessarily independence or border 
changes. 
The Liechtenste in initiative was widely seen as looking towards new law and new structures, and as 
opening up new developments in application of the principle of self-determination. While still w ith in 
the broad framework of that principle, and not necessarily excluding the attainment of independence. it 
was seen as being more related in practice to forms of development not going as far as independence 
or the break-up of States through secession or otherwise. 
It was noted that the Liechtenstein initiative put the emphasis on the development of new struc-
tures within the State, and in particular on forms of territorial decentralisation or autonomy (i.e. 'inter-
nal' self-determination, as compared with 'externa l' self-determination, w hich manifested itself in 
notions of independence and sovereignty). Several participants accordingly suggested possible advan-
tages in departing from the terminology of self-determination as the defining principle of the Liechten-
stein initiative. 
While some participants noted the possible danger that the Liechtenstein initiative cou ld be used to 
limit fu rther developments in self-determination and to defend the status quo, most saw it as without 
prejudice to that principle, as co-existing with it, and as indeed underpinning it ra ther than the reverse . 
Several participants noted that the questions arose as to whether, once a State had atta ined inde-
pendence through the exercise of the right of self-determination. groups within that State had a further 
right to self-determination for themselves - and then, perhaps, so on ad infinitum. Self-determination 
needed to be balanced against the need for new States to build their nationhood, and establish their 
internal stability. It was necessary to guard against the abuse of self-determination through the encour-
agement of separatism. 
The Meeting then turned to a consideration of a number of particular issues. 
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Concept of 'Community' 
There was general support, in principle, for the introduction of a new concept such as 'a community' as 
the basic unit in terms of which rights of autonomy might be developed. It was helpful in underlin ing 
the departure from existing ideas in this field, and was appropriate for the autonomy-related focus of 
the Liechtenstein initiative rather than for the independence-related focus of existing provisions on self-
determination. 
The need for a 'community' to be essentially territorially based was generally accepted. But poten-
tial difficulties of definition were identified in a number of areas. These included: the relationship with 
the notion of nationality; the territorial identity of a 'community', and the problems of covering commu-
nities which were territorially scattered or fluid, or living in cross-frontier areas; the distinctive qualities 
which a 'community' should possess; their size; the need for flexibility in definition, to take account of 
the varying factors which give a community its particular identity; the economic factors which ohen 
determine the identity of a community; and the relationship between the definition of a community and 
the degree of autonomy it possesses. 
The distinction between 'community' on the one hand, and 'minority' and 'indigenous people' on 
the other, was noted by many participants, as was the partial overlap between the various concepts. 
Emphasis in the Liechtenstein initiative on the position of communities was seen by a number of 
participants as placing it in the context of collective human rights . 
General safeguards 
Possible safeguards were seen by some participants as really involving the checks and ba lances wh ich 
would be necessary to make a new system work effectively. They were the forms through wh ich com-
promises could be sought. It was acknowledged that some checks and balances would be necessary. 
It was noted that 'safeguards' depended on the point of view: a safeguard for the interests of the 
State was not necessarily a safeguard for the interests of a community within the State. 
There were differing views on the need for some safeguard for the territorial integrity of States. 
Several participants attached importance to such reassurance for States, especially as in other similar 
contexts there was often such a safeguard to balance provisions tending towards the atta inment of 
independence or accordingly, any threat to a State's territorial integrity, and that therefore, a safeguard 
on this point was inappropriate. Others saw emphasis on the protection of territorial integrity as a way 
of frustrating the right to self-determination through independence. 
There was some reluctance to accept any prohibition on communities resort ing to force in order to 
achieve their ends so long as States were still able to use force against communit ies, even in merely 'law 
and order' circumstances. Also, force by communities might be justified (e.g . by oppression by State 
authorities). 
Several participants noted that democracy and the proper observance of human rights offered nec-
essary safeguards (or perhaps pre-conditions) for the effective exercise of the right of self-
determination. 
Avoidance of foreign interference was suggested as a possible safeguard . 
Some participants thought it best to avoid spelling out possible safeguards in detail : deta ils would 
be best left to be worked out by the parties concerned, in the light of the 'genius of the people'. 
Automatic, initial level of autonomy; 
Optional, subsequent levels of autonomy 
The automatic initial level of autonomy was conceived as comprising the basic rights needed to safe-
guard and enhance a community's existence, and protect its separate identity w ith in the fabric of the 
State. The optional subsequent levels of autonomy allowed for progressive additions to the degree to 
which the community conducted its own affa irs . 
Autonomy- like sovereignty and independence -was widely acknowledged not to be an 'a ll or 
nothing' concept, but rather one allowing for a gradual evolution and variable structures. The flexibility 
of the Liechtenstein initiative in this respect was widely welcomed . 
Autonomy was thought to be a valuable concept, offering a socio-political structure wh ich could 
help in the search for higher levels of freedom for individuals. But some noted that autonomy cou ld also 
be divisive, as compared with the development of multicultural States: all groups w ith in such States 
were in many respects interdependent. 
Many participants noted that emphases on autonomy helpfully avoided, or at least severely limited, 
problems which could arise with proposals emphasising the atta inment of independence. tvlany com-
munities would not want independence, but would be satisfied w ith something considerably less, so 
long as it allowed sufficient expression for a community's own identity. Autonomy could therefore be an 
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adequate expression of self-determination, without necessarily undermining other forms of self-
determination . 
The relationship of a·utonomy and federalism was noted by some participants. 
A number of participants thought that a linear approach to various stages of autonomy (with each 
stage, with the addition of extra elements, leading on to the next stage), could be too rigid: a more 
flexible, a Ia carte, approach might be better, allowing communities to suit their progress more exactly 
to their needs: the reality was likely to be a process of constant dialogue, leading to all kinds of develop-
ment in many different directions. · 
Other pertinent issues 
Many participants referred to the need for mechanisms to support any new arrangements which might 
be introduced, in order to secure their effectiveness in practice. 
It was noted, and widely welcomed, that the underlying purpose of the Liechtenstein initiative 
appeared to be to find ways of avoiding the conflicts which often arose through communities not being 
allowed adequate means of self-expression. In that context several participants thought that an 'early 
warning system' was needed, to identify situations in which such conflicts might erupt. 
It was noted that civil wars within States were often more a matter of differences between political 
leaders than of conflicting aspirations of differing groups within States. The real causes of internal con-
flicts needed study. 
Several participants noted that at present there were no adequate mechanisms to help with self-
determination issues. Many saw value in establishing new fora, or a new procedural framework, for 
such issues, including dispute settlement problems which could arise in that context. Mechanisms for 
coordination were thought useful by some participants. 
The establishment of some kind of international advisory centre was suggested, to which Govern-
ments and communities could turn for advice on possible options for governmental structures appropri-
ate for the particular self-determination problems they faced. 
Sorne participants warned against the establishment of new inter governmental institutions, with-
out a very clear idea of what functions they would fulfil : there were already some existing institutions 
with functions in at least part of this field . Optional mechanisms or processes might offer a more useful 
way forward; as might the encouragement of private law bodies which could be active in this field. 
New York, 
20 September 1993 
Source: Herb.Feith, 1993, The East Timor Issue Since the Capture ofXanana Gusmao, East Timor 
Talks Campaign, Melbourne. 
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